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

NARRATIVE
OF THE
BATTLE OF JUTLAND.

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NARRATIVE

OF THE

BATTLE OF JUTLAND.

LONDON:
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ABBREVIATIONS, &c.

All times are Greenwich Mean Time.

Courses and bearings are magnetic except when they are reckoned from 0 to 360 degrees.

F.J. = The Fighting at Jutland, 1921, edited by H. W. Fawcett and G. W. W. Hooper.

G.F. = The Grand Fleet, 1914–16, by Admiral, Viscount Jellicoe of Scapa, G.C.B., O.M., G.C.V.O.

J.P. = Battle of Jutland, May 30th to June 1st. Official Despatches with Appendices (Command Paper No. 1068, published 1920).

German I etc., refers to the numbered charts of German movements from Admiral Scheer's report issued with the official Jutland Papers.

(r) = reports from individual ships or Admirals to be found in the Command Paper.

(l) = ship's log.

(s) = signal log.

(w) = wireless log.

(w/e) = wireless entry log.

Scheer = Germany's High Sea Fleet in the World War, 1920, by Admiral Scheer.

Hase = Kiel and Jutland, being the English translation of Die Zwei Weissen Volken by Commander Georg von Hase, First Gunnery Officer of *S.M.S. Derfflinger*, translated by Arthur Chambers and F. A. Holt.

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INTRODUCTION.

1. The Battle of Jutland must appear to many as a grey mass of ships manœuvring in and out of the battle smoke with no possibility of ascertaining their movements with clear and definite precision. To attempt to do so is certainly no light task. The official reports of individual captains represent only an effort, often necessarily hasty, to reduce the observations of a number of observers into one story; and similarly the despatches of the admirals can be regarded only as a provisional attempt to reduce the reports of individual captains to a single focus.

From a historical point of view both must be regarded merely as rapid preliminary surveys. By their very nature they could be no more, for a complete survey requires the careful and critical examination of every source of information—every log, every signal log, every individual report.

But in a battle where 154 British flags and pendants were flying, this in itself is a heavy and laborious task, and when in addition it is remembered that in the case of most ships the signal volumes alone number at least three or four[1] and the total number of volumes runs into hundreds, the mere physical labour of arrangement and custody is a considerable item of work.

2. The ships' logs and signal logs in conjunction with the official reports may be regarded as the principal sources available.

Even where there is sufficiency of information, visual discrepancies in time and place arise. Times differ in different ships and in the same ship the times of different observers may differ, and different observers see the same incident from different points of view. One sees the destruction of the *Indefatigable* in the explosion of the bursting salvos, another in the disappearance of her hull beneath the waves.

On the whole, however, the discrepancies in time are not very serious. The wireless logs rarely differ by more than two or three minutes and in many cases are synchronous.

In addition to the difficulty of establishing relative positions, discrepancies which occur in reckoning introduce an element of complexity, for three positions have to be considered. For instance, in the case of the bearing of the *Iron Duke* and *Lion* when they were approaching one another at 5.30, there are the *Iron Duke's* reckoning position, the *Iron Duke's* actual position, and the *Iron Duke's* bearing according to the *Lion's* reckoning all to be considered in arriving at an estimate of the situation.

3. The signal and wireless logs constitute another valuable source. All the signals made have been collated in a record of

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[1] Signal and Wireless, Odd Day and Even Day, Auxiliary Wireless and Wireless Entry. In the case of the *Iron Duke* there were some seven or eight volumes kept, of which a number were wireless entry registers.

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messages[1], and the work has been carefully done, but one or two signals of minor importance are not to be found in it, and in some cases the time of receipt has become merged in the time of origin.

In the case of the *Lion*, a fire apparently destroyed a number of the original forms. A careful compilation of material from the ship's logs, signal logs, and reports of all ships which embodies all the relevant information they contain was made by Captain J. E. T. Harper's Committee, and a complete compilation of all the material in ships' logs has also been made by Lieutenant-Commander J. F. H. Pollen (Historical Section, C.I.D.).

4. The next large collection consists of the Admirals' despatches and the reports of individual ships. These were photostated for Captain Harper's use in 1920, but have become more readily accessible in the Jutland Papers.[2]

It should be noted that the Commander-in-Chief's first despatch and plan is dated June 18th, 1916. Three tracings were also sent at different times by the Commander-in-Chief, the first dated June 18th, 1916, with the report of June 18th, 1916; a second, dated June 19th, 1916, sent on July 8th, 1916; and a third sent on August 29th, 1916. These tracks differ in the adjustment of the track of the battle cruisers to that of the Battle Fleet. The Jutland Papers give the Plans of June 18th, 1916 (Plan 1A), and of August 29th, 1916 (Plan 4A).[3]

5. In addition to these sources, Captain J. E. T. Harper's record and diagrams of the battle have been of very great assistance and really represent the first stage of this work. But as there is no such thing as finality in historical work, so there are certain points where the record is considered open to revision, more particularly in its representation of the movements and courses of the German fleet which differ widely from those of Admiral Scheer. Until the German Staff account of the battle is issued, a certain element of uncertainty must surround the German movements, but Admiral Scheer's report and diagrams provide a large amount of reliable material, and pending further information must be accepted as the nearest approach to accuracy, though they contain some obvious errors.

It is certain, for instance, that at 7.15 p.m., when the German fleet turned away the second time, the First Squadron was practically in line with the Third Squadron, otherwise the turn of the *Friedrich der Grosse* to port, specifically stated and clearly explained in Admiral Scheer's book,[4] would be meaningless. These

[1] This is the source of the signals in Jutland Official Despatches (1920), Appendix II.

[2] Command Paper No. 1068, published 1920.

[3] Since the publication of the Command Paper in 1920, Lord Jellicoe has expressed the opinion that while he does not consider either plan to be completely accurate, the later plan of August 29, 1916, is the more correct of the two. The note on page 51 of the Jutland Papers is, therefore, not correct.

[4] English translation, p. 158.

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courses have been carefully revised with the assistance of Lieutenant-Commander J. F. H. Pollen, and the diagrams attached to the narrative are based on this revision.

6. It has not been considered necessary to attach a complete plan showing the continuous track of each ship; nor is it altogether desirable. A plan of this sort is necessary in the historical reconstruction of the battle as a norm or standard to test the reliability of particular statements, but it must not be regarded as more than the adjustment of a number of varying observations to a general mean. In some cases the course of a ship or squadron is certain, in others less certain, in others again it is largely supposititious. A continuous track of a battle tends by its very nature to convey an impression of absolute accuracy which may be very misleading unless accompanied by a critical commentary assessing the relative degree of credence to be given to particular portions of it, and it is considered that a commentary of this sort would overload this narrative. Also a complete and continuous track of the movements of all vessels in a battle, however desirable, may not always be possible. If the incident is on a small scale, and the facts were accurately recorded, it is easy to construct such a track. But when the incident is on a very large scale or the facts are not recorded[1] or are insufficiently or inaccurately recorded, then it is better to confine oneself to the main outlines of the battle. For instance, in the case of destroyer actions at night, the information is generally so scanty that only an approximate plan of the movements can be reproduced.[2]

Where discrepancies occur in time, courses, ranges and bearings, these all have to be adjusted so as to harmonise with one another and with criterions of possibility and probability. The final adjustment which gives a generally correct view of the battle is not based on any one record, but is more of the nature of a complicated mosaic or puzzle picture whose composition requires a great deal of knowledge, skill and patience—how much can only be known to those who have tried it. When the general variations in time have been ascertained by a study of the logs and records there remain three elements of place to be adjusted—the geographical position in latitude and longitude, the relative position of the enemy, and the relative position of one's own squadron and ships. In Captain Harper's diagrams the latitude and longitude of the *Invincible*, subsequently ascertained by careful survey, have been used as a datum point, and the position of the *Iron Duke* adjusted to it. For the relative position of

---

[1] To carry the argument to its extreme limit, it is useless to attempt to draw an accurate track of each ship in the Battle of Salamis. The information is not there.

[2] The movements of some of the 12th Flotilla during the attack on the German 2nd Squadron must remain uncertain, and the individual reports of the destroyers of the 11th Flotilla were not sent in by the Captain (D).

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the enemy there are numerous bearings and ranges, but the bearings were usually in terms of red or green, and the ranges were as a general rule rapid rangefinder observations on a misty day and not carefully surveyed distances.

In the case of the relative positions of our own ships and squadrons, the number of observations recorded is small.[1]

For these reasons it has been thought better to confine the narrative to diagrams of the more important phases of the battle, which are also simpler and clearer than a continuous track.

Lord Jellicoe's "Grand Fleet" has been used to supplement the despatches, and mention should be made of "The Fighting at Jutland," a valuable collection of personal narratives largely based on notes made during the action, compiled by Lieutenants H. W. Fawcett and G. W. W. Hooper.

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[1] For the relative position of the Battle Fleet and Battle Cruiser Fleet between 7 p.m. and 8 p.m., there are only four recorded observations, viz., *Minotaur* at 7.10 p.m. (J.P. p. 272) and at 8 p.m. (*Minotaur's* track, J.P. Plate 24), *Shannon* at 6.58 (J.P. p. 280) and *Calliope* at 7.28 (J.P. p. 385). Again there was considerable bunching in the Battle Fleet during deployment, but the observations are too few to enable one to plot it.

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CHAPTER I.

PRELIMINARY MOVEMENTS.

MAY 28th–30th.

1. The appointment of Admiral Reinold Scheer to command the High Sea Fleet in place of Admiral von Pohl was the first sign of a more offensive German policy. As Admiral Commanding the Second Squadron he had chafed at the inactivity of the fleet and had advocated a bolder strategy. His star was now in the ascendant. He received his formal appointment as Commander-in-Chief of the High Sea Fleet on January 18th, 1916, and in February proceeded to Berlin to a conference with the Chief of the Naval Staff, Admiral von Holtzendorff, where it was decided to adopt bolder measures.[1] Victory on land had not been achieved; the pressure of the blockade was being keenly felt; and it was hoped that the fleet by resolute and skilful sorties might do something to break the enemy's stranglehold by sea. The Emperor in person visited Admiral Scheer's flagship and publicly expressed approval of his policy.

Admiral Scheer was a strong advocate of ruthless submarine warfare, and he had hardly been in command a month when the attack on the *Sussex*[2] led to an outburst of neutral feeling and to a decisive note from President Wilson threatening to break off relations with Germany. The German Government temporarily abandoned the idea of ruthless warfare, and issued orders on April 24th that the submarine campaign was to be conducted in accordance with the Prize regulations involving visit, search and capture in due form. Admiral Tirpitz resigned. Admiral Scheer, then at sea on his way to bombard Lowestoft, recalled all submarines and announced that the campaign had ceased. This placed a number of submarines at his disposal, and plans were now drawn up for co-operation with them based primarily on the stratagem of enticing out the Grand Fleet and attacking it with submarines in the vicinity of the East Coast.

It was intended at first to despatch a Battle Cruiser Squadron to bombard Sunderland in order to draw out the British fleet, which was then to be attacked by submarines stationed on the East Coast and, if a favourable opportunity presented itself, by the High Sea Fleet itself.[3] The exits from the British bases were to be mined. Sixteen U boats and a half-dozen boats of the Flanders Flotilla were to be stationed in suitable positions with orders to remain at their posts from May 23rd to June 1st, reporting any movements of British ships, and seizing any favourable opportunity for attack. Clear weather was, however,

[1] Scheer, p. 105.
[2] March 25th, 1916.
[3] Scheer, p. 134.

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an essential condition for an operation of this sort, for air reconnaissance would be necessary to give the High Sea Fleet ample warning of the approach and composition of any British force. Unfortunately, a spell of bad weather had set in: day after day the airship commander reported air reconnaissance impossible, and the Commander-in-Chief finally decided to try the less risky operation of enticing the British fleet out by a sortie in the direction of the Skagerak and the coast of Norway.[1]

The submarines had been ordered to take up their position by May 23rd, and as they were only to remain out till June 1st, this became the last day for any operation in conjunction with them. On May 30th, therefore, the High Sea Fleet was ordered to be in the outer roads of Wilhelmshaven by 7.0 p.m. Thirteen submarines were by this time lying off the British coast,[2] and U.75, after laying on May 29th off the West coast of Orkney the mines which were to sink the *Hampshire* and lead to Lord Kitchener's untimely end, was on her way home.

2. These precursory movements had not been made without attracting attention. The British Admiralty was already on the alert. On May 16th and 17th there had been indications of the departure of nine submarines, an incident sufficiently unusual in itself to arouse attention, and as several days elapsed without any sinkings being reported, it became clear that some special movement was afoot. But its precise nature still remained obscure, and there was nothing tangible to indicate that it was part of a larger operation to be carried out in direct conjunction with the High Sea Fleet.

By May 28th, however, it became clear that some considerable movement was on foot, and at noon on May 30th a message was sent to the Commander-in-Chief, Grand Fleet, that there were indications of the German fleet proceeding out. The position still remained obscure, but steps were taken to meet the contingency. Harwich destroyers and minesweeping sloops on the East Coast were recalled, and Commodore (S) was ordered to have all submarines ready for sea. At 5.16 p.m. a message went off to the Commander-in-Chief, and Senior Officer, Battle Cruiser Fleet, to raise steam, followed by a further wire at 5.40 p.m. ordering the fleet to concentrate to eastward of Long Forties[3] ready for eventualities. The operations had begun.

Disposition of the Fleet.[4]

3. The Grand Fleet on this date was distributed between Scapa Flow, Invergordon and Rosyth.

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[1] Scheer, p. 135.

[2] Off Scapa, U. 43, 44; off Kinnaird Head, U. 47; off the Forth, U. 66, U. 63, U. 51, U. 32, U. 24, U. 70, U. 52; on the way to the Tyne, U. 24; off the Humber, U. B.22, U. 21; south of Dogger Bank, U. 67. Scheer's Diagram, German II in J.P.

[3] Long Forties lies about 60 miles east of Scottish Coast. Sent to Commander-in-Chief and Senior Officer, Battle Cruiser Fleet, at 5.40 p.m., May 30th.

[4] For details *see* Appendix A.

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The major portion was with the Commander-in-Chief at Scapa Flow, including the 1st and 4th Battle Squadrons and 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron, with the 2nd Cruiser Squadron (only organised that day from the 2nd and 7th Cruiser Squadrons) and the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron. With them were the 4th Flotilla, part of the 11th Flotilla (*Castor* and 4 destroyers), the 12th Flotilla, and the seaplane carrier *Campania*.

At Invergordon were the 2nd Battle Squadron, the 1st Cruiser Squadron, and part of the 11th Flotilla (*Kempenfelt* and 9 destroyers).

Vice-Admiral Sir David Beatty was at Rosyth with the *Lion* and 1st and 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadrons. The 5th Battle Squadron was there, too, with the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Light Cruiser Squadrons and the 1st Flotilla (*Fearless* and 9 destroyers), the 13th Flotilla (*Champion* and 10 destroyers), part of the 9th Flotilla (4 destroyers), and part of the 10th Flotilla (4 destroyers); also the seaplane carrier *Engadine*.

The usual preparations for leaving harbour ensued, and at the various ports the fleets began to raise steam.[1]

Before sailing, a message from the Admiralty stated that the eight submarines which had sailed between May 16th and 20th were believed to be still in the North Sea, and during the afternoon and evening several reports were received from ships sighting enemy submarines. At 12.30 p.m. a torpedo fired at the *Gentian*, outside Scapa Flow, had missed.

The Commander-in-Chief had now to arrange for the concentration of his forces. He decided to proceed to a rendezvous in Lat. 57° 45′ N., Long. 4° 15′ E., 240 miles from Scapa, and sent a telegram at 7.37 p.m. to Admiral Beatty informing him of this position and directing him to proceed with the 5th Battle Squadron to a position in Lat. 56° 40′ N., Long. 5° E. (260 miles from the Forth). If he had no news of the enemy by 2 p.m. he was to stand towards the Commander-in-Chief, who would steer for Horns Riff. Sir David Beatty was also informed that the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron, *Chester* and *Canterbury*, would leave with the Commander-in-Chief, but might be sent on to the battle cruiser rendezvous.[2]

The Commander-in-Chief states[3] that he felt no anxiety in regard to the advanced position of Sir David Beatty's force,[4] for, supported by the 5th Battle Squadron, it could hold its own

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[1] At Rosyth, signal 5.45 p.m., steam for 22 knots; at Invergordon, signal 6.5 p.m., for 18 knots; at Scapa, 5.40 p.m., preparatory signal, which included orders to raise steam for 18 knots; 7.5 p.m., Battle Fleet raise steam for 19 knots; at 6.25 p.m., 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron for 22 knots; at 7 p.m., cruisers and destroyers for 20 knots.

[2] Commander-in-Chief to Senior Officer, Battle Cruiser Fleet, 7.37 p.m., received 8.15 p.m.

[3] Despatch, June 18th, 1916 (J.P. p. 1).

[4] Admiral Beatty's rendezvous was 69½ miles 159° from that of the Battle Fleet.

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against the 1st Scouting Group, the only force able to compete with it in speed.

The Harwich Force.

4. Just before 6 p.m. the Commander-in-Chief was informed by the Admiralty that the Harwich Forces and 3rd Battle Squadron lying in the Swin would not be sent out till more was known.[1]

5. Meanwhile the various portions of the fleet had left harbour, and by 10.30 p.m. on May 30th the whole force was at sea. The Grand Fleet under Sir John Jellicoe had cleared Hoxa by 10.15 p.m., leaving the harbour almost empty. Only the *Royal Sovereign*, recently commissioned, the seaplane carrier *Campania*, and three destroyers were left behind.[2]

The *Iron Duke* shaped course S. 73° E. at 17 knots. At 1.47 a.m.[3] the cruisers formed a disposition No. 1[4] with some modifications arising from the recent formation of the 2nd Cruiser Squadron. The 1st and 2nd Cruiser Squadrons were spread 10 miles ahead of the Battle Fleet, and the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron 10 miles ahead of the cruisers.

One or two reports of submarines came in during the night. The *Trident* had been attacked by one[5] off the Forth at 7.45 p.m., and another had been seen on May 30th at 11.15 a.m., 45 miles east of Aberdeen,[6] both belonging to the German force sent out in conjunction with the coming sortie, but the Battle Fleet saw nothing and the night passed without any incident.

At dawn, the Battle Fleet formed divisions in line ahead disposed abeam to starboard, columns eight cables apart, the 3rd Division on the port hand, and the 4th, 5th and 6th Divisions on its beam. At 9 a.m. speed was reduced from 17 to 16 knots,[7] and shortly afterwards contact was effected with the cruisers of the 2nd Battle Squadron from Invergordon. At 11.15 a.m. this squadron joined[8] and took station in the port beam of the fleet. At noon the *Iron Duke* was in Lat. 58° 09′ N., Long.

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[1] Admiralty to Commander-in-Chief, 5.55 p.m., May 30th.

[2] There were left only the *Royal Sovereign* of the 1st Battle Squadron, which had arrived at Scapa on May 25th newly commissioned, the destroyer *Victor* of the 4th Flotilla, the *Phœnix* of the 1st Flotilla, the *Nepean* of the 13th, and the *Campania*.

[3] Senior Officer Cruisers, to Cruisers, 1.47 a.m.

[4] This disposition had been ordered before leaving harbour, but the cruisers were directed not to spread till daylight.

In Cruising Disposition No. 1, with centre of screen 10 miles ahead of Battle Fleet, and 5th Battle Squadron absent, the Armoured Cruisers were spread five miles apart, seven miles ahead of the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron, which was three miles ahead of the Battle Fleet.

[5] Probably U. 32.

[6] Probably U. 66.

[7] Courses and speeds :—Courses, S. 79° E. to 1.30 a.m., S. 73° E. to 5 a.m., S. 50° E. to 3 p.m.; Speeds, 17 knots to 9 a.m., 16 knots (speed of advance 15 knots) to noon, 17 knots 2.43 p.m., 18 knots 2.52 p.m.

[8] In Lat. 58° 12′ N., Long. 2° 42′ E., 58 miles from the Battle Fleet's rendezvous.

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DIAGRAM I.

DISPOSITION OF BATTLE CRUISER FLEET (LION)

AT NOON MAY 31ST

(BY SIGNAL 10·05 A.M.)

2ND B.C.S. N.E (31°) 3 MILES, 5TH B.S. N.W. (301°) 5 MILES FROM LION; LION'S COURSE. S.81° E. (85°); CENTRE OF SCREEN E BY S. (87°) FROM LION, 8 MILES; LINE OF DIRECTION OF SCREEN N.E. (31°) AND S.W. (211°). 5 MILES APART.

AND RE-DISPOSITION ORDERED

(BY SIGNAL 1·30 P.M.)

2ND B.C.S. E.N.E. (54°) 3 MILES; 5TH B.S. N.N.W. (324°) 5 MILES CENTRE OF SCREEN, S.S.E. 8 MILES FROM LION. LINE OF DIRECTION OF SCREEN E.N.E. (54°) AND W.S.W (234°)



318 WT 10737A /250/ 618.1500.6.24.
411 WT 9568 A /679. 1000 8 24

H.M.S.O., Cr., Lith.

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2° 59′ E.[1] (position obs.) and reduced to 15 knots with a speed of advance of 14. The fleet had been steering S. 50° E. since 5 a.m. and by 2 p.m. the *Iron Duke* had reached a position according to her reckoning in Lat. 57° 57′ N., Long. 3° 46′ E.[2] The rendezvous for 2 p.m. was in Lat. 57° 45′ N., Long. 4° 15′ E., and she was still 19½ miles from it, or over an hour late. The fleet had been zigzagging since 2.35 a.m., but this, of course, had been allowed for, and it was the examination of neutral trawlers that had caused the delay.[3]

The Battle Cruiser Fleet.

6. Meanwhile the Battle Cruiser Fleet,[4] zigzagging on a course S. 81° E., was approaching the two o'clock rendezvous (56° 40′ N., 5° E.). It had cleared the Forth by 11 p.m. and had gone at 18 knots through the night, increasing to 19½ knots at 2.45 a.m., and reducing to 19 at 4 a.m. The cruisers had taken up disposition No. 6 on passing May Island, and were disposed at noon on a line of direction 31° with the centre of the screen 87° from the *Lion*,[5] and the *Galatea* and *Phaeton* at the north-east end of the line (Diagram 1).

Several reports of submarines in the North Sea had been received. The *Trident* had reported being attacked by one off the Forth[6] in the evening.

There were actually no less than seven submarines lying off the Forth, but none of them appear to have attacked the Battle Cruiser Fleet on its way out.

The *Galatea* in the early morning reported a torpedo fired at her at 3.55 a.m.,[7] and the *Yarmouth* and *Turbulent* made similar reports during the forenoon,[8] the former involving the fleet in an eight-point turn to port for 20 minutes, but nothing in the shape of a submarine was seen by the larger ships. At

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[1] J.P., Plate 6A. J.P. makes *Iron Duke's* longitude at noon 3° 0′ E., but signals 12.40 p.m. and 1.5 p.m. give 2° 59′ E. Her position deduced from mean of all ships' noon positions was 58° 7′ N., 3° 1′ 30″, *i.e.*, 2¼ miles. S.S.E. (mag.) from her reckoning.

[2] J.P., Plate 6A, *Iron Duke's* track.

[3] "The Fleet had been slightly delayed to enable the usual and necessary practice of examining trawlers and other vessels met with *en route* to be carried out." G.F., p. 319.

[4] Comprising 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron, 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron, 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron, 1st Flotilla, 13th Flotilla, 9th Flotilla (part), 10th Flotilla (part), 5th Battle Squadron and *Engadine*.

[5] At 10.02 a.m. the line of direction had been altered to 31°, centre to bear 87° from *Lion*. The 5th Battle Squadron at the same time took station five miles 301° (N.W.) and 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron three miles 31° (N.E.) from *Lion*.

[6] Probably U. 32.

[7] Possibly by U. 32, which at 6.50 a.m. G.M.T. reported two battleships and two cruisers in 56° 15′ N., 0° 42′ W. U. 32 had been out since May 18th and her position may have been considerably out.

[8] *Yarmouth* in about 56° 40′ N., 1° 55′ E.; *Turbulent* at 9.8 a.m. in about 56° 42′ N., 2° 5′ E. There is no trace of any German submarines in these vicinities in any enemy record hitherto available.

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noon the *Lion's* estimated position was 56° 44′ N., 3° 45′ E.,[1] though she was actually some 5½ miles to the north-westward of it. At 1.30 p.m. the line of direction of the cruiser line was swung through 23° to 54° (E.N.E.) with its centre bearing 144° (S.S.E.) from the *Lion*. At the same time the bearing of the 5th Battle Squadron was altered to 324° (N.N.W.) five miles and that of the 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron to 54° (E.N.E.) three miles (Diagram 1). The *Lion*, like the *Iron Duke*, was behind time, and at 2 p.m., according to her reckoning, was still some 10 miles to westward of her rendezvous.

The Enemy in Sight.

7. The Vice-Admiral had orders if nothing was in sight to close the Battle Fleet, and at 1.58 p.m. the signal had already been made to alter to N. by E. at 2.15 p.m. Ten minutes later the *Galatea* at 2.10 p.m. sighted a steamer bearing 95° some eight miles away, blowing off steam and apparently stopped, and closed to examine her. The light cruisers were taking up their new line of direction and the Vice-Admiral at 2.15 p.m. had already turned to N. by E. to get in touch with the Commander-in-Chief, and had told the 5th Battle Squadron to look out for the latter's cruisers. Five minutes later the *Galatea* at 2.20 p.m. made the signal "Enemy in sight," at the same time sending the following signal by wireless: "Urgent. Two cruisers probably hostile in sight bearing E.S.E. course unknown. My position Lat. 56° 48′ N., Long. 5° 21′ E.[2]" (Diagram 2.)

But the *Galatea* was closing the suspicious craft and at 2.28 p.m. her guns opened fire. The whole situation was now assuming a new aspect. The Vice-Admiral turned at 2.32 p.m. and increased speed to 22 knots with the intention of cutting the enemy off from Horns Riff. His cruisers without further orders began to close the *Galatea*.

Movements of the German Fleet.

8. The vessels seen were the German destroyers B. 109 and B. 110, which were in company with the 2nd Scouting Group, and had stopped to examine a merchant ship. The German cruiser force[3] had left the Jade at 2 a.m., followed at 2.30 a.m. by the Main Fleet. The latter included the 2nd Battle Squadron with its six ships, five of the *Deutschland*, and one of *Braunschweig* class (four 11 in.). They were slow and ill-armed,

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[1] The signalled and other positions have been carefully reduced to positions observed and D.R., and a mean of positions observed places *Lion* at noon in Lat. 56° 46′ N., Long 3° 36½′ E.

[2] *Galatea's* log says: "2.07 p.m. sighted enemy T.B.D.'s." *Engadine* remarks: "2.20 sighted two enemy cruisers bearing East."

[3] For constitution *see* Appendix B. The 2nd Scouting Group consisted of *Frankfurt* (Rear-Admiral Boedicker), *Wiesbaden*, *Pillau*, *Elbing*. The *Regensburg*, Commodore Heinrich, Second Senior Officer (T), was with them.

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318 WT 10734/230/6m.
4/1 WT 3569/6/9



BATTLE CRUISER FLEET.

POSITION AT 2·20 P.M.

"ENEMY IN SIGHT."

1ST L.C.S. NOT YET IN POSITION ORDERED AT 1·30 P.M.

SCALE OF NAUTICAL MILES.

0 5 10

DIAGRAM 2.

H.M.S.O.Cr.Lith.

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DIAGRAM 3.

DISPOSITION OF 1ST & 2ND SCOUTING GROUPS.

2 P.M.



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411. W.T. 9568A/619

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and Admiral Scheer had not intended to take them with him, but when the time came sentiment prevailed over reason, and he gave way to the Admiral and officers of his old squadron when they begged him not to leave them behind. The battle cruisers were to proceed to the Naze and show themselves there on the evening of May 31st, in the hope that the Grand Fleet would put to sea to intercept them and give the submarines lying in wait an opportunity to attack. The main body of the High Sea Fleet was to pick them up on the morning of June 1st. The battle cruisers drew rapidly away on their separate quest, and between 11.30 noon and 1 p.m. no fewer than five airships were despatched for reconnaissance, but owing to poor visibility they saw nothing of the British fleet nor did they hear or see anything of the engagement.[1] The German Commander-in-Chief was not left, however, without intelligence of the British movements. At 5.29 a.m. U. 32 reported two battleships, two cruisers and destroyers in a position 56° 15′ N., 0° 43′ W., approximately 60 miles east of May Island.[2] At 6 a.m. Neumünster[3] reported that two battleships or battle squadrons had just left Scapa Flow, and at 6.47 a.m. U. 66 sighted eight battleships[4] in 57° 45′ N., 0° 7′ W., about 60 miles east of Kinnaird Head. In Admiral Scheer's opinion the information was too vague to affect his plan. The forces seemed too far apart and their courses too divergent to be associated with an advance into the Bight or to have any connection with his enterprise. He continued his course, and at 2.30 p.m. the main body of the High Sea Fleet was well past Horns Riff with the Scouting Groups some 50 miles ahead. Spread ahead of the 1st Scouting Group in a fan formation were the four light cruisers of the 2nd Scouting Group, accompanied by the *Regensburg*, Second Senior Officer (T), and the 11th and 12th Half Flotillas. The *Elbing* was to westward on the port hand (Diagram 3). About 2.15 p.m. the latter sighted a neutral steamer and detached a couple of destroyers, B. 109 and B. 110, to examine it. At 2.28,[5] while busy with this task, they observed smoke to the westward, and shortly afterwards sighted enemy vessels steering east. The *Elbing* immediately closed to investigate, followed by the *Frankfurt*, *Pillau* and *Wiesbaden*. The squadrons were in touch, and their general position at 2.30 p.m. is shown in Diagram 4.

The "Galatea" in touch (2.30—3.30 p.m.).

9. At 2.28 the *Galatea*, making to the eastward, opened fire on the two destroyers, which made off to the northward, and a few minutes later sighted the *Elbing* coming down on a S.S.E.

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[1] Admiral Scheer's despatch, J.P. p. 589.
[2] This was the Battle Cruiser Fleet.
[3] The German W/T station.
[4] The 2nd Battle Squadron.
[5] Scheer, p. 141.

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course.[1] The German cruiser opened fire at 15,000 yards (Diagram 5). The *Galatea* and *Phaeton* altered course to the N.E., and then at 2.37 p.m. turned sharp round to the N.W., the 2nd Scouting Group following them in pursuit seven miles astern.

Two more cruisers of the 2nd Scouting Group were now in sight, and a large amount of smoke was visible to the E.N.E.[2] This was evidently a force some 15 miles to the eastward, and Admiral Beatty now felt confident that the enemy were to the north-eastward and could be brought to action before reaching Horns Riff.

The *Inconstant* and *Cordelia*, the cruisers next to the *Galatea*, were hurrying up, and the whole light cruiser line without orders was closing to the north-eastward in support. The *Galatea* continued to run to north-west, keeping just out of range, with the intention of drawing the enemy on, while the Battle Cruiser Fleet altered course to S.S.E. at 2.32 p.m. in order to cut him off from Horns Riff. But by this time the 1st Scouting Group had heard the call of their light cruisers, and was making westward to support them. The two forces were thus rapidly closing the distance[3] between them, and an action was now imminent.

As the *Lion* turned, the *Barham* hauled away two points to port to N. by W., presumably to recommence her zigzag.[4] Six minutes later,[5] the *Lion's* alter course signal having been received,[6] the *Barham* turned back fifteen points to S.S.E. By the time she had completed this turn, the *Barham* was over nine miles from the *Lion*, and though in the next hour she was able by steering a converging course, to regain some of this distance she was still considerably astern of her appointed station when the action commenced about 3.50 p.m.

At 2.51 p.m. the *Galatea* reported the enemy had turned north, and the *Lion* altered course to S.E., and at 3.0 to east (Diagram 6). The enemy was still some thirty miles away, though his light cruisers had come in sight of the *Falmouth* at 2.45 p.m.[7], and between 3.0 p.m. and 3.30 p.m. the *Galatea* and *Phaeton*, with the other light cruisers closing on them, were

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[1] Signal 2.34; time of origin 2.30.

[2] *Galatea* to Senior Officer, Battle Cruiser Fleet, 2.35. The smoke seen by the *Galatea* may have been that of destroyers ahead of the German battle cruisers.

[3] At 2.32, about 40 miles, when the *Lion* turned S.S.E.

[4] *Barham* (s); *Valiant* (log) and (s); *Warspite* track chart (J.P., pl. 17) and (s); *Malaya* (s). N. by W. would have been the port leg of a 4 point zigzag. Before the course of the fleet was altered at 2.15 p.m., the squadrons had been zigzagging 4 points each way, turning on to the port leg at the half hour.

[5] At 2.38 p.m. *Barham* (r) 2.38; the logs of *Valiant*, *Warspite* and *Malaya* all give 2.40 p.m. as does *Warspite* track chart (J.P., pl. 17).

[6] At 2.30 p.m., *Barham* had received a signal indicating the course that the Vice-Admiral intended to steer; the actual "executive" signal is logged as having been received at 2.37 p.m., *vide Barham* (s).

[7] *Falmouth* (r). But her log says 3.00 and her signal is timed 3 p.m.

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DIAGRAM 4.



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911 W.T. 9568*/8/3

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316 WT 10737/M/2501/6/18.
411 WT 9569/619.

DIAGRAM 5.



GALATEA & 1ST L.C.S. CLOSING ENEMY.

— 2·30 P.M. —

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H.M.S.O., Cr., Lith.

drawing them to the north-west at a range which gradually increased from 17,000 to 20,000 yards.

At 3.07 the *Galatea* reported the enemy cruisers had altered course north-east, and at 3.13 p.m. the *Lion* altered course to north-east, going on to 23 knots. A few minutes later the *New Zealand*, three miles E.N.E., sighted five enemy ships on her starboard bow.[1]

The *Engadine* and her aircraft how joined in the reconnaissance. She had been told at 2.47 p.m. to send up her seaplane, and it got off the water by 3.8 p.m. and flew off northward. Though the visibility was poor (only some four miles at 1,000 feet), the observer sighted three enemy cruisers[2] and several destroyers, and between that time and 3.45 sent three signals reporting their course and their alteration to the south at 3.35.[3] Her signals, however, never got past the *Engadine*; engine trouble forced her to descend, and the *Engadine* picked her up while the battle cruisers passed swiftly on to the eastward.

The *Galatea*, at 3.29 p.m., was some 16 miles to the northward with the other ships of the 1st and 3rd Light Cruiser Squadrons. Close to the *Lion* was the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron, the *Nottingham* and *Dublin* three miles on her starboard bow, the *Southampton* and *Birmingham* 3½ miles astern. The *New Zealand* and 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron was three miles on starboard bow, bearing E.N.E.; rather more than five miles off on the port beam, the 5th Battle Squadron could be seen bearing about N. 60° W. Admiral Beatty now altered course to east[4], increasing to 25 knots, and at about 3.31 p.m. sighted the enemy, which was made out to be two, three, four, and finally five battle cruisers. They were some 14 miles off; the visibility was good, the wind south-east and the sun behind, and everything seemed favourable for the approaching action. The 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron was now ordered to form astern in line of battle,[5] and the two flotillas were ordered to take station—the 13th, two points on the starboard bow, and the 9th, right ahead.[6] The 1st Scouting Group, on receiving the report of the British cruisers, had turned to the westward, and were some ten miles behind their light cruisers, which were chasing the *Galatea* to the north-westward. Admiral Hipper had received no word of the proximity of British battle cruisers, when at 3.20 he suddenly sighted Admiral Beatty's force to the westward approaching at full speed. Its appearance must have been disconcerting in the extreme. The whole original plan of operations now fell to the ground. Admiral Hipper recalled the 2nd Scouting Group at once, and after continuing a

[1] *New Zealand* (s). Probably the battle cruisers 17 miles east by north of her. The light cruisers were 17 miles N. 51° E., or almost ahead.

[2] Evidently the 2nd Scouting Group.

[3] *Engadine* observer's time 3.33.

[4] *Nottingham*, three miles ahead of *Lion*, had reported smoke E.N.E. at 3.22 p.m. *Nottingham's* signalled position is 56° 46′ N., Long. 5° 14′ E.

[5] Signal 3.34.

[6] Signal 3.42.

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little way to the northward, turned at 3.33 to a south-easterly course, with the evident intention of closing his battle fleet.[1] At 3.45 the *Lützow*, carrying the Admiral's flag, was steering S.S.E., and behind her in single line, and on a line bearing N.W., came the *Derfflinger*, *Seydlitz*, *Moltke* and *Von der Tann*, with the *Regensburg* (Commodore Heinrich, second senior officer of torpedo craft) and the 9th Flotilla on their port bow.

The 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron had turned, and was taking up its position astern of the 1st, when Admiral Beatty gave orders to form on a line bearing N.W.[2] to clear the smoke, and the signal went up almost simultaneously with a signal to alter course together to E.S.E.

The enemy was now plainly visible on the port bow, and the two forces were closing rapidly. At 3.49,[3] the *Lützow* fired the first gun, and shortly afterwards the *Lion* opened fire in reply. The action had begun.

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[1] Admiral Scheer's report says the enemy deployed to south, and that Hipper followed the movement, but it seems clear that the Germans urned first. *See* Hase, p. 140.

[2] Signal 3.45 p.m.

[3] *Lion* gives 3.47 for enemy, 3.47½ for *Lion*; *Lion* (s) 3.47; *Tiger* 3.49 (enemy), 3.50 *Lion*; *Princess Royal* 3.50 (enemy), 3.51 (British), Hase 3.48 (*Lützow*); Scheer, 3.49.

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CLOSING ENEMY.

3. P.M.

"GALATEA" HAS REPORTED ENEMY TURNED NORTH 2·45.
"LION" HAS ALTERED COURSE E. AT 3·00 AND IS 28 MILES FROM ENEMY.
"FALMOUTH" "INCONSTANT" "BIRKENHEAD" CLOSING "GALATEA".
"NOTTINGHAM" ON "LION'S" PORT BOW.
"ENGADINE" STOPS AT 3·05 TO HOIST OUT SEAPLANE.



DIAGRAM 6.

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DIAGRAM 7.

BATTLE CRUISER SQUADRONS ENGAGING 1ST SCOUTING GROUP.

POSITION 3·50 P.M.



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CHAPTER II.

THE BATTLE CRUISER ACTION.

FROM 3.50 P.M. TO 4.40 P.M.

10. When the action began the British Battle Cruiser Fleet was on a course E.S.E., going 25 to 26 knots in the process of forming a line of bearing N.W.[1]; the 9th Flotilla was taking up position ahead, and the 13th on the starboard bow. The 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron was with the *Lion*, the *Nottingham* and *Dublin* some three miles off on her port bow making to the southward to get ahead, and the *Southampton* and *Birmingham* a couple of miles before the beam to starboard; the *Galatea* with the 1st and 3rd Light Cruiser Squadrons, was away to the north-west almost out of sight[2] making to the eastward after the enemy; to the northward were the enemy light cruisers some 11 miles off, coming down at full speed on a south-easterly course to rejoin their battle cruisers (Diagram 7).

The opening range has been variously estimated, and was probably about 15,300 yards.[3]

The firing was hot and effective. The *Lion* and *Princess Royal* concentrated at first on the *Lützow*[4], while the Germans fired at their opposite numbers. Great rippling sheets of flame came from the enemy's guns[5], and the ships were quickly surrounded with mountainous columns of water and huge fountains of spray.

Hitting soon became general; the *Lion* was hit twice about 3.51, one shot exploding forward on the inboard side of the 4-in. armour and the other forward on the upper deck, causing many casualties among the 4-in. guns' crews; the *Tiger* was hit on the forecastle and then on the port side of X turret, breaking the armour but leaving the gun mounting uninjured; then again on the roof of Q turret, knocking off the central sighting hood but

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[1] The signal for the line of bearing was made at 3.45 and ships were probably on this line by 3.48 or 3.49.

[2] N.N.W. 15 to 16 miles.

[3] There are wide differences between the gun ranges of the various ships until 3.55 p.m., when they agree fairly well. The opening range of 15,300 is obtained by laying back the known runs of both squadrons to 3.50 p.m.

[4] *Lion* opened on *Lützow*; *Princess Royal* first on *Lützow*, later on *Derfflinger*; *Queen Mary* on *Seydlitz* at first, then on *Derfflinger*; *Tiger* and *New Zealand* on *Moltke*; *New Zealand* at 3.57 on *Von der Tann*. *Derfflinger* was unengaged for a time till the *Princess Royal* shifted to her. On the German side, *Lützow* on *Lion*, and stuck to her through the action; *Derfflinger* on *Princess Royal* at first, then *Queen Mary* (and blew her up); *Seydlitz* on *Queen Mary*; *Moltke* probably on *Tiger*; *Von der Tann* possibly on *Tiger* up to 3.56, then on *Indefatigable* (sank her).

[5] The *Derfflinger* (according to von Hase), and possibly the other German ships, used her secondary as well as her primary armament. None of these projectiles, however, were observed from the Battle Cruiser Fleet.

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leaving the turret in action.[1] Information as to the hits obtained on the enemy is naturally less detailed, but the *Princess Royal's* third salvo hit the *Lützow*.

The *Lion* by 3.54 had altered course some four points to starboard parallel to the enemy, and the squadron was now running S.S.E.[2] at a range of about 13,000 yards. The 9th Flotilla was making strenuous efforts to get ahead to a position favourable for attack, and its smoke was interfering with the fire of the *Tiger* and *Princess Royal*.

The *Lion* shortly afterwards received her heaviest blow. A shell struck Q turret, entered the gun-house and burst over the left gun. Nearly all the guns' crews were killed and all the men in the working chamber killed or severely wounded. Major Harvey, R.M.L.I., the officer of the turret, was severely wounded, but was able to pass the word down to close the magazine doors and flood magazines, a precaution which saved the ship and won him a Victoria Cross in death.

A fire started in the wreckage of the turret and about 20 minutes later a charge slid back from the gun and fell into the well. The fire caught it and spread to the charges in the gun-cages, then down the main trunk to the charges there. It gathered into a great flash of flame which passed right up and down and through the turret, penetrating up the escape trunk into the switchboard compartment and killing instantly all there. Their bodies and clothes were not burnt, and where they had screened their faces with their hands, their skin was not even singed. It reached the doors of the magazines, but they were closed.

It was now close on four o'clock. A large barque with all sail set was lying becalmed between the two fleets. The *Princess Royal* had shifted her fire to the *Derfflinger*, and the two were hotly engaged. The *Derfflinger* received a hit in one of her casemates which did a great deal of damage,[3] and shortly afterwards hit[4] the *Princess Royal* putting her Argo tower and main control out of action till 4.16 p.m.

The squadrons were gradually coming round to the southward and the range was beginning to increase (Diagram 8).

The *Von der Tann* was maintaining a steady fire on the *Indefatigable*. Shortly after four o'clock a salvo of three shots fell on the latter's upper deck in line with the after turrets and evidently penetrated the interior; an explosion followed and she fell out of line, sinking by the stern. Another salvo struck her near the fore turret; a second explosion followed, and she turned over and disappeared. In the roar and crash of the battle

[1] It jammed the wires of the gun-cages, reducing the right gun to secondary loading, and "wooded" the telescopes, reducing the turret to percussion firing by elevation and bearing from director. Two men were killed and the midshipman mortally wounded. F.J. p. 83.

[2] Scheer makes the German course S.S.E. (J. P. German IV.)

[3] Hase, p. 151.

[4] At 3.56 *Derfflinger* was firing at 11,500 m. (12,600 yards).

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BATTLE CRUISER ACTION.

POSITION 4·02 P.M.

SCALE.

YARDS 2000 1000 0 1 2 3 4 5 SEA MILES.



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her loss passed almost unobserved by some of the ships ahead. Meanwhile, the 5th Battle Squadron had been coming up astern at full speed. They were still some seven or eight miles astern of the Battle Cruiser Squadrons, but shortly after four o'clock[1] their guns were beginning to range on the rear of the enemy's line. The *Barham* opened fire at 19,000 yards, and made a signal to concentrate in pairs on the rear ships. It was some minutes, however, before their fire became effective, for the light was difficult, and the targets constantly obscured, and often only the flashes of the enemy's guns could be seen; but the *New Zealand* could see the splashes of other shells falling round the enemy, and knew that the *Barham's* squadron was coming into action. Torpedo tracks were stated to have been seen about this time, one passing under the *Princess Royal* and another missing the *Lion*, but these reports must be regarded as supposititious.[2]

By 4.05 the range had increased to nearly 20,000 yards, and at 4.12 the Battle Cruiser Squadrons altered course to the S.E. to close the enemy; the *Lion* now came under a heavy fire, and was hit several times, but no important damage was done, though several fires were started and a number of men were killed and wounded by a shell bursting on the mess deck.

The 13th Flotilla had been ordered to attack and was beginning to draw ahead, though the attack did not exercise an influence on the battle till after 4.30 p.m. Before it had begun to develop the squadron was to suffer another heavy loss. The *Queen Mary* was now firing steadily at the *Derfflinger*[3], and had twice straddled her, obtaining a hit each time on her opponent, who was firing in reply with a slowly decreasing range.[4] But at 4.26 p.m. a plunging salvo pitched on the *Queen Mary* abreast of Q turret; a dazzling red flame leapt up in the forward part of the ship, accompanied by an explosion and a mass of black smoke. The *Tiger* passed her to port, the *New Zealand* to starboard. Her stern was high in the air with the propellers revolving. Men were crawling out of the after turret and great masses of paper were blowing out of the after hatch. Suddenly the entire ship was rent by a terrific upheaval and disappeared in a gigantic pall of smoke which rose 1,000 feet in the air.[5] A rain of debris fell on the deck of the *Tiger* as she passed through the dreadful cloud, but hardly a fragment of the ship remained afloat. She

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[1] *Warspite* (s), 4.00; *Warspite* (r), 4.02; *Valiant* (r), 4.01; R.A., 5th Battle Squadron (r), 4.06; *Barham* (r), 4.11.

[2] *See* J.P., pp. 132, 148, 257, 451. These are stated in two reports to have passed from starboard to port, *i.e.*, from west to east, and are attributed to submarines, but Admiral Scheer definitely states that none took part in the action.

[3] Hase, p. 157.

[4] At 4.25, 200 yards a minute, Hase, p. 160. Von Hase gives time of salvo as 4 hrs. 26 min. 10 secs., and range as 13,200 m. (14,400 yards).

[5] Hase, p. 160, and "Fighting at Jutland," p. 30.

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had gone down, leaving only 17 survivors to be picked up later by the *Laurel* and *Petard* (Diagram 9).

This was the second blow which had befallen the Battle Cruiser Fleet within half an hour, but it continued its course undismayed till 4.30 p.m., when a destroyer action began to develop and to occupy the water between the lines.

The Destroyer Attack.

11. Shortly after 4 p.m. Admiral Beatty had ordered Captain Farie in the *Champion* (13th Flotilla) to attack the enemy.[1] The flotilla,[2] with the exception of the *Obdurate*, was then almost a mile on the starboard and disengaged beam of the *Lion*; on her engaged side were six destroyers of the 9th Flotilla,[3] which had been ahead when the squadron turned to south-east, and since the beginning of the action had been making strenuous efforts to recover that position, steaming hard about half a mile on the port beam, receiving the splash and splinters of some of the "shorts," and causing considerable interference with their smoke.[4] The *Obdurate*, too, which had become detached from the 13th Flotilla, was with them on the engaged side. They had gradually drawn level with the *Tiger*, when they were ordered about 4.10 p.m.[5] to clear the range, and, turning to port, took station astern, with the exception of the *Morris* and *Moorsom*, which went further ahead, and continued their course on the engaged side.

At 4.15 p.m.[6] the *Champion* gave the order to attack, and the flotilla, increasing to full speed and led by the *Nestor* (Commander E. B. S. Bingham), gradually drew ahead of the *Lion*. But before they crossed her track, they met a momentary check; the *Nottingham*, hitherto on the *Lion's* engaged side, crossed her bows about 4.21 p.m. and ran through the line of destroyers ahead of the *Petard*, forcing its rear to turn astern of her and parting them from the van. The foremost portion, consisting of the *Nestor*, *Nicator*, *Nomad*, *Narborough* and *Pelican*, went on at full speed, crossing the *Lion's* track about a mile ahead of her, and steered for a favourable position to attack the enemy, who could be seen some eight miles off to the north-east with his destroyers coming across to meet the attack. Precisely how and when the *Narborough* and *Pelican* became detached is doubtful, but they evidently did not follow the *Nestor*, and being unable to open fire on the advancing destroyers, and not finding

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[1] Signal is timed 4.09, and was evidently made by wireless and visual. It was passed by *Princess Royal* as *Lion's* main W/T was out of action. *Champion* (r), 4.15; *Nicator* (r), 4.15; *Nestor* shortly after 4 p.m.

[2] *Champion*, Captain (D), *Nestor*, *Nomad*, *Nicator*, *Pelican*, *Narborough*, *Petard*, *Nerissa*; also *Turbulent* and *Termagant*, detached from 10th Flotilla.

[3] *Lydiard*, *Liberty*, *Landrail*, *Laurel*, *Morris*, *Moorsom*.

[4] J.P. pp. 132 (*Lion*); 148 (*Princess Royal* at 3.59); 155 (*Tiger* at 3.51).

[5] *Lion* (s), 4.9, also 4.20; *Lydiard* (r), 4.30.

[6] 4.15, *Champion* (r); 4.20, *Pelican* (r); 4.15, Hase; 4.15, *Nicator* (r); 4.30, *Nerissa* (r).

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BATTLE CRUISER ACTION.

POSITION AT 4.30 P.M.

SCALE.

YARDS 2000 1000 0 1 2 3 4 5 SEA MILES.



318. WT 10737/250/618. 1500. 6.24
411. WT 9568/619. 1000. 8. 24.

H.M.S.O., Cr., Lith.

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an opportunity to attack, turned back to join the *Champion*. The *Petard*, with her three destroyers, after clearing the *Nottingham* and supported by the *Moorsom* and *Morris* from the engaged side, was making approximately east-south-east to attack.

Admiral Hipper saw the attack developing and launched his 9th Flotilla against it, supported later by the *Regensburg* and a portion of the 2nd Flotilla.

The destroyers rapidly covered the distance between the lines, and by 4.35 p.m. the two forces were well within range, engaging each other with an energetic fire.

By 4.40 p.m.[1] the *Nestor* found herself on the starboard bow of the enemy and turned some 14 points to attack on a north-westerly course. They now came under a heavy fire from the destroyers and the battle cruisers, and the *Nomad* was hit by a shell which burst in the engine-room, killed the Engineer-Lieutenant-Commander, and brought the ship to a dead stop.

The *Nestor* and *Nicator* each fired two torpedoes at about 6,000 yards, but the *Lützow*[2] had turned away and the torpedoes probably ran harmlessly past. The *Petard* had turned to attack immediately after the *Nestor*, and had fired her first torpedo at V. 27, the leading German destroyer, which she probably hit, and three others at the second or third battle cruiser (*Derfflinger* or *Seydlitz*), at a range of about 7,000 yards.[3]

By this time two of the German destroyers, V. 29 and V. 27, which had been badly hit, were sinking.[4] The remainder had fired twelve torpedoes[5] without a hit, and after rescuing the crews of their sinking vessels were now racing back to the shelter of their squadron.

The *Nerissa*, astern of the *Petard*, saw the enemy turn sixteen points to a northerly course, and, turning with the *Turbulent* and *Termagant* to a southerly course to attack, fired two torpedoes at 7,000 yards,[6] and then shaped course to rejoin the *Champion*.

The turn away of the enemy at 4.45 p.m. had frustrated the *Nestor's* attack, but Commander Bingham was determined to press it home. Turning with the *Nicator* to an easterly course, he followed him up under a heavy fire. Reaching a position abeam of the *Lützow* at a distance which, according to von Hase,[7] was "devilishly close," she fired her third torpedo at 3,000 to

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[1] *Nestor* says 4.30 p.m.

[2] At 4.28, 4.33 and 4.36 probably to open the range.

[3] One of these may have hit the *Seydlitz*.

[4] The *Petard* probably hit one with a torpedo. Scheer (p. 144) states they were hit by heavy calibre shell, but the *Tiger* is the only ship that reports firing on them (J.P. p. 155). V. 27 was the leader of the 17th Half-Flotilla.

[5] Scheer, p. 144. None of them seems to have reached the British line except a couple mentioned by the *Barham*, and even in their case the time seems uncertain (J.P. p. 193).

[6] J.P. p. 235.

[7] Hase, p. 164.

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4,000 yards,[1] then turned to make back. By this time the enemy battle fleet could be seen to the southward, and the *Nicator* fired her third torpedo at the second ship. The destroyer recall was flying,[2] but the gallant *Nestor* was not to reach home. The *Regensburg*, appearing from behind the battle cruisers, opened a heavy fire on her, and succeeded in getting two shots into her boilers, reducing her speed to 17 knots with the enemy battle fleet drawing nearer and nearer. The captain of the *Petard* (Lieutenant-Commander E. C. O. Thompson), seeing his leader disabled, closed, and offered him a tow. But minutes were precious. Every moment brought the enemy nearer, and Commander Bingham, loath to involve another in his impending fate, refused the offer, and watched him turn westward and make off. The *Nestor* soon came to a full stop. The *Nomad* was lying equally helpless a mile or so away. The latter was visibly sinking. Both commanders could see that a storm of fire must break on them in a few minutes, and both made shift to strike a last blow by firing their remaining torpedoes at the approaching battle fleet. The *Nestor's* crew gave three cheers for the *Nestor*, and sang a verse of "God Save the King." The Carley rafts were launched, and the wounded got on to them.

As the High Sea Fleet approached, an overwhelming fire was opened, which sank both ships in a few minutes; the crews were picked up by enemy destroyers as they passed.

The destroyer attack was over. Boldly led by Commander Bingham, it has exercised considerable influence on the battle. Eleven destroyers had attacked; two had been lost on each side;[3] ten torpedoes had been fired at the battle cruisers, ten at the approaching battle fleet,[4] and one at a destroyer. Two hits had been made on the enemy, one on the *Seydlitz* and one on V. 27[5], and the attack had thrown out the fire of his heavy guns.

All this time while the destroyers were firing at one another in between the lines, the thunder of the heavy guns had continued over their heads. At 4.33 the fire of the *Lion* and *Princess Royal* forced the *Lützow* to turn away. She was badly hit and on fire, and she did not resume her southerly course till 4.49 p.m.[6]

The increasing range threw out the German fire, and for nine minutes[7] the *Derfflinger* did not fire a single round from her

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[1] It may have been this torpedo that hit the *Seydlitz*.

[2] *Lion*, 4.43 p.m.

[3] *Nomad* and *Nestor* (British). V. 27 and V. 29 (German).

[4] A = at battle cruisers; B = at battle fleet; C = at destroyers. *Nestor*, 3 A, 1 B; *Nomad* (when stopped), 4 B; *Nicator* 2 A, 1 B; *Petard*, 1 C, 3 A; *Nerissa*, 2 A; *Turbulent*, unknown; *Termagant*, 0; *Narborough* and *Pelican* did not attack; *Morris*, 0; *Obdurate*, 0; *Moorsom*, 4 B. Total, 10 A, 10 B, 1 C = 21. Hits, 2 (*Seydlitz* and V. 27). Torpedoes fired by Germans = 12. Hits, nil.

[5] Scheer, p. 145, states that none of these torpedoes hit, but it is now admitted from German sources that the *Seydlitz* received her torpedo hit about 4.56 p.m.

[6] Course at 4.20, S.; 4.28, S.E. by S.; 4.33, E.S.E. 4.36, E.

[7] From 4.36 to 4.45, Hase, p. 164.

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big guns, mainly owing to the smoke of the destroyer action raging between the lines, partly also the fire of the 6-in. guns throwing out the control. As the British destroyers approached, the German ships could also see the 5th Battle Squadron coming up,[1] and began zigzagging to throw out their fire. At 4.49 the destroyer attack was spent and the *Lützow* turned to a southerly course. The van of the High Sea Fleet was in sight, and at 4.53 Admiral Hipper turned to starboard and took station some seven miles ahead of it. His ships were all in a condition to renew the action.[2]

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[1] Hase, p. 164.

[2] The damage done to the German battle cruisers in this phase of the action was considerable, but German information on the point is not conclusive. The *Lützow* was badly hit and on fire about 4.30 p.m.; von Hase distinctly mentions three hits on the *Derfflinger* and says that the enemy (the *Queen Mary*) shot splendidly. The *Moltke* had only four hits, and all of these were on the starboard side. At least two out of the *Von der Tann's* four hits were also on the starboard side. Five or six of the hits on the *Seydlitz* were on the starboard side, one of which was a hit on No. 4 turret by a 13·5 shell at about 15,310 yards which necessitated the turret being abandoned, and which was possibly *Queen Mary's* about 4 p.m. Finally, this ship had been hit by a torpedo.

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CHAPTER III.

GERMAN BATTLE FLEET IN SIGHT.

THE ACTION FROM 4.40 P.M. TO 5.40 P.M.

12. The *Southampton* was the first to see the enemy battle fleet. She was two or three miles ahead of the *Lion* and sighted an enemy cruiser at half-past four. Following it to the south-east she sighted the head of the enemy battle fleet three minutes afterwards, and immediately flashed the signal "Battleships south-east" to the *Lion*. This was followed by a more detailed report five minutes later,[1] and the *Champion*, who had also sighted them, sent in a signal at the same time.[2] The signalled positions of both the *Southampton* and *Champion* were considerably out,[3] due partly to unavoidable errors in reckoning. These errors[4] did not affect Admiral Beatty, for both ships were only a few miles off, and before the *Champion's* signal got through, and probably before he himself had seen the *Southampton's* second report,[5] the enemy battle fleet was in sight from his own flagship. It was the first time it has been seen since that momentous hour when the war began, and with Admiral Jellicoe's battle fleet hurrying down only 50 miles away, the door of a great opportunity seemed at last to be on the point of opening.

Admiral Scheer's appearance probably came as something of a surprise, for only a few hours before Admiral Beatty had seen an intercepted signal from the Admiralty to the Commander-in-Chief stating that directionals placed the enemy flagship in the Jade at 11.10 a.m. and here they were some 180 miles from it at half-past four.

They were now plainly visible. The head of their line was some 11½ miles off to the south-east, and the signal went up to turn 16 points to starboard, followed almost immediately by the destroyer recall[6] (Diagram 10). Admiral Hipper's battle cruisers were some ten miles off to the north-eastward when the *Lion* turned.

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[1] Senior Officer, 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron, to Commander-in-Chief, and Senior Officer, Battle Cruiser Fleet: "Have sighted enemy battle fleet bearing approximately S.E. Course of enemy, north. My position Lat. 56° 34′ N., Long, 6° 20′ E., 4.38 p.m." Received *Lion* (w), 4.40; *Iron Duke*, 4.35; *New Zealand*, 4.38; *Barham*, 4.40.

[2] "Course of enemy battle fleet is E.N.E., single line ahead. Van, Dreadnoughts. Bearing of centre S.E. My position 56° 51′ N., 5° 46′ E., 4.30." *Champion's* time of origin 4.30 is evidently a mistake for 4.38. The *Southampton* was ahead of the *Champion* and her brief signal at 4.33 bears all the stamp of a first report.

[3] *Champion's* about 12 miles to northward of actual position, *Southampton's* about 13¼ miles 98° from actual position.

[4] The effect of these errors in the Commander-in-Chief's view of the situation will be dealt with in the next chapter.

[5] *Lion* received *Champion's* signal at 4.47; *Southampton's* at 4.40 p.m.

[6] Signal to alter course, 4.40 p.m.; 4.43, destroyer's recall.

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ENEMY BATTLE FLEET IN SIGHT.

4.40 P.M.

SCALE.

YARDS 2000 0 1 2 3 4 5 SEA MILES



3/8. WT 10737⁴/250/6/8
4/11 WT 8566⁴/6/12.

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Admiral Scheer sights Sir David Beatty's Squadron.

13. Admiral Scheer's fleet,[1] which had just appeared, consisted of the 3rd, 1st and 2nd Squadrons, numbering 16 modern battleships and 6 pre-Dreadnoughts. In the van was the 5th Division comprising the newest and strongest ships of the *König* class. With the battle fleet was the 4th Scouting Group of five light cruisers, the *Rostock* with the 3rd, 5th and 7th Flotillas, and the 11th Half-Flotilla, 39 destroyers in all. He had received the news of the British battle cruisers at 3.25 p.m. and at 4.05 had altered course to north-west and increased to 15 knots. At 4.20 he shaped course west, hoping to pass to southward of the British and catch them between two fires, but news arrived shortly afterwards of the presence of British battleships, and, fearing the position of the 1st Scouting Group might become critical, he altered course again to north.

At 4.32 he sighted the ships in action some 15 miles off[2] to the N.W. His fleet was at this time in line ahead steering north at 15 knots with ships 2½ cables and squadrons 3,500 metres (1·9 miles) apart, screened by light cruisers and torpedo craft.

At 4.45 p.m. he increased to 17 knots and altered course by divisions, leaders together to N.N.W., going on to full speed about 4.55 p.m. The *Regensburg* with the 3rd Flotilla and 1st Half-Flotilla were a couple of miles on the starboard beam of the leading squadron, while the 7th and 5th Flotillas were on the starboard beam[3] of the 1st Squadron. Admiral Hipper had seen the *König* coming up, and he now turned 16 points and took station about seven miles ahead of her.[4] It was 4.50 when von Hase in the *Derfflinger* told his guns that the 3rd Squadron was coming up. The *König* and her proud sisters seemed to them the harbingers of victory, and they were burning to win fresh laurels. But the day was not over yet.

14. When the *Lion* turned at 4.41 p.m. the *Southampton*, some three miles ahead of her, gallantly held on for a time to get a better view of the enemy fleet, but at 4.45 came under a heavy fire at 13,000 yards, which forced her to turn and follow the Battle Cruiser Squadrons now some five miles off to the north-

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[1] First Squadron, 1st Division—*Friedrich der Grosse* (flag), *Ostfriesland, Thüringen, Helgoland, Oldenburg.* 2nd Division—*Posen, Rheinland, Nassau, Westfalen.* 2nd Squadron, 3rd Division—*Deutschland, Hessen, Pommern.* 4th Division—*Hannover, Schlesien, Schleswig-Holstein.* 3rd Squadron, 5th Division—*König, Grosser Kurfürst, Kronprinz, Markgraf.* 6th Division—*Kaiser, Kaiserin, Prinzregent Luitpold.*

[2] Admiral Scheer's report. J.P., p. 592. *Lion* was then N. 39° W. 15½ miles from *König*; the *Southampton* leading the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron, was then 12 miles from *König*, and was probably the ship first sighted. c.f. 4.33, when *Southampton* sighted the enemy.

[3] J.P., German VI, Diagram 1.

[4] Scheer's diagram, German V, makes them turn at 4.48 p.m. ; von Hase's track and the revised track makes the turn at 4.53 p.m.

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west. Salvos were falling around her for some time, sending torrents of spray over the bridge and the navigator, whose time was wholly taken up with zigzagging to avoid them. She kept the enemy battle fleet in sight, however, and between 4.38 and 5 p.m. sent to the Commander-in-Chief three valuable reports.

The 5th Battle Squadron, still on a southerly course, was now rapidly closing Admiral Beatty's battle cruisers. When the action commenced it found itself seven miles on the *Lion's* port quarter, and though the *Barham* and *Warspite* opened fire on the 2nd Scouting Group about 4 p.m.[1] and drove them to the eastward, it was not till ten minutes later that they were able to range on the German battle cruisers.[2] The enemy replied at 4.21 and straddled the *Barham*, hitting her a few minutes later, but doing no serious damage. The fire had then slackened and tended to become intermittent owing to decreasing visibility. To the south-east the light was growing steadily worse and the enemy battle cruisers were gradually becoming merged in a grey background, illuminated fitfully by the flashes of their guns, while to the south-west our own destroyers silhouetted against a clear horizon showed that the squadron presented a good target to the enemy.[3] The range, however, was too great for him and his fire was intermittent and desultory. At 4.40 p.m., when the enemy destroyers attacked, Rear-Admiral Evan Thomas had made a signal to turn 2 points away, which was apparently carried out about 4.46.[4] By this time the *Lion* was returning at full speed on a northerly course. She was soon on the port bow of the *Barham* with a signal flying to the 5th Battle Squadron to turn 16 points[5] in succession. She passed about one and a half miles off on the port hand about 4.53 and the 5th Battle Squadron turned to starboard shortly afterwards.[6] They had hitherto seen nothing of the German battle fleet, but as the *Warspite* and *Malaya*, the rear ships of the line, turned, they sighted it, and the *Barham* saw it, too, to the S.S.E. as she steadied on a northerly course. Her turn had been delayed, and the *Lion* was now some three or four miles off on the starboard bow.

Course at 4.45 p.m. to join the Commander-in-Chief.

15. When the *Lion* turned at 4.45 she had to draw the enemy back to the Grand Fleet, and the relative position of the two flagships was therefore a question of primary importance. At 4.45 Admiral Beatty sent a signal to the Commander-in-Chief through *Princess Royal*, reporting the enemy battle fleet bearing

[1] *Barham* (r), 3.58 at 17,000 yards; *Warspite*, 4.2; *Valiant*, 4.1.
[3] *Barham* on *Von der Tann* at 19,500, 4.11; *Warspite*, 4.14; *Malaya* on *Von der Tann* at 18,500, 4.15.
[3] *Barham* (r), J.P., pp. 193–199. *Malaya* (r), *ibid.*, p. 217.
[4] *Valiant* (r).
[5] *Lion* (s), 4.48.
[6] *Barham* (r), 4.53; *Warspite* (r), 4.56; *Valiant* (r), 4.57; *Malaya* (r), 4.57.

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S.E. and giving his own position in Lat. 56° 36′ N., Long. 6° 04′ E.[1] This signal was made correctly by the *Princess Royal*, and taken in correctly by some of the ships of the Grand Fleet, but in the form in which the flagship received it at 5.5 p.m. it made the enemy steering S.E. This error did not affect the *Lion's* position, which got through correctly, so that by 5.5 p.m. the Commander-in-Chief knew where the *Lion* thought she was at 4.45 p.m. The next question is the position of the Commander-in-Chief as known to the *Lion*. The last position made by the Commander-in-Chief placed him at 3.15 in 57° 50′ N., 4° 15′ E., proceeding S.E. by S. at 19 knots. This signal, sent at 3.26 and received about 3.38 p.m.,[2] was what the *Lion's* navigating officer had to work with at 4.45 p.m., and it made the Commander-in-Chief at 4.45 in 57° 30′ N., 4° 56½′ E., that is, 66 miles 325° (N.N.W.) from the *Lion*.

On the basis of these figures the course to join him would have been N. 14° W.; the course steered was northerly, governed probably by the necessity of keeping in touch with the enemy battle cruisers and covering the destroyers of the 13th Flotilla returning from their attack.

The Run to the North, 4.45 p.m. to 5.35 p.m.

16. At 4.45 p.m. the enemy battle cruisers bore from the *Lion* some nine miles north-east, and their Battle Fleet about ten miles south-east.[3]

Three or four minutes later fire was re-opened by the *Lion* for a few minutes, and by 4.50 all the battle cruisers except the *New Zealand*, which could not get the requisite elevation of

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[1] (*a*) "Have sighted enemy's battle fleet bearing S.E. My position Lat. 56° 36′ N., Long. 6° 04′ E., 4.45 p.m." J.P., p. 453. (*b*) *Lion* (s): "Flag to *Princess Royal*. Report enemy's battle fleet to Commander-in-Chief bearing S.E. 4.45 p.m." (*c*) *Barham* (w). *Princess Royal* to Commander-in-Chief, urgent, 4.45 p.m. To Commander-in-Chief from Senior Officer, Battle Cruiser Fleet: "Have sighted enemy battle fleet bearing S.E. Lat. 56° 36′ N., Long. 6° 04′, received 5.10 p.m." (*d*) *Benbow* (s): "W/T 4.45 p.m., urgent. Battleship? Number of enemy ships 26–30, bearing S.S.E. Course S.E. Lat. 56° 36′ N., Long. 6° 04′ E., received 5.8." (*e*) *Iron Duke* (s) has "4.45 p.m., 26–30 battleships, probably hostile, bearing S.S.E., steering S.E. Lat 56° 36′ N., Long 6° 04′ E., received 5.5 p.m." (*f*) *Marlborough* (w) and (s) *Princess Royal* to Commander-in-Chief, Senior Officer, Battle Cruiser Fleet to Commander-in-Chief. "Have sighted enemy's battle fleet, bearing approximately S.E. My position Lat. 56° 36′ N., Long 6° 04′ E., 4.45 p.m., received 5.8 p.m." (*g*) *Minotaur* (s). Senior Officer, Battle Cruiser Fleet, to Commander-in-Chief: "Have sighted the enemy's battle fleet bearing S.E. Lat. 56° 36′ N., Long. 6° 04′ E." The error apparently originated in the *Benbow*, which was acting as "stand by" ship on "S" wave. The signal does not appear to have been received on main W/T in the *Iron Duke*.

[2] *Iron Duke* (s), 3.34; *Minotaur* (s), 3.38; *Lion* (w/e), 3.38; *Barham* (s), 3.39; *New Zealand*, 3.35; *Falmouth* (s), 3.37.

[3] The revised track makes them 9¼ miles N.E. and 10¼ miles S.E. by E.

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her guns, were in action again at a range of over 18,000 yards.[1] The enemy replied with a heavy fire, and succeeded in obtaining a few more hits.

The *Lion* was hit by two shells, one of which went through the upper deck and exploded on the inboard side of the 4-inch armour, the port side, and another wrecked the galley and caused many casualties amongst the gun crews.

The increased range and decreased visibility rendered the fire much less effective, and the rear ships of the German battle cruisers may have been firing at the 5th Battle Squadron, for neither the *Tiger* nor the *New Zealand* received a single hit.

At 5 p.m. the *Lion* altered course to N.N.W., to establish her junction with the Commander-in-Chief (Diagram 11). The visibility was becoming worse and worse. Earlier in the day light mists had been driving down, but the enemy battle cruisers now became obscured in mist and could barely be seen. The conditions were peculiarly unfavourable to the British, for the mist only extended to the eastward; to the westward all was clear, and they themselves were silhouetted against a sharp yellow horizon.

By this time all the light cruisers had joined up, and were in visual touch. The 1st Light Cruiser Squadron (*Galatea*) had been sighted at 5 p.m. on the starboard bow. They had lost sight of the *Lion's* squadron at 3.45 p.m., and followed the 2nd Scouting Group to the eastward for a time; then, turning to the S.E., had come down practically along the track of the 1st Scouting Group, and at 5 p.m. had sighted the battle cruisers on the starboard bow coming north. As Admiral Beatty turned to the N.N.W., they shaped a converging course to the north-westward to take station ahead of him.

The 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron (*Falmouth*), a couple of miles to the northward of the *Galatea*, followed suit. The 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron (*Southampton*), which held on for a time when the *Lion* turned, at 4.45, was gradually coming up on her port quarter, but was still some five miles off.

The *Onslow* and *Moresby* (13th Flotilla), who had been assisting the *Engadine*, came down from the northward about this time, and, finding themselves between the lines on the enemy's bow, closed to make an attack. The *Onslow* was driven off by the 2nd Scouting Group, but the *Moresby*, at 5.10, managed to fire a torpedo at the *Kronprinz*[2] at about 8,000 yards without effect.

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[1] Salvos were fired from the *Lion* at 4.48, 4.49, 4.50½, 4.52½ at the "left-hand ship (?) *Von der Tann*." Then no more till 4.57½, 4.58½, 5.00½, then five between 5.01½ and 5.04 (*Lion* T.S. record). It would appear that fire was re-opened about 4.50 on the battle cruisers still steering a southerly course till about 4.53. The enemy's turn, with the resulting smoke and confusion, threw out the British fire. Then about 4.58 they were again visible and fire was re-opened till about 5.08 p.m., when the enemy was lost sight of in mist and smoke.

[2] The third ship of the *Dreadnought* line. *Moresby* (r), J.P., p. 238.

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APPROXIMATE POSITIONS OF MAIN SQUADRONS.

AT 5 P.M.



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The *Lion* could now see all her cruisers, and some 3½ miles astern of her was the 5th Battle Squadron. Its two leading ships, the *Barham* and *Valiant*, were engaging the battle cruisers; its rear ships, the *Warspite* and *Malaya*, the enemy battle fleet. It will be remembered that the 5th Battle Squadron had held on for a mile or two at 4.50, when the Vice-Admiral signalled to it to turn. This brought it under a heavy fire from the *König*, and the leading division of the German battle fleet. The *Barham* had hardly turned when she was hit by a heavy shell which went through the *glacis* the starboard side forward, and burst on the main deck, wrecking the auxiliary wireless, putting her wireless set out of action, and causing heavy casualties among the W/T staff and medical parties. The flash passed up to the battery deck, starting a serious cordite fire in S. 2 casemate, which put the guns' crew out of action. Three other hits were received, but the damage done by them was less serious.[1]

The *Valiant* was engaged intermittently with the *Derfflinger* on the northerly course, and not only escaped injury, but seems to have obtained two or three hits.[2]

The *Warspite* was heavily hit, and nearly half of the total hits she received seem to have been in this phase of the action.[3] One of the first hits went through the side armour on the boys' mess deck, bursting in a "terrific sheet of golden flame, stink and impenetrable dust,"[4] and starting all the fire brigade souvenir hunting. Another blew in the side aft and began to flood the steering compartment. Another burst in the captain's lobby, reducing it to a state of indescribable wreckage. Further forward, X turret was hit and water was flooding through a hole in the side and going down the engine-room supply trunk. Another took away the engineer's office.

The *Malaya*, too, suffered heavily. She herself was firing at the *König*,[5] but the leading German division concentrated on her with the evident intention of disabling her and making her fall behind, and at one time salvos were falling round her at the rate of six a minute. At 5.5 the enemy had her range and forced her to haul out to port, and for the next 20 minutes she was constantly straddled. At 5.20 two shells struck her below the water line, one of which burst on impact and made a rent in both inner and outer bottoms, flooding the wing compartments[6] and giving her a list. At 5.30 p.m. another shell penetrated the forecastle deck the starboard side, and, bursting inside the starboard battery, wrecked it, starting a fire, and causing 102 casualties. The 5th Battle Squadron in this phase of the action suffered severely, and its apparent inability with a speed of 25

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[1] The main wireless feeder and action feeder were both severed.
[2] Hase, p. 172.
[3] Probably five or six out of the 13.
[4] Fighting at Jutland, p. 139.
[5] *Malaya* (r), J.P., p. 218.
[6] At station 98.

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knots to escape from the *König* class, which though designed for only 20·5 knots were expected to reach 22 for a short distance, gave rise to an exaggerated idea of the *König's* speed.[1] The explanation lay, however, not in this speed, but in the fact—unknown, of course, at the time—that the two squadrons were steering on converging courses.[2] The superior speed of the *Barham* was never really in doubt, for it never fell below 24 knots, while the *König* steamed at about 20 knots up till 5.15 p.m. and for the next 27 minutes managed to touch 22 knots. Had the *Barham* turned away, she would soon have opened the range, but her course had to be governed by considerations of covering the Battle Cruiser Fleet and of joining the Grand Fleet. Only for a short time did she turn to a parallel course and she never turned right away, for this would have delayed her junction with the Grand Fleet. At 5 p.m. the *Barham* increased to 25 knots and at 5.13 turned to N.W. for seven or eight minutes. By 5.26 the shots were becoming fewer and fewer and the action was gradually broken off. The whole force was speeding to the northward to join the Commander-in-Chief (Diagram 12).

To the German battle cruisers this phase of the action was as disappointing as the first had been full of promise.[3]

Their guns were outranged, and von Hase in the *Derfflinger* confined himself to firing single rounds from one turret. The British battle cruisers were disappearing in mist and smoke, and it was to little purpose that at 5.21 Admiral Scheer ordered Admiral Hipper to "pursue," for his ships could do no more than 25 knots, while the British appeared to be "romping"[4] away at 28 knots. They turned their guns on the 5th Battle Squadron, but found that the British were able to keep them under fire at ranges too great for the 12-inch guns to reply—conditions which evoked a sense of depression and anxiety and kept their nerves constantly on the stretch.[5]

Von Hase states that the salvos pitched well together with a maximum spread of 400 to 500 yards, but they fell at very irregular distances. Due p[illegible]bly to the inadvisability of drawing too far ahead [illegible]eir battle fleet, or possibly to a

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[1] Commander-in-Chief's despatch (J.P., p. 2): " . . . ships of the 3rd Squadron of the High Sea Fleet possess an unexpected turn of speed, for, at any rate, a short period . . . I have always expected that they might reach 22 knots for a short distance, but the fact that the 5th Battle Squadron was unable to increase its distance . . . comes as an unpleasant surprise, and will have considerable effect on the conduct of future operations. It is quite obvious that all German ships possess a speed much in excess of that for which they are nominally designed."

[2] From 5.00 to 5.08 *Barham's* course was N. 16° E., *König's* N.N.W.; between 5 p.m. and 5.42 the *Barham's* mean course was N. by W., *König's* N.W. by N.

[3] Hase, p. 171.

[4] "lief uns spielend," Hase, p. 109 of German text. The actual speed was 25 knots at 4.52, 24 knots at 5.10, and 25 knots again at 5.52 p.m.

[5] Hase, p. 172.

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DIAGRAM 12.

THE RUN TO THE NORTH.

APPROXIMATE POSITIONS AT 5-15 P.M.



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reduction of the *Seydlitz's* speed when she was torpedoed, the pursuit ordered by the German Commander-in-Chief was not pressed (according to his own diagram) at more than 22 knots, which was also the maximum speed developed by the *König*.

The State of the Battle Cruiser Fleet.

17. In the lull hours between 5.10 p.m. and 5.40 p.m. Admiral Beatty may have found time to review the state of his force. Their speed had not been reduced. Of the ships that were left the *Lion* had suffered most heavily and Q turret was out of action: the *Tiger* was making water in a wing compartment aft, which had been penetrated by a shell, but the damage was not serious.[1] The *New Zealand* had not been hit.

The state of the 5th Battle Squadron was equally satisfactory. Both the *Barham* and the *Malaya* had suffered severe casualties in the 6-inch batteries, and the *Warspite* had been heavily hit, but none of them were seriously damaged, their turrets were all in action, their engines were intact, and the *Valiant* had not been hit.[2]

Every minute, too, was bringing them nearer and nearer to the Grand Fleet, and the Vice-Admiral could look forward with confidence to a renewal of the action.

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[1] *Tiger* had flooded Q magazine. These details were not known to the Senior Officer, Battle Cruiser Fleet, till later.

[2] Hits received up to 5.40 p.m. on southerly and northerly courses:—

	Southerly.	Northerly.		Southerly.	Northerly.
Lion - -	10	2	*Barham* - -	2	4
Princess Royal -	2	0	*Valiant* - -	0	0
Tiger - -	4	0	*Warspite* -	3(*a*) ?	5(*a*)
New Zealand -	0	0	*Malaya* - -	0	7

(*a*) Approximate estimate only.

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CHAPTER IV.

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF'S VIEW OF THE SITUATION.

2.0 P.M. TO 5.0 P.M.

18. Leaving the Battle Cruiser Fleet hastening northward, we must turn to the doings of the Battle Fleet and look at the situation from the point of view of the Commander-in-Chief. At 2 p.m. he was, according to the *Iron Duke's* reckoning, still some 20 miles from his rendezvous,[1] proceeding at 15 knots with nothing to indicate that any meeting with the enemy was likely, particularly in view of the Admiralty signal which located Admiral Scheer's flagship in the Jade. The first sign of the enemy came from the *Galatea* at 2.20 p.m., and the two other signals made by her in the next quarter of an hour confirmed the first report. It was clear that enemy light forces of some sort were at sea, and at 2.35 the Commander-in-Chief ordered the fleet to raise steam for full speed.

From this time up to 5.35 p.m. reports fell into three series :—

Series I.—(1 hour 15 minutes) From 2.20 p.m. to 3.35 p.m., ten reports of enemy light cruisers.

Series II.—(19 minutes) 3.40 p.m. to 3.59 p.m., six reports of enemy battle cruisers.

This was followed by an interval of 39 minutes.

Series III.—(22 minutes) 4.38 p.m. to 5.0 p.m., six reports of enemy battleships.

This was followed by an interval of 40 minutes.

Each of these series falls naturally into a group by itself, and as it is justifiable to assume that each group gave rise to a fresh view of the situation, each will be considered separately.[2]

The reports up to 3 p.m. indicated clearly the presence of light cruiser forces in the vicinity of 57° N., 6° E., and at 3.10[3] the cruisers were ordered to take station 16 miles ahead of the battle fleet, but owing to their insufficient speed they never attained anything like that distance, and were actually only some four or five miles ahead of the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron when the *Black Prince* sighted the *Falmouth* coming north at 5.33 p.m.

On receipt of these reports the Commander-in-Chief made a signal to prepare for action, opened his columns[4] to manœuvring

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[1] N.40° W., 20 miles from the rendezvous. The *Iron Duke* was actually in Lat. 57° 54½′ N., Long 3° 52′ E., or 4½ miles ahead of her reckoning.

[2] For Summary of Reports of Enemy received, *see* Appendix F. For full text of signals, reporting enemy light cruisers, from 2.20 to 3.35 p.m., from *Galatea, Falmouth, Lion, Nottingham* and Admiralty, *see* J.P., pp. 444–6.

[3] *Marlborough* (s), 3.07 p.m.

[4] J.P., p. 445, 3.16; *Iron Duke* (s), 3.20; *Benbow* (s), 3.16; *Marlborough* (s), 3.15.

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DIAGRAM 13.

ADMIRAL HOOD PROCEEDING TO SUPPORT ADMIRAL BEATTY

(ADMIRAL HOOD'S RECKONING)

POSITION AT 4·06 P.M.



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distance of a mile, increased speed to 19 knots,[1] and shortly after 3.30 p.m. made his 3.15 position to the Senior Officer, Battle Cruiser Fleet.[2] His view of the situation at this time is reflected in a signal made at 3.30 to the 3rd Sub-Division and Commodore (F), stating that enemy cruisers were being chased to the north and should be in touch with our cruisers by 4 p.m.

Up to 3.30, then, the encounter appeared as an affair of light cruisers, and in view of the Admiralty signal of 12.35 p.m. the Commander-in-Chief possibly did not expect it to develop into anything more.[3]

19. In the course of the next half-hour, however, the situation began to harden. At 3.40 p.m. an important signal came in from Sir David Beatty reporting five battle cruisers north-east of him, and between that time and four o'clock six signals were received.[4]

By the *Iron Duke's* reckoning, the *Lion* at 3.35 p.m., when she sighted the enemy, bore S. 16° E., 60 miles from the Commander-in-Chief.

The positions given in the *Lion's* signals were not reconcilable with her speed on a straight course, but the mean of these positions showed that somewhere about Lat. 56° 52′ N., Long. 5° 31′ E., she was engaging the enemy battle cruisers on an E.S.E. course.

At 3.55 p.m. an important signal arrived: Sir David Beatty was engaged. Speed was increased at 4.0 p.m. to 20 knots, and a few minutes[5] later the *Invincible* and the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron were sent off at full speed to support him (Diagram 13).

The *Invincible* was then some 25 miles from the *Iron Duke*, four and a half points on her port bow.[6] Her normal position was 20 miles ahead of the battle fleet, but at 3 p.m. she had been rather ahead of her station,[7] and when the *Galatea's* signal came in at 3.8 p.m. stating the enemy light cruisers had altered course N.W. she had shaped course E.S.E. at 22 knots to intercept them. Then came the *Galatea's* signal at 3.44 p.m. saying the enemy had turned south and Rear-Admiral Hood had altered at 3.45 p.m. to S.26° E. A quarter of an hour later

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[1] J.P. p, 446, 3.18; *Benbow* (s), 3.20; *Iron Duke* (s), 3.25 p.m.

[2] Position 3.15 p.m., Lat. 57° 50′ N., Long. 4° 15′ E. Course S.E. by S., 19 knots 3.26 p.m.; J.P., p. 447, 3.27. *Iron Duke* (s), 3.27 and 3.34; *Iron Duke* (w/e), 3.34; *Minotaur* (s), 3.38. *Benbow* (s), 3.36; *Marlborough* (s), 3.36; *Lion* (s), 3.38.

[3] Compare the signal to destroyers at 3 p.m. to bank fires in boilers not required for 21 knots, followed at 3.22 by orders to raise steam for full speed. (J.P., pp. 445, 447.)

[4] *See* Appendix F. For text of signals reporting enemy battle cruisers and light cruisers from *Lion*, *Galatea*, and *Falmouth*, *see* J.P., pp. 449 450.

[5] J.P., p 451. *Iron Duke* (s), 4.04 p.m.; *Marlborough* (s), 4.12; *Benbow* (s), 4.14.

[6] Rear-Admiral Hood signalled his position shortly after 4 p.m. in Lat. 57° 39′ N., Long. 5° 35′ E.

[7] S. 64° E. (*i.e.*, on port bow), 25 miles from *Iron Duke* at 3 p.m.

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he received the order to support Admiral Beatty, whose latest position was that made at 3.50,[1] which made him at 4 p.m. about 48 miles S. by W., steering in a south-easterly direction, from the *Invincible*, and as the latter had no margin of speed, she could not hope to overtake or intercept him. Rear-Admiral Hood accordingly steered S.S.E. in the hope of getting in touch—a happy course which was to disconcert the enemy and give Admiral Scheer an entirely false impression of the tactical situation.

After 4 o'clock the reports shut down, and for three-quarters of an hour the Commander-in-Chief received no news of the situation. He was evidently somewhat anxious about it, for at 4.15[2] he asked Rear-Admiral Evan Thomas if the 5th Battle Squadron was in company with Sir David Beatty's force, and received a reply in the affirmative.

Commander-in-Chief hears of Enemy Battle Fleet.

20. It was now 4.30, and there was no indication of the enemy battle fleet appearing on the scene, but in the next quarter of an hour the whole situation underwent a dramatic change. For the first time in the war, the enemy's battle fleet was reported in sight. The first token of it was the signal from the *Southampton* reporting a cruiser to the south-east, followed by a definite and detailed report of the enemy battle fleet made at 4.38 p.m., with one from the *Champion* at the same time, and then five more reports[3] made between 4.38 and 5.0 p.m.

Shortly afterwards a signal came in from the *Lion*, made at 4.45 p.m., which would have cleared up the confusion had it been correctly taken in. Unfortunately it became mutilated in transmission, and, as received by the Commander-in-Chief, reported the enemy to be steering south-east. Then at 5 p.m. came a signal from the Admiralty giving the enemy's position accurately at 4.9 p.m., and then a final signal from the *Southampton*, concluding an admirable series.

It was clear, from these early signals, that the enemy battle fleet was coming north, and at 4.50 p.m. the Commander-in-Chief informed the Admiralty that a fleet action was imminent.

A minute later the message charged with such tremendous issues was received at Whitehall. At once, at all the ports, tugs and docks were ordered to be held in readiness, and Commodore Tyrwhitt was ordered to complete with fuel in readiness to relieve light cruisers and destroyers. The signal crossed a message from him stating that he was proceeding to sea,[4] and he was recalled.

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[1] 56° 53′ N., 5° 31′ E.
[2] *Barham* (s), 4.24, reply 4.30.
[3] *See* J.P. pp. 452–4.
[4] J.P. p. 454.

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At 5.13 the Commander-in-Chief made his position to the Senior Officer, Battle Cruiser Fleet.[1] This was evidently his 5.0 p.m. position,[2] but as no time was mentioned in the body of the signal, the *Lion* probably gave it as the time of origin, in which case the *Iron Duke* would appear to be 13 minutes (or four miles) behind the Commander-in-Chief's reckoning. This in itself would not be serious, but in conjunction with other cumulative errors of reckoning, would throw out the *Lion's* bearing of the *Iron Duke*.

From 5.0 p.m. to 5.30 there was silence for half an hour. No reports came in. The Battle Fleet was ready to deploy; its guns were manned, and every man was at his station. The mists had come down, and the columns were becoming grey and ghostly.

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[1] J.P., p.454. "My position Lat. 57° 25′ N., 5° 12′ E., steering S.E. by S., 20 knots 5.13 p.m."

[2] Position at 5 p.m., 57° 24′ N., 5° 12′ E., Commander-in-Chief's despatch. J.P., p. 12.

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CHAPTER V.

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF IN TOUCH WITH BATTLE CRUISER FLEET.

5.35 P.M. TO 6.15 P.M.

21. The phase which follows between 5.35 and 6.15 p.m. is one of great importance, but of some complexity. All the forces were converging, and four encounters, all more or less coincident, require to be borne in mind. First, touch is made between Admiral Beatty's cruisers and those of the Grand Fleet; secondly, Admiral Beatty renews the engagement with Admiral Hipper; thirdly, the *Chester* comes into action from the north-east with the 2nd Scouting Group, and is supported by the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron; fourthly, an engagement develops between the *Defence* and *Warrior* ahead of the British battle fleet and the light cruisers of the 2nd Scouting Group (Diagram 14).

In the *Lion* as she sped northward the last news of the *Iron Duke's* position was received about 5.20 p.m.[1] This signal was timed 5.13 and gave the Commander-in-Chief's position as Lat. 57° 25′ N., Long. 5° 12′ E. This was actually his position at 5 p.m., but as no particular time was given, the time of origin (namely, 5.13) was probably attached to it, which would make the *Iron Duke* about 333° 30½ miles off[2] at 5.35 p.m.

The *Lion* altered course at this time[3] to N.N.E., apparently with the two-fold intention of renewing the engagement with Admiral Hipper and of striking the cruiser screen[4] which had been spread ahead of the Battle Fleet in accordance with the instructions contained in the Grand Fleet Battle Orders (Diagram 15).

The Commander-in-Chief in his despatch[5] says that "it was apparent on meeting that the reckoning of the Battle Cruiser Fleet was about 12 miles to the eastward of the *Iron Duke's* reckoning." This was the cumulative effect of the following errors (Diagram 16) :—

(*a*) First, the *Iron Duke's* real position was 4½ miles ahead (that is, to south-eastward) of her reckoning.

(*b*) Second, the *Lion* was actually some 6¾ miles to westward of her reckoning.

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[1] J.P., p. 454 gives 5.16, but signal logs of Battle Cruiser Fleet are all later; *Iron Duke* (s), 5.16; *New Zealand* (w), 5.19; *Falmouth* (w), 5.20; *Princess Royal* (w/e), 5.21.

[2] Admiral Beatty's despatch, J.P., p. 135, gives the estimated position of G.F. as N. 16° W. or 331°.

[3] *Lion's* track, 5.30; *Princess Royal* (r), 5.35.

[4] The course to strike the cruiser screen 10 miles ahead would have been about 6° (N. 18° E.).

[5] J.P., p. 16.

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DIAGRAM 14.

FALMOUTH IN TOUCH WITH BLACK PRINCE AT 5·33 P.M.

POSITION AT 5·30 P.M.



3RD AND 4TH DIVNS (PRE-DREADNOUGHTS) AND 4TH S.G. FOLLOWING IN REAR OF 2ND DIVISION.

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To the *Lion* the error must have appeared much greater, since the omission of a specific time in the *Iron Duke's* 5.13 p.m. position signal had superimposed another error of 4·3 miles (13 minutes at 20 knots) in the anticipated position of the *Iron Duke.*

Renewal of Engagement with Admiral Hipper at 5.40 p.m.

22. At 5.25 p.m. Admiral Beatty ordered his force to prepare to renew the action; a quarter of an hour later the ships of the 1st Scouting Group were seen again dimly through the mist, and fire was reopened at 14,000 yards. The *Lion* and the *Princess Royal* opened on the *Lützow*, the *Tiger* on the *Seydlitz*, and the *New Zealand* on the *Derfflinger*. Admiral Hipper came under a heavy fire and things went badly with him; the setting sun was in his eyes and it was becoming more and more difficult to range and spot. The *Lützow* was heavily hit about 5.50 and her main and auxiliary wireless were put out of action. Admiral Hipper could stand it no longer, and at 5.53 turned to the eastward and withdrew.[1] He had entered what really amounted to a trap. To the north-west was the Grand Fleet; to the west, Admiral Beatty and the 5th Battle Squadron; to the eastward, Rear-Admiral Hood and the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron were rushing down ahead of him. He had not gone far before he heard Admiral Hood's guns ahead of him engaging the 2nd Scouting Group and turned accordingly to S.E. at 6.04. He had barely gone a mile when he saw the *Shark's* little flotilla coming out to attack. Like Admiral von Ingenohl on December 16th, 1914, he thought that the British main fleet must be behind her and that a big torpedo attack was menacing him. He decided to retire on the battle fleet, and at 6.07 turned to S.W.

The 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron comes into Action.

23. In the meantime, while the *Lion* was hammering the *Lützow*, the *Chester*, *Canterbury* and 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron away to the eastward had come into contact with the enemy. Since 4 p.m. the *Invincible* with the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron had been hurrying down to Admiral Beatty's support, with the *Chester* about six miles off a point or two abaft her starboard beam, and the *Canterbury* about five miles ahead. At 5.30 the sound of gunfire was heard to the south-westward; flashes of guns could be seen through the mist, and the *Chester* ran down to investigate. This was the roar and flash of Admiral Hipper's guns engaging the 5th Battle Squadron, and as the *Chester* came down she sighted at 5.36 p.m. a three-funnelled cruiser with

[1] Sir David Beatty (r), "Hauling gradually to the north-eastward." Von Hase indicates that Admiral Beatty's reappearance greatly disconcerted them "by completely outflanking us in spite of our utmost speed. Admiral Beatty executed a brilliant manœuvre . . . compelling us to alter course, bringing us at length into a position where we were completely encircled by the British battle fleet." For the effect of the sun and the hit on the *Lützow*, *see* Admiral Scheer's Report, J.P., p. 593.

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one or two destroyers[1] showing dimly on the starboard bow. This was one of the 2nd Scouting Group under Rear-Admiral Boedicker, probably in a quarterly formation,[2] two or three miles to north-eastward of Hipper on a north-westerly course.[3] The *Chester* turned west to bring her guns to bear, but this course laid her open to attack by the destroyers now on her port bow, and she turned north to bring the enemy well abaft the port beam. As she turned she saw two more cruisers. They opened fire about 5.40 and the *Chester* replied at a range of about 6,000 yards (Diagram 17).

She was almost immediately smothered in a hail of fire. Within five minutes three guns were disabled, a number of her men were killed and wounded, and the after gun only was left in action. But Rear-Admiral Hood had heard the firing, and at 5.37 p.m. had turned the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron round to the north-west. He was now on the *Chester's* starboard bow coming up at full speed, and at 5.55 his 12-inch guns crashed out a reply to Admiral Boedicker and checked his relentless pursuit.

The *Chester*, badly damaged, crossed the *Invincible's* bows and was safe. She had been under fire for 19 minutes; her guns and fire control system were badly damaged,[4] and she had suffered severe casualties, but the engines and boilers were intact, and she was able to steam. She remained to north-eastward of the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron, and afterwards took station astern of the *Minotaur* and 2nd Cruiser Squadron.

The alteration of the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron to the north-westward at 5.37 brought the *Canterbury* astern and was followed by her. About 6.0 p.m. she sighted two light cruisers on her port bow coming down on a southerly course ahead of the enemy battle cruisers. She thereupon altered course about 14 points to port and engaged the light cruisers, which were then firing at the *Shark* and *Acasta*. The enemy turned away at 6.20, and the *Canterbury* then proceeded to the northward and joined the 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron.

This sudden appearance of heavy ships to the north-eastward fell on Admiral Boedicker like a thunderbolt. A mist was hanging over the sea, and it was impossible to make out the full extent of the British strength. He turned sharply to the south-east,[5] fired three torpedoes at the enemy, and reported them by wireless

---

[1] 12th Half-Flotilla accompanying 2nd Scouting Group.

[2] Admiral Scheer's diagram, J.P., German IV.

[3] *Ibid.*, N. 26° W.

[4] Three guns disabled, after control destroyed, electrical circuits damaged, holes in armour, two holes above armour, slight damage to two boilers from splinters, number of small steam pipes shot away. The casualties were 76 (30 killed, 2 died of wounds, 32 seriously and 12 slightly wounded), among them the Commander, Charles Stuart Forbes, and Jack Travers Cornwell, Boy 1st Class, who gained the V.C.

[5] Admiral Scheer's diagram, J.P., German V, S. 23° E. *Indomitable* (r) 16 points."

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CRUISER FORMATION.
L.S.I.
G.F.B.O. CRUISER INSTRUCTIONS.

NOTE:- IN THE ABSENCE OF 5TH B.S. "HAMPSHIRE" WAS TO BE AT "J" AS LINKING SHIP. THIS FORMATION WAS THE NORMAL WITH CENTRE OF SCREEN 20 MILES AHEAD OF BATTLE FLEET. WHEN THIS DISTANCE WAS REDUCED, ALL DISTANCES WERE REDUCED IN PROPORTION WITH CERTAIN EXCEPTIONS, *E.G.* THAT THE 4TH L.C.S. WAS NEVER TO BE LESS THAN THREE MILES AHEAD. IN L.S.I-16, WHICH WAS ORDERED AT 3·10 P.M. IT SHOULD HAVE BEEN 3·2 MILES AHEAD, THE CRUISERS EIGHT MILES APART, AND THE CENTRE OF SCREEN 16 MILES AHEAD OF BATTLE FLEET, OWING TO LACK OF SPEED AND DECREASING VISIBILITY, THESE LATTER DISTANCES WERE NOT ATTAINED.



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to Admiral Scheer,[1] leading the latter to think that the British battle fleet had appeared to the north-east.

In spite of the fog and poor visibility, the *Wiesbaden* and *Pillau* were badly hit, the former was put out of action, and Admiral Boedicker found himself in a nasty predicament. Heavy ships were ahead and Admiral Beatty's squadron astern, but the German 12th Half-Flotilla and the 9th Flotilla were close at hand, and recognising the gravity of the situation, pushed boldly to the front and attacked. By this time the *Wiesbaden* had set smoke boxes alight and was enveloped in a dirty white screen. The 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron left her and passed on to the north-westward. Nine or ten German destroyers were forging ahead of the 2nd Scouting Group, and the *Shark* and *Acasta* could be seen pushing boldly out to make an attack.

It was 6.04[2] when the *Invincible* turned to the westward, steering for the sound of the guns or possibly to keep the light cruisers under fire. As she drove on, heading now towards Admiral Jellicoe and the Grand Fleet, the *Lion* came in sight on the port bow making to the eastward, and almost simultaneously the tracks of torpedoes could be seen coming from the direction of the enemy's light cruisers. The *Invincible* stopped and turned sharply to starboard.[3] The *Indomitable* and *Inflexible* turned too, and the torpedoes ran harmlessly past. The *Lion* was rapidly approaching from the westward, and Rear-Admiral Hood shaped a course S. 50° E. to take station ahead of her. Five miles to the westward the battle fleet had begun to deploy. To the south-eastward the guns of the German destroyers could be heard engaging the *Shark*.

The "Shark's" Attack, 5.50 p.m.

24. The *Shark* was leader of four destroyers,[4] acting as a screen to the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron, and when the *Invincible* turned to the north-westward to close the *Chester* she left the *Shark* on her port quarter. Commander Loftus Jones in the *Shark* saw the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron open fire, and saw the enemy light cruisers turn to the south-eastward on his port bow, and at once pushed out to attack.

This was not the first time he had shown himself a bold and resolute leader. On the morning of the Scarborough raid (December 16th, 1914), with only four destroyers[5] (one of them badly damaged), he had followed an enemy cruiser so stoutly to

[1] Scheer, p. 151.

[2] This turn is not mentioned in the *Indomitable* or *Inflexible* reports, but appears in the *Indomitable's* track. (J.P., Plate 3.)

[3] Large quantities of steam were issuing from her exhaust, and she hoisted the Disregard, then hauled it down and went on at full speed. *Indomitable* (r). The cause of this action remains obscure. She certainly was not hit. The torpedoes were probably fired by the 12th Half-Flotilla and the 9th Flotilla.

[4] *Shark*, *Acasta*, *Ophelia* and *Christopher*, of the 4th Flotilla.

[5] *Shark*, *Acasta*, *Spitfire* and *Hardy* (damaged).

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the eastward as to create the impression that a great force was behind him, inducing the Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Von Ingenohl, to turn back with the whole High Sea Fleet from a position[1] where he was advancing on Admiral Beatty and the 2nd Battle Squadron. He was now to repeat his exploit in a larger arena on a greater day.

On the port bow two or three light cruisers could be seen with the *Regensburg* and nine or ten destroyers, and the *Shark*, followed by the *Acasta*, *Ophelia* and *Christopher*, altered course to west to engage them, supported by the fire of the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron. She fired a torpedo at the *Regensburg*, then as she turned to go back came under a heavy fire.

The pipes to her oil suction were damaged; she was forced to ease down, and finally brought to a stop. Her fore steering gear was shot away. Another shot blew away the foremost gun and she lay helpless in the water. The *Acasta* (Lieutenant-Commander John O. Barron), which had been with her on the morning of the Scarborough raid, stood stoutly by her now and offered to help, but was told by the captain "not to get sunk for him," and withdrew badly damaged and holed fore and aft. At that moment the *Canterbury* appeared, and drew the light cruisers off to the southward, giving the *Shark* a short respite. But soon afterwards several destroyers, probably of the 9th and 6th German Flotillas, came up and opened a heavy fire on her. The after gun was hit and all its crew killed, but the midship gun remained in action. The captain's leg was shot off at the knee, but he continued to encourage his men, and even gave orders for a new ensign to be hoisted to replace the one that was shot away. Right up to the end her single gun was firing[2]; then a destroyer came up and fired two torpedoes at her, one of which hit her near the after funnel. She took a heavy list and sank.[3]

The *Acasta*, trying to help her, had been holed fore and aft, but was still in action, and at 6.12 p.m. could see the battle cruisers of the 1st Scouting Group coming up again on a north-easterly course.[4] She fired her foremost tube at them at about 4,500 yards, unfortunately without hitting, then crawled off badly hit in the engine-room, with her steering gear shot away.[5]

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[1] This was not known at the time, but it is now evident from German reports. This was the "lost opportunity" which von Tirpitz lamented so bitterly.

[2] It possibly accounted for V. 48, which belonged to the 3rd Flotilla, and was a total loss before 6.35 p.m.

[3] A stoker petty officer had tied a lifebelt round Commander Jones, and as the ship sank got him on to a Carley raft. There a few hours later he succumbed from exhaustion, and the remaining survivors were picked up by the Danish S.S. *Vidar*. Commander Loftus Jones was awarded a posthumous V.C.

[4] *See* para. 22. Admiral Hipper had turned to N.E. again at 6.12 p.m.

[5] "At 5.55 we turned east, and at 6 p.m., as the enemy destroyers launched their attack, the entire Battle Cruiser Squadron turned together on a southerly course." Hase, p. 177. Scheer. J.P. (German Plan V), has S. 24° E. then S.W.

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DIAGRAM 16.

DISCREPANCY BETWEEN RECKONINGS OF BATTLE FLEET (IRON DUKE) AND BATTLE CRUISER FLEET (LION)

NOT TO SCALE


A
IRON DUKE'S POSITION AT 6·00 AS IT WOULD APPEAR TO LION, WORKING FROM C. IN C8 1713 SIGNAL WHICH GAVE HIS 5 P.M. POSITION BUT OMITTED TO GIVE THE TIME.
9 MILES
C
6·00 POSN IRON DUKE BY HER D.R.
4½ MILES
B
IRON DUKE (ACTUAL)
B'
POSITION OF IRON DUKE AS IT WOULD APPEAR TO LION ON SIGHTING HER AT 6·00 P.M.
X
LION 6·00 (ACTUAL)
6¾ MILES
Z
LION 6·00 (BY HER RECKONING)
5·35
5·35
ZA IS N 35°W (MAG:) 15½ MILES.
XB IS N 32°E (MAG:) 5½ MILES.
ZB' IS PARALLEL AND EQUAL TO XB.
AB' WHICH IS 14 MILES, IS THE APPARENT DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE RECKONING OF THE BATTLE FLEET AND BATTLE CRUISERS, OR IF THE ERROR ARISING FROM THE OMISSION OF A TIME IN THE 1713 SIGNAL IS NEGLECTED, THE DIFFERENCE IS CB' OR 11 MILES 100°.

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The *Ophelia* (Commander L. G. E. Crabbe, Captain of the *Hardy*, during the Scarborough raid), which had been driven off for a time, saw the battle cruisers alter course to the southward to engage the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron, and, attacking at full speed, fired a torpedo at them.

The attack had borne good results. In its first stages it gave Admiral Hipper the impression that the Grand Fleet was ahead of him, which induced him to turn to the south, to fall back upon his battle fleet. This, in its turn, led Admiral Scheer to a serious miscalculation of the position of the Grand Fleet relative to his own.[1]

The "Defence" in Action, 5.47 p.m. to 6.19 p.m.

25. The period between 5.40 and 6.15 p.m., when two great battle fleets were about to enter the arena, appears at first as a confused picture of mist and battle smoke, but out of it the various cruiser forces began to emerge clearly enough. Admiral Beatty's guns begin to speak, renewing the engagement with the 1st Scouting Group, and a little earlier[2] the *Chester*, 10 miles or so to the eastward, comes into action with Admiral Boedicker, and the 2nd Scouting Group, then a mile to the eastward of Admiral Hipper. The *Lützow*, heavily hit by the *Lion* and *Princess Royal*, turns to the eastward, the firing from the *Defence* ahead of her, perhaps, contributing something to this result.[3]

The 2nd Scouting Group engaging the *Chester* suddenly finds itself under fire from the *Defence* and *Warrior* in the north-west. The *Chester* almost simultaneously turns to the north-eastward, and the 2nd Scouting Group, glad to escape from the *Defence's* fire, follows her in hot pursuit.

A few minutes later Admiral Boedicker finds the *Invincible* and 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron barring his path, and is forced to the south-eastward, leaving the *Wiesbaden* disabled and out of action—the *Shark's* attack, with what he fancied might lie behind it, contributing to this result.

Admiral Hipper hears the crash of the *Invincible's* guns, sees the *Shark's* attack, thinks he is facing the British fleet, and at 6.07 p.m. turns to the S.W. to close the German battle fleet. As soon as he sights it three or four miles to the westward of him, he turns[4] and resumes his course to the north-east,

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[1] *See* page 57 *infra*. *See also* the estimated position of the British battle fleet on Admiral Scheer's plans (J.P., German Plans V and VI).

[2] *Lion's* renewal of engagement may be taken as at 5.41. The *Chester* came into action about 5.38.

[3] Scheer and von Hase both mention a destroyer attack at 5.40 p.m. (Scheer (r), J.P., p. 593; Hase, p. 177.) The former hintsthat this turn away, at 5.53, was made on account of it, but the latter is definite that it was the previous turn from N.W. to N.E. about 5.40 that is meant. There was no destroyer flotilla near enough to make an attack, but their account probably refers to the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, ordered at 5.27 to keep touch with them. *Galatea* reports that she sighted them again about 5.40 p.m. (J.P., p. 173).

[4] At 6.12 p.m.

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giving the *Acasta* a chance to get in another attack. This represents the general trend of events up to the moment when the 1st Cruiser Squadron comes prominently on the scene.

As early at 5.47,[1] the *Defence* and *Warrior*, then about five miles ahead of the *Iron Duke*, sharp on her starboard bow,[2] had caught a glimpse of the 2nd Scouting Group, and turning 3 points to port opened fire at long range. As it disappeared in the mist Sir Robert Arbuthnot evidently decided to chase, and at 6.0 p.m. turned south-eastward to do so. By this time the *Wiesbaden*, crippled by the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron, was crawling slowly back to the westward, hoping perhaps to find cover behind the advancing battle fleet. Admiral Scheer had heard from Admiral Boedicker of her plight, and had altered, course 2 points to port to help her.[3] But it was too late. The *Defence* saw her at 6.5 and opened fire.[4] She was hit by the second salvo and brought to a stop.

Rear-Admiral Sir Robert Arbuthnot, evidently determined to put her out of action and prevent her using torpedoes, altered course to starboard[5] across the head of the advancing battle fleet and came rushing down on her at full speed. Impatient to get into action he pressed across the bows of the *Lion*; he was only 5,500 yards from his target, and had turned to starboard to bring his whole broadside to bear, when he found himself facing a more terrible foe. Admiral Hipper's squadron, after turning to the south-west away from the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron, was coming up again on a north-east course. Von Hase saw the *Wiesbaden* terribly disabled and hidden in smoke, on fire fore and aft with shell after shell crashing into her.[6] Seized with fury, and evidently regarding the plucky little *Onslow* as her tormentor, he fired a salvo at her and she turned away in a cloud of escaping steam, managing, however, to fire a torpedo at the battle cruiser line, another at the *Wiesbaden*,[7] and two more at the advancing battle fleet. Then through the mist and smoke von Hase saw the *Defence*, but in the very act of training his guns on her, she was struck by two salvos from the *Friedrich*

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[1] *Duke of Edinburgh* (r), 5.50, *Hampshire* (r), 5.47, *Warrior* (r), 5.47, "observed 4 points on starboard bow three and possibly four enemy light cruisers." (J.P., p.291.) The range was then 9½ miles. The *Defence* and *Warrior* each fired three salvos, but the initial damage to the *Wiesbaden* seems to have been done by the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron at a range of about five miles.

[2] Since 4.40 p.m. the *Defence* and 1st Cruiser Squadron had been steering S.E. (in towards *Iron Duke*) in order to close *Minotaur* on account of decreasing visibility. *Duke of Edinburgh* (r), J.P., p. 286.

[3] Scheer, p. 151.

[4] *Warrior* (r), J.P., p. 291.

[5] *Warrior* mentions this turn at 6.1 (possibly for 6.10), J.P., p. 291. *Duke of Edinburgh's* track chart, J.P., Plate XI (*a*), also gives 6.10 p.m.

[6] Von Hase saw a light cruiser (evidently the *Onslow*) firing on her, and apparently did not at first see the *Defence*. The *Onslow* engaged the *Wiesbaden* at 6.5 and fired 58 rounds at 2,000 to 4,000 yards. "I was struck by a big shell amidships." (J.P. p. 227.)

[7] This may have hit.

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DIAGRAM 17.

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der Grosse or *Lützow*[1] in quick succession. One hit her aft and a big red flame flashed up and died away; another hit her forward. A huge furnace flared into flame under her fore turret and she blew up with a terrific explosion, leaving only a pillar of smoke to mark the place of Admiral Arbuthnot's flagship. The *Warrior*, too, astern of her, came under a heavy fire[2] from Admiral Hipper's ships and the head of the approaching battle fleet. Another five minutes and she would almost certainly have suffered the same fate. But just at the critical moment the *Warspite* with her helm jammed turned between her and the enemy, drawing off their fire, and she managed to get away safely to the westward.

The movements of the *Black Prince* are obscure during this phase of the action. She reported battle cruisers bearing south at 5.42 p.m.[3] and the *Duke of Edinburgh* saw her turn about 12 points to port at that time.[4] She was probably the armoured cruiser sighted later by the *Warrior* about four miles astern of the battle fleet.[5]

The *Duke of Edinburgh*, endeavouring to follow the *Defence*, found herself unable to cross ahead of the *Lion* and withdrew to the eastward.

Contact Signals, 5.35 p.m. to 6.14 p.m.

26. The series of signals made at this time must be viewed in a very different light from those made between 4.45 and 5.0 p.m. The conditions were much more difficult. Two great fleets were approaching one another wrapped in mist and with only a limited time to make the most momentous decisions.

Positions had to be rapidly plotted, and there was no time available to check or confirm them, but though a considerable amount of information did come in, it was deemed to be too confusing to give any very definite information of the enemy's position.

At 5.55 p.m.[6] the Commander-in-Chief asked the *Marlborough* what she could see, and received a reply about 6.0 p.m. that our battle cruisers bore S.S.W. three to four miles, and were steering east. The thunder of heavy guns could be heard from

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[1] *Warrior* (r), 6.19; *Colossus*, 6.19; *Malaya*, 6.20 p.m. Admiral Scheer says the *Friedrich der Grosse*; von Hase thought it was the *Lützow*. Hase, p. 178; Scheer, p. 153. *Warrior* (r), J.P. p. 291.

[2] Hit 15 times by 11-in. shell (evidently from the *Von der Tann*). Very severe damage was done by a heavy shell which struck the waterline on the port side and entered the engine room, bursting as it passed through the middle line bulkhead.

[3] J.P., p. 456 gives this signal as "enemy battle cruisers," but *Iron Duke* (s), also *Marlborough* (s), has "battle cruisers," and the Commander-in-Chief rightly assumed them to be Admiral Beatty's squadron (G.F., p. 344).

[4] J.P., p. 286.

[5] J.P., p. 292.

[6] *Iron Duke* (s), 5.55; *Marlborough* (s), 6.0 p.m.

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ahead right round to the starboard beam, and it must have been a matter of great difficulty to form a clear picture of the situation.

27. At 6.0 p.m. the *Lion* could be seen from the *Iron Duke* S.W., about five miles off, steering east, and the Commander-in-Chief decided to take ground to the southward. His intention as given later[1] was " to clear up the situation," but the movement, slight in itself, had a distinct tactical significance which merits examination. Here a short digression is necessary. A clear distinction can be drawn between what may be called a direct deployment by a single turn of divisions to N.E. by E. at right angles to the line of advance, and a deployment on the wing in the direction of the line of advance. The time occupied by the former would have been four minutes, by the latter twenty-two. Now the Commander-in-Chief had evidently expected to meet the enemy right ahead, which would have required only a turn of divisions to N.E. by E., and the fleet would have been deployed. But if the enemy were found on the starboard bow, a turn to N.E. by E. would not be enough. For a direct deployment the line of bearing of the guides would have to be thrown forward to an angle at right angles to the enemy's bearing, that is to E. by N.[2] But the same object could be obtained without altering the bearing of the guides by altering the bearing of the enemy, and bringing him right ahead by moving the fleet to the southward. Herein lies the tactical significance of the alteration of course to south at 6.02 p.m.

Hardly had the columns turned to south than the sound of heavy firing indicated the close proximity of the enemy's heavy ships, and the *Lion* signalled[3] that the enemy's battle cruisers bore south-east. The *Southampton's* 5.50 p.m. signal, according to Lord Jellicoe,[4] added now to the perplexities of the situation. The *Lion's* signal made the enemy battle cruisers bear about S. by E. from the *Iron Duke*, but the *Southampton's* report placed them S.W. from his battle fleet, which tended to make the German battle fleet some seven miles or so to the south-eastward.[5] In the Commander-in-Chief's mind, however, the conviction was gradually shaping itself that he would strike the enemy's battle fleet on a bearing sharp on the starboard bow,[6] and in these circumstances he turned back to a S.E. course and ordered all destroyers to take up position No. 1 for battle.

Meanwhile the *Barham* had sighted Admiral Scheer's battleships S.S.E. at 6.10 and ordered the *Valiant* to pass the news by

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[1] G.F., p. 346.

[2] The Commander-in-Chief evidently had this in mind (cf. G.F., p. 345). To alter the bearing of the guides to E. by N. would have taken 20 minutes.

[3] At 6.6 p.m.

[4] G.F., p. 347.

[5] The discrepancies in the *Southampton's* previous series of signals would lead, however, to the rejection of any statement which seemed improbable.

[6] G.F., p. 346.

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DIAGRAM 18.

LAST REPORTS.
6·14 P.M.



THIS DIAGRAM SHOWS POSITION OF ENEMY'S BATTLE FLEET BY LAST REPORTS. VIZ:- BARHAM'S 6·10 AND LION'S 6·14. VISIBILITY DISTANCE TAKEN AS 5 MILES. (G.F.P. 348)
"J" IS THE POSITION GIVEN TO THE ENEMY BY ADMIRAL JELLICOE AT THE TIME AND THE RED PECKED LINE (--------) SHOWS THE PROBABLE ACTUAL POSITION OF THE VAN OF ENEMY BATTLE FLEET.

318 WT 10737A/250/618
411. WT 9568B/618.
H.M.S.O. Cr., Lith.

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wireless. The Commander-in-Chief received it about 6.14 p.m.,[1] and almost simultaneously a signal came in from the *Lion* reporting them in sight, S.S.W. (Diagram 18). These two reports tended to place the enemy thirty to forty degrees on the *Marlborough's* bow,[2] and there appeared to be danger of deployment on the starboard wing column involving it in action with the German battle fleet before the movement could be completed, and exposing the Battle Fleet to destroyer attack.

These were the considerations which passed through the Commander-in-Chief's mind. He decided to deploy to port on a S.E. by E. course and the signal for deployment went up—Equal Speed Pendant C.L. It was made by flags and wireless at fifteen minutes past six.[3]

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[1] *Iron Duke* (s), 6.14 p.m. Lord Jellicoe says 6.15 in G.F., p. 347.

[2] G.F., p. 348, Diagram I, 30° on *Marlborough's* bows, seven miles. Admiral Scheer's diagram makes the course of the German battle fleet. N. 68° E. (mag.) from 6 p.m. to 6.16 p.m., then N. 45° E. (J.P., German Plan V).

[3] J.P., 6.15; *Iron Duke* (s), 6.16 and 6.14; *Marlborough* (w), 6.13; *Marlborough* (s), 6.15; *Benbow* (s), 6.16; *Falmouth*, 6.15 p.m.

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CHAPTER VI.

THE FIRST HALF HOUR.

6.15 P.M. TO 6.40 P.M.

Formation of German Fleet.

28. When the British battle fleet turned to deploy at 6.15 the *König*, which was leading the enemy's line, bore about S. 16° E., seven miles from the *Marlborough*. She was on an E.N.E. course,[1] and astern of her were the six ships of Rear-Admiral Behncke's 3rd Squadron. Then came the *Friedrich der Grosse*, Admiral Scheer's flagship, followed by the eight ships of the 1st Squadron. At 6.16 the *König* turned to N.E., and the position at 6.19 is shown in Diagram 19.

Preliminary Firing.

29. As the British Fleet turned to deploy at 6.15, a few enemy salvos fell round the centre and rear divisions,[2] and the ships of the *Marlborough's* division could see vessels of the *Kaiser* or *Helgoland* class looming indistinctly and intermittently through the mist. The *Wiesbaden* could be seen through its smoke screen some five miles off, and became the first target for a number of ships.[3] With the exception of the *Marlborough* and 5th Battle Squadron, few ships were firing as the fleet proceeded N.E. by E.[4] Even after turning to S.E. by E., fire was impeded by mist and intervening smoke, and did not become general till about 6.25.

The Battle Cruisers.

30. When the battle fleet started to deploy, the battle cruisers were already two or three miles ahead of the *Benbow's* division, steaming at full speed on an easterly course. They presented a tremendous picture of speed and power, with the scars of battle plainly visible. The guns of one of the *Lion's* turrets were gazing blankly out on the disengaged side, and a long trail of smoke was pouring from a shellhole in her side.

---

[1] J. P. German plan VI, diagram No. 4.

[2] *Iron Duke, Hercules* and *Revenge.*

[3] *Hercules, Collingwood, Vanguard, Iron Duke, Superb, Canada, Monarch, Conqueror, Thunderer* and *Barham.* The smoke screen was evidently effective, for she managed to survive till 7 p.m. Some 13 ships fired about 50 salvos at her, and the *Onslow* fired a torpedo, which very possibly hit.

[4] The *Marlborough* opened fire at 6.17 at a *Kaiser* class battleship at a range of 13,000 yards and fired seven salvos in four minutes. The *Barham* opened fire about 6.14 and the *Valiant* reports a range of 19,000 yards and very good visibility at 6.17. Her time is apparently two or three minutes fast. (J.P., p. 207.)

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9TH FLOTILL

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DIAGRAM 20.

1ST & 2ND BATTLE CRUISER SQUADRONS.

AT 6·15 P.M.



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DIAGRAM 21.

3RD BATTLE CRUISER SQUADRON AND 1ST SCOUTING GROUP.

AT 6.20 P.M.



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411 Wt 9568/6.0
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The battle cruisers were engaging the enemy to the southward,[1] when the *Defence* and *Warrior* crossed their bows, forced the *Lion* to alter course to port to avoid collision, and, coming down their engaged side, fouled the range and shut out the target for a time (Diagram 20). A few miles off on the port bow the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron could be seen approaching on a westerly course,[2] and Admiral Beatty now ordered Rear-Admiral Hood to take station ahead. Admiral Hood's ships had just been manœuvring to avoid torpedoes fired by the 12th Half-Flotilla and 9th Flotilla about 6 p.m.[3] He now turned in a masterly manner ahead of the *Lion* to a south-easterly course. Away to the southward, Admiral Hipper was returning on a north-easterly course, and a few minutes later the engagement commenced which was to prove so fateful to the *Invincible* (Diagram 21).

The 5th Battle Squadron.

31. Leaving the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron at 6.21 just before their guns open on Admiral Hipper's ships, we must look at the 5th Battle Squadron turning up in the rear of the battle line. When Admiral Evan Thomas first sighted the *Marlborough* shortly after 6.0 p.m.,[4] he decided to take station ahead of her, evidently regarding her as the head of the line till he saw the fleet beginning to deploy. When the deployment commenced, the *Barham* had reached a position a mile or so on the *Marlborough's* starboard beam, and as she could not follow Sir David Beatty's squadron, now some 3½ miles ahead of her, without masking the fire of the battle line, Admiral Evan Thomas decided to take station in rear. To do this he had to make a wide turn to port, during which the range fell to about 10,000 yards.

Three of his ships turned in safety, but the *Warspite* was not so fortunate. About 6.20, just as the *Barham* was turning to the northward, she was closing the *Malaya* and 20° port helm was given her.[5] The steering engine was working badly at the time, probably due to a heated thrust bearing and the helm being put

[1] Probably about 12,000 yards off, about 30° before the *Lion's* starboard beam. *Princess Royal* reports a range of 13,000 yards at 6 hrs. 16 mins. 40 secs.; *Tiger*, 15,000 yards at 6.17; *New Zealand* (battleship), 17,000 yards at 6.19.

[2] About 6.17.

[3] These flotillas had gone out to cover the turn away of the 1st Scouting Group and 2nd Scouting Group at 5.55. The tracks of about five torpedoes were seen by the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron. The *Invincible* turned to starboard about 6.15, the *Indomitable* to starboard, the *Inflexible* to port to avoid them.

[4] At 6.6 p.m., G.F., p. 351.

[5] The account of her movements is not clear. The R.A. 5th Battle Squadron (J.P., p. 194) says the turn was made without signal, but the signal log contains the signal at 6.18, "Turn in succession 16 points to port." Her movements can be best accounted for on the assumption that she put her helm over with the *Barham*, and then gave hard-a-port helm to get back into line again. The helm jammed and she went right round, shaving the stern of the *Valiant*.

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over too quickly for the speed of 25 knots, bent the telemotor gearing and the helm jammed. The ship swung round to starboard, just shaving the *Valiant's* stern, and neither helm nor engines would bring her head back to port. She continued to swing round and was coming under a heavy fire[1] when Captain Phillpotts, making a virtue of necessity, went full speed ahead, and continued the compulsory turn to starboard. A mile or so to the eastward, the *Defence* had just disappeared in a black pall of smoke, and the *Warrior*, badly damaged, with her bridge wrecked, and the fate of the *Defence* menacing her every moment, was drawing close, making to the westward under heavy fire.

The *Warspite's* turn carried her right round to the *Warrior*, and drawing off the enemy's fire gave the latter a respite of five or six minutes, which probably saved her from immediate destruction. After making a complete turn to starboard under heavy fire,[2] the *Warspite* regained control of her helm and followed the *Barham* to the northward (Diagram 22).

At 7.0 p.m. she was about half a mile off the *Malaya* when it was discovered that the helm was again out of order, and she withdrew out of action to the north-west.[3] She did not return to the fleet. She had received 13 hits, one of which had opened the wings and appeared to threaten the engine-room bulkheads.

The Light Cruisers and Destroyers.

32. The movements of the light cruisers and destroyers were largely governed by the deployment diagram (Diagram 23). At about 6.15 p.m. the position of the Light Cruiser Squadrons was approximately as in Diagram 24.

The 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, which had been two miles ahead of the *Lion* at 6.0 p.m., got entangled for a time in the lines of the battle fleet,[4] then, leaving the *Galatea* behind, went on at full speed round the disengaged side of the fleet. The *Falmouth* and 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron were well ahead[5] of the battle fleet just before deployment, keeping in touch with the enemy. As the fleet deployed, they engaged the *Wiesbaden* to the southward,[6] and the *Falmouth* fired a torpedo at her at 5,000 yards. The movements of the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron were simple enough. In a position immediately ahead of the battle fleet, it was more easily able to conform to its movements, and

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[1] *Warspite* (r) gives the closest range as 12,000 yards. (J.P. p. 203.)

[2] Between 6.18 and 6.28.

[3] One report states that the second steering engine had been connected up with 15 degrees port helm (Fighting at Jutland, 147). At 8.30 she was some 30 miles to the northward of the *Barham*, and at 8.50 asked for the position of the Battle Fleet and was ordered by the Rear-Admiral, 5th Battle Squadron, to proceed to Rosyth.

[4] Between 6.07 and 6.21; it turned sharp round between the 4th and 5th Divisions at 6.07 and passed astern of the 4th. The *Galatea's* speed was reduced to 16 knots by a breakdown in the port forced draught fan.

[5] About three miles ahead of the *Orion*.

[6] At 10,000 to 7,000 yards.

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5TH BATTLE SQUADRON.

WARSPITE AND WARRIOR

AT 6.18 P.M.



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31B W.T. 10237A/250 6/18
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DEPLOYMENT DIAGRAM.

(GRAND FLEET BATTLE ORDER, DECEMBER, 1915.)



A TO L ON BOW = 2 POINTS.

M TO P ON QUARTER = 5 POINTS ABAFT BEAM.

A	¾′ FROM B. 5TH L.C.S. } HARWICH FORCE	I	ASTERN OF G. 4TH OR 11TH FLOTILLA
B	½ FROM C. 10TH FLOTILLA } HARWICH FORCE	J	4¼ AHEAD OF B.F. 12TH FLOTILLA
C	2′ FROM E. L.C.S.	K	ON QUARTER OF H 9TH FLOTILLA
D	AHEAD OF E 13TH FLOTILLA	L	1½′ FROM B.F. 5TH B.S
E	8′ FROM B.F. 6½ FROM 5TH B.S } BATTLE CRUISER FLEET	M	POSITION OF 5TH B.S. IF THE FLEET DEPLOYS AWAY FROM HELIGOLAND
F	½′ FROM G. 2ND C.S.	N	1¼′ FROM B.F. L.C.S.
G	4¼′ FROM B.F. 4TH L.C.S.	O	2¼ FROM B.F. 11TH OR 4TH FLOTILLA
H	5½ FROM B.F. L.C.S.	P	3½′ FROM B.F. C.S.

DIAGRAM 23.

H.M.S.O.Cr.Lith.

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LIGHT CRUISER SQUADRONS.

ABOUT 6·15 P.M.



(POSITIONS APPROXIMATE ONLY)



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forming line ahead just before deployment,[1] took station on the disengaged bow of the *King George V.* The *Southampton* and 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron were some distance away all this time. When the deployment commenced they were some 7½ miles behind the *Lion*, and, passing "Windy Corner"[2] at 6.25, went on towards the deployment point.

The position of the flotillas on deployment is shown in Diagram 25. Shortly after 6.0 p.m.[3] the Commander-in-Chief had ordered destroyers to take up No. 1 disposition. The 4th, 11th and 12th Flotillas[4] were ahead of the battle fleet. On the port beam of the *Lion* was the 1st Flotilla, unable to get ahead because of the *Lion's* speed; the *Fearless*, their leader, had fallen behind; so, too, had the 13th Flotilla;[5] the 9th and 10th, led by the *Lydiard*, had dropped to the port beam of the 5th Battle Squadron at 6.0 p.m.[6]

When the fleet deployed, the 4th and 11th Flotillas turned to port and proceeded to take station ahead of the line; the 12th turned and took up its position in rear on the engaged side. The 13th and 9th did the same on the disengaged side and remained there during the action.

As the battle cruisers passed the head of the battle fleet the destroyers of the 1st and 12th Flotillas began to run through one another's lines, and several had to stop and go astern to avoid collision.[7] Salvos were falling round them, and the *Attack* was hit by the nose of an 11-inch projectile.

The lines were in some confusion at this juncture, and for a short time destroyers were busy getting out of one another's way.

The Battle Fleet.

33. The battle fleet after deployment could only occasionally get into action. Its actual firing was confined to two periods of about 20 minutes and a quarter of an hour respectively; the first immediately after deployment when the fleet was in line ahead, commencing about 6.20 and lasting till about 6.40, when

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[1] At 6.10 p.m.

[2] A name given in the fleet to the point nearest the enemy where the *Marlborough* turned at 6.15.

[3] At 6.8 p.m., No. 1 disposition was divisions in line ahead disposed abeam with leaders ahead.

[4] The 4th Flotilla, ahead of the 2nd Battle Squadron, was 12 in number. With the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron: *Shark* (sunk), *Acasta* (disabled), *Ophelia*, *Christopher*. With the 2nd Cruiser Squadron: *Owl*, *Hardy*, *Midge*. The 11th Flotilla, ahead of 4th Battle Squadron, 16 in number. The 12th Flotilla, ahead of the 1st Battle Squadron, 15 in number. *Mischief* with 2nd Cruiser Squadron.

[5] Only five ships with the *Champion*, viz.:—*Narborough*, *Obdurate*, *Petard*, *Pelican*, *Nerissa*. The *Turbulent*, *Termagant* and *Nicator* were with the *Lydiard* and 9th Flotilla. The *Onslow* and *Moresby* were on the engaged side of the *Lion*. The *Nestor* and *Nomad* had been sunk.

[6] *Lydiard's* diagram, J.P., Plate 22.

[7] *Faulknor*, *Obedient* and several others (Fighting at Jutland pp. 130, 131.)

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the enemy had turned away and was lost to sight; the second, on the southerly course, from about 7.10 till about 7.25 p.m. During this first period no battleship could fire for many minutes together, for the enemy could only be seen fitfully through the smoke and mist.

Between the fleets lay the blazing *Wiesbaden*, wreathed in smoke[1]; at the rear of the line, the cloud of the explosion in which the *Defence* had perished hung like a pall over the water; while towards the van, the *Duke of Edinburgh*, in her desperate efforts to get clear, was leaving a long trail of smoke behind her.[2] The deployment upon the port wing had committed the battle cruisers to crossing the front to take up their station ahead, and as they passed, they, too, had to mask the fire of some of the ships in the van.[3]

The *Iron Duke* was one of the first to fire; she turned to S.E. by E. at 6.21[4] and opened fire on the *Wiesbaden* two minutes later, but it was not till 6.30 that she found a suitable target in the form of a ship of the *König* class, and gave it nine salvos and saw six hits. For the first twenty minutes the firing was limited to about one-third of the fleet, the ships firing with any effect on the enemy's battle fleet at this time numbering less than a dozen[5]; but in spite of smoke and poor visibility considerable punishment was certainly inflicted between 6.25 and 6.35 on the leading ships of the German line.[6] At 6.26 the Commander-in-Chief reduced speed to 14 knots in order to let the battle cruisers get ahead.[7] The signal did not get through quickly, and bunching and overlapping began to occur,[8] with the result that two or three ships found their fire masked.[9] It was probably accentuated by the numerous small craft moving close to the lines, but gradually the line straightened out, and the deployment may be regarded as completed about 6.40.[10]

The German Fleet.

34. At 6.27 the *König*, coming up on a N.E. course, turned to east, probably induced to do so by the thunder of the guns on

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[1] *Marlborough* (r), J.P., p. 70.

[2] Vice-Admiral Jerram (r), J.P., p. 108.

[3] *e.g.*, *Monarch* (r), J.P., p. 373.

[4] Admiral Jellicoe's plan, J.P., Plate 7A.

[5] *Iron Duke* (9 salvos), *Hercules* (7 salvos), *Marlborough* (7), *Revenge*, *Colossus*, *Neptune*, *Barham* (3), *Orion* (4), *Monarch* (3), *Conqueror* (3), *Thunderer* (3).

[6] Forty-two salvos are reported at the 3rd Squadron between 6.16 and 6.40. It received 25 hits altogether, and it is reasonable to attribute at least one-half of them to this period.

[7] G.F., p. 352; the *Lion* was then on the starboard beam of the *King George V.*, going 25 knots.

[8] The *Marlborough* had to reduce to 8 knots and the *St. Vincent* had to stop. The 5th Division was still bunched at 6.32.

[9] *Neptune* (6th Division) by *St. Vincent* (5th Division), 6.32. *Thunderer* and *Conqueror* (2nd Division) by *Iron Duke* (3rd Division).

[10] This did not include the 5th Battle Squadron, which was independent of the line.

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DIAGRAM 25.

DESTROYER FLOTILLAS.
ABOUT 6.15 P.M.
POSITIONS APPROXIMATE.

2ND C.S.

OWL (4TH)
HARDY (4TH)
MIDGE (4TH)
MISCHIEF (12TH)

SCALE.

½ 0 1 2 3 4 5 NAUTICAL MILES.





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her starboard bow.[1] The 1st Squadron had apparently turned together to the northward about 6.24.

Just at this time the poor visibility evidently led Admiral Jellicoe to think of closing the range, and he hoisted a signal to alter course by sub-divisions to S.S.E.[2] This would have been a difficult movement to accomplish. Half the fleet only had deployed, and, including the 5th Battle Squadron, there were still some twelve ships to turn.[3] The British fleet was therefore in the form of an L open to the S.S.E., and a turn by sub-divisions in that direction would have resulted in an L with twelve sub-divisions steering out of it. The disadvantages of such a formation was quickly seen and the signal was negatived. Admiral Jellicoe's choice of a southern horizon seems to have been fully justified, for the Germans do not seem to have seen the British line, and their fire at this time was apparently directed against the battle cruisers. Half the British fleet was firing by now,[4] but the enemy's reply was ineffective,[5] and no British battleship was hit.

The Loss of the "Invincible."

35. While the battle fleet was deploying a fierce engagement had developed to the south-eastward between Admirals Hipper and Hood. As the *Invincible* turned to south-eastward at 6.20, the 1st Scouting Group could be seen approaching from the southward,[6] and turning to a parallel course, they opened fire about 6.23[7] (Diagram 21). The advantage at first lay with the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron, and several heavy projectiles crashed into the *Derfflinger*. But at 6.31[8] the veil of mist lifted for a few minutes. Von Hase in the *Derfflinger* saw a "Dreadnought" sharply silhouetted before him steaming at full speed on a parallel course. He trained rapidly on her and gave a range of 9,000 metres (9,876 yards). The salvo went over and he came down 100. The next salvo had two shorts and two hits. The third fell on Q turret, and again was witnessed the tremendous tragedy of a great ship disappearing beneath the waves.

Several big explosions took place in rapid succession; masses of coal dust issued from the riven hull; great tongues of flames played over the ship; the masts collapsed; the ship broke in two,

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[1] The 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron engaging the 1st Scouting Group.

[2] Not in *Iron Duke* (s); *Benbow* (s), 6.29.

[3] The turning point was probably occupied at 6.29 by the *Temeraire*.

[4] Mean time of opening fire was 6.27½.

[5] "Our ships were not seriously under fire," Vice-Admiral Sturdee (r), J.P., p. 122. "The 3rd Sub-division was never under fire," Rear-Admiral Duff (r), J.P., p. 124.

[6] Bearing about S. 15° W.

Von Hase says they engaged "Dreadnoughts" to the N.E., but as he speaks of the *Invincible* as a "Dreadnought," it is clear that the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron is meant.

[8] Von Hase says 6.29.

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and an enormous pall of black smoke ascended to the sky. As it cleared away the bow and stern could be seen standing up out of the water as if to mark the place where an Admiral lay.[1]

The action continued for a few minutes, but Admiral Hipper's squadron had evidently suffered severely, for at 6.35 it turned sharply away to the westward.

Admiral Scheer's Turn Away at 6.35 p.m.

36. The position at this time is shown in Diagram 26. The *König* and the 3rd Squadron after turning at 6.27 had continued for some six minutes on an easterly course. Admiral Behncke, in the *König*, then turned to the south-east, mistaking the guns of the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron on his port bow for the British battle fleet. The 1st Squadron seems to have turned together at the same time to E.N.E., bringing them once more in line with the 3rd. The *König* had only been a few minutes on her new course when Admiral Scheer, evidently falling into the same mistake as Admiral Behncke and influenced by Admiral Hipper's turn away at this time,[2] decided to withdraw, and made a signal for the whole fleet to turn 16 points together to the westward.

The manœuvre was not a simple one, for it involved a turn together of 16 ships with a kink of not less than 2 points at two places in the line.[3] But this swing round of the whole fleet on a curved line had been constantly practised by Admiral Scheer in manœuvres, and it now stood him in good stead. The line turned,[4] and, followed by the battle cruisers, drew off to the westward.

As Admiral Scheer turned, the 3rd Flotilla was sent out to attack to the north-east, but the slackening of the British fire led Commodore Michelsen, the Senior Officer (T), to think that it was being launched "into a void," and he recalled it. It came back after raising a smoke screen to cover the turn of the fleet, but two of its boats, G. 88 and V. 73, went on in company with S. 32 of the 1st Flotilla, and fired six torpedoes, four of which passed close to the *Princess Royal* and *Tiger*.[5] This was one of the critical moments of the action, and Admiral Scheer's manœuvre was almost precisely similar in its main features to that which he performed three-quarters of an hour later at 7.15.

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[1] Hase, p. 184; picture of the explosion in Fighting at Jutland, p. 244. Six survivors (two officers and four men) were picked up by the *Badger* (1st Flotilla) at 6.40 p.m.

[2] Admiral Scheer says "that the battle cruisers were forced to turn away so sharply that at 6.35 I was obliged to make a battle turn of 16 points to starboard, altering course to west." Probably the heavy fire on his van contributed to his decision.

[3] A kink of about 4 points at the 3rd or 4th ship (*Kronprinz* or *Markgraf*) and of some 2 points at the last ship of the 3rd Squadron, the *Prinzregent Luitpold*. J.P., German Plan VI., Diagram 5.

[4] To about S. 60° W.; and at 6.41 to west. J.P. German Plan V.

[5] Scheer (r); Scheer, p. 154; *Tiger* (r) states that they "developed a very heavy smoke screen" at this time.

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

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It bears all the marks of a preconcerted design. The prospect of meeting the British fleet must often have presented itself to the German Commander-in-Chief. A fight on parallel courses with a fleet greatly superior in gun power was out of the question. There was only one course to pursue—to turn away—and in each case the same manœuvre is repeated. A flotilla attacks, a smoke screen is thrown up, and the fleet turns away altogether.

In the thickening mist and smoke the enemy was lost to sight, and a lull ensued which gave Admiral Scheer a short and much needed respite.

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CHAPTER VII.

THE SECOND ENGAGEMENT AND ADMIRAL SCHEER'S TURN-AWAY.

The Turn to South-east and South.

37. By 6.40 the British deployment was complete and the line was straightening out. The enemy was out of sight, and at 6.42 the Commander-in-Chief made a signal to alter course by divisions to south-east[1] (Diagram 27). Course was altered at 6.44, a lull ensued in the firing, and for eleven minutes the fleet moved to the south-east. The 4th Light Cruiser Squadron had crossed the track of the fleet at 6.33, and now took station ahead of the *King George V.*[2]

The *Lion* by this time had reached a position some 3½ miles ahead[3] of the *King George V.* and was steering S.E. The 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron was a mile off, on her starboard bow. Far away to the westward, astern of the battle fleet, was the *Southampton.* She had just reached the point of deployment where the long file of ships had followed one another in succession to S.E. by E. There she saw the enemy turn away, and, to keep them in view, ran boldly down to the southward and south-eastward. At 7.0 p.m. she signalled their bearing and course to Admiral Beatty,[4] and though the importance of the signal was subsequently diminished by the re-appearance of the enemy, it deserves to be remembered as a fine example of light cruiser work. She then turned, and as the British fleet was now coming down on a southerly course to the eastward of her, passed to the northward and astern of it.

The Commander-in-Chief did not receive the *Southampton's* report till 7.0 p.m. and had already ordered the fleet to alter course to south[5] (Diagram 28). Whilst this signal was being made the only German torpedo to hit in the action got home on the *Marlborough.* The probability is that it was fired by the *Wiesbaden.* The explosion flooded the Diesel and hydraulic engine rooms; one of the boiler rooms began to flood and the ship listed seven degrees, but she was able to continue in the line and to maintain a speed of 17 knots. In "A" boiler room the rising water quickly put out the fires on the starboard side,

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[1] Lord Jellicoe in G.F., p. 356 says "without signal"; *Iron Duke* (s), 6.42; *New Zealand,* 6.42; *Marlborough* (w/e), 6.41; *Benbow* (s), 6.40.

[2] It came too close, and the *King George V.* had to alter course to starboard at 6.51 to avoid a collision.

[3] At 6.44, 10° on *King George V.'s* engaged bow.

[4] "Enemy battle fleet steering E.S.E. Enemy bears S.S.W., number unknown. My position Lat. 57° 02′ N., Long. 6° 07′ E." Received in *Iron Duke,* 7 p.m.

[5] *Benbow* (s), 6.52; *Iron Duke* (s), 6.50; *Marlborough* (s), 6.52. executive, 6.53; *New Zealand* (s), 6.55; *Iron Duke* (r) mentions altering course to S. 8° E. at 6.51 (J.P., p. 53).

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818 Wt 10737/230/6/8 150C. 6.24.
4/11 Wt 9568/619 1000. 8.24.

DIAGRAM 28.









APPROXIMATE POSITIONS AT 6·56 P.M.

BRITISH FLEET TURNED TO SOUTH AT 6·55 P.M.

GERMAN FLEET TURNED TO EAST AT 6·57 P.M.



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but the stokers, working in water up to their knees, continued with the greatest coolness to keep the port boilers going.[1]

At about 6.55 Admiral Scheer had sent three or four destroyers to save the crew of the *Wiesbaden*. On their way V. 73 and G. 88 seized the opportunity of firing four torpedoes at the 5th Battle Squadron. It is just possible that one of these may have hit the *Marlborough*, but it would have had to be fired about 6.44, which does not agree with Admiral Scheer's time.

Admiral Scheer's Turn to Eastward at 6.55.

38. The enemy meanwhile was retiring on a westerly course His formation was apparently a loose divisional formation.[2]

The lines were reversed, and the *Westfalen* was leading, with the *König* bringing up the rear. The 2nd Squadron was a mile or so to the south-westward on a north-westerly course, conforming to the movements of the 1st Squadron. Some three or four miles to the south-eastward of the *König* was the 1st Scouting Group in a far from happy state.

The *Lützow* was badly down by the bows, listing heavily with enormous volumes of smoke pouring out of her forecastle; she hauled out of the line and steamed slowly off on a southerly course.[3] At 7.0 p.m. Admiral Hipper left her and headed in a destroyer for the *Seydlitz*, signalling to Captain Hartog of the *Derfflinger* to assume command till his flag was transferred.

The *Derfflinger* herself was in a bad way. The masts and rigging were badly cut up and the wireless sending apparatus out of action. Two armour plates had been torn off the bows, leaving a huge hole open to the sea. A danger of another sort now confronted her. The torpedo nets aft had been shot away and were trailing over the port propeller, threatening every moment to foul it and bring the engine to a stop. But the enemy were no longer in sight. The ship was stopped; the crews of the two turrets, all to perish within an hour, swarmed out, and, working like madmen, cut away the nets.

At 6.55, when about 13 miles S.W. of the *Iron Duke*, the German battle fleet was swung round 16 points together to an easterly course. It was now heading straight into the centre of the arc formed by the British fleet. In a few minutes the leading squadron and battle cruisers would be threatened with envelopment and the concentrated fire of practically the whole Grand Fleet. The High Sea Fleet seemed to be rushing headlong to destruction. The motives for this manœuvre which are given in Admiral Scheer's book and despatches should be accepted with reserve. He explains that it was too early to take up night cruising order. The British could follow, and by compelling him to fight, force him to adopt a particular course of action under enemy pressure. The initiative would pass into their

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[1] At 2 a.m. the ship had to reduce to 12 knots.
[2] J.P., German Plan VI, Diagram 6.
[3] German Plan V shows her out of the line at 6.30 p.m.

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hands, and they would be able to cut off his retreat from the Bight. There was only one way to avoid this: by advancing regardless of consequences and sending all destroyers to the attack. A bold offensive would upset Admiral Jellicoe's plans for the rest of the day and, if the blow fell heavily, facilitate the German retreat during the night. It would give an opportunity, too, for a last effort to save the *Wiesbaden*, or at least rescue her crew.[1]

His intention was, more probably, to slip past the rear of the British fleet and make for home. (*See* paragraph 41 *infra.*)

British Movements from 6.55.

39. Meanwhile the British battle fleet was pursuing its way to the south in divisions line ahead one mile apart, disposed approximately S.E. by E. At 7.5 the Commander-in-Chief had altered course 3 points to starboard (to S.W. by S.) in order to close the range, but he had only been on this course a few minutes when a submarine was reported,[2] and hostile destroyers were seen approaching from the S.W. The Commander-in-Chief thereupon turned back to south[3] with the twofold object of turning on the submarine and being ready for any manœuvre that might be required.[4]

Admiral Beatty meanwhile had ordered the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron (then a mile or so ahead) to take station astern, and turned at 6.54 to allow it to do so, then shaped course S.W. by S. to cross the line of the advancing battle fleet (7.09 p.m.).

The Engagement, 7.12 p.m. to 7.25 p.m. (Diagram 29).

40. The battle fleet had hardly turned to south when the *Hercules*, the third ship in the *Marlborough's* division, sighted

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[1] The Austrian Naval Attaché's report (June 17th, 1916) quotes Scheer as saying that "The fact is, I had no definite object. I made the first advance because I thought I ought to assist the *Wiesbaden* and because the situation was quite obscure to me, for I saw nothing of the *Lützow* and received no W/T reports. I soon saw that the leading ships were coming under an overwhelming fire and that I could not risk the fleet on the *Wiesbaden's* account. When I noticed that the British pressure had quite ceased and that the fleet remained intact in my hands, I turned back under the impression that the action could not end in this way, and that I ought to seek contact with the enemy again." Von Trotha, the Admiral's Chief of Staff, is reported on the same authority to have said jocularly that if an admiral had brought about such a position at manœuvres, he would be relieved of his command.

[2] G.F., p. 360. The *King George V.* at 7 p.m. reported a submarine ahead of the *Iron Duke*, and the *Duke of Edinburgh* (then about 3½ miles on the port bow of the *Iron Duke*) reported a submarine at 7.1 2 points on her own port bow. The reports could not have referred to the same submarine, but as there was no submarine in the vicinity, the point need not be laboured.

[3] *King George V.*, 7.09; *Revenge*, 7.10; *Iron Duke*, 7.7; Commander-in-Chief's despatch, 7.10.

[4] G.F., p. 361. The Commander-in-Chief's despatch mentions only the approach of a flotilla of destroyers.

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318. W.T.10237/1880/250
400. W.T.9558/1918



DIAGRAM 29

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the *Seydlitz* to the south-westward, and at the same moment the *Colossus* in the next division saw the *Derfflinger* coming out of the mist. There were the German battle cruisers clearly visible on a south-easterly course at a range of less than 10,000 yards. Two or three miles further off, Admiral Scheer's battleships could be seen. He was returning in line ahead, the *König* leading at the head of the 3rd Squadron, with the *Friedrich der Grosse* and the 1st Squadron following in rear. The *Hercules* opened fire on the *Seydlitz* and the *Colossus* on the *Derfflinger*, and hits were obtained by both after a few salvos. The *Marlborough's* guns came into action at the same time,[1] followed at 7.15 by those of the battle cruisers, and the guns of practically the whole fleet joined in. The mist cleared for a few minutes and the *Derfflinger* and *Seydlitz* came under a tremendous fire.[2] In the former, a 15-inch shell went through the armour of C turret and burst. The flames passed to the working chamber and ignited four charges, and then to the handing room, setting four more on fire. But they burnt only, and did not explode. Of the 78 men in the turret, 73 perished. Another 15-inch shell struck the roof of D turret,[3] went through it, and burst inside with terrible effect. The flash set fire to a number of cartridges, and great tongues of flames went roaring skyward from both the after turrets—like two ghastly funeral torches.[4] Another shell struck the conning tower, tearing huge pieces out of the armour, and another burst under the bridge.[5] The visibility was all in favour of the British. The British ships were barely visible; the red flashes of the guns were all that could be seen. In the *Derfflinger* only A turret remained in action, and got in two hits on the *Colossus;*[6] one entered the foremost superstructure and burst on the port side of the lower gun deck, firing ten boxes of ready use cordite but only slightly wounding two or three men; the other hit the port signal deck without bursting; a third burst short, abreast of the fore bridge, wrecked the starboard searchlight, damaged the

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[1] The *Marlborough* says she was firing at a *Markgraf* class at 10,200 yards.

[2] The *Derfflinger* from the **Revenge*, **Colossus*, **Neptune*, **Benbow*, and *Superb*; the *Seydlitz* from **Hercules*, **Revenge* and **Barham*, *Agincourt*, **Collingwood*, *Bellerophon*, *Royal Oak* and *Lion*. The **Valiant* and **Malaya* at the *Von der Tann* at 10,400. The *Orion* was firing at 19,000 yards; *Monarch* about 18,000, and *Centurion*, probably at *Lützow*. (Asterisks denote probable hits.)

[3] This corresponds with the *Benbow's* report. (J.P., p. 120.)

[4] Hase, p. 199.

[5] It is highly probable that the *Derfflinger* would have shared the fate of the *Queen Mary* if it had not been for experience gained during the Dogger Bank action, when a shell which ignited charges in the *Seydlitz's* after turret wiped out two complete turrets' crews. Double asbestos flaps were fitted subsequently, and alterations were made in the stowage of ammunition. Curiously enough, a shell hit the *Seydlitz* in almost exactly the same place at Jutland, but only caused a few casualties.

Colossus (r) states that they were hit by the second ship (*i.e.*, *Seydlitz*). These were the only hits received in the Battle Fleet during the action.

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chart and signal house, and severely wounded three men. The guns of the 5th Battle Squadron were also in action. The ships in the British port wing divisions were firing too, but at a considerably greater range.[1]

The *Iron Duke* had opened fire on the battleships[2] as early as 7.13 at a range of 15,400 yards, shifting to the battle cruisers at 7.20. Some 2½ miles ahead[3] of the port wing of the British battle fleet Admiral Beatty's battle cruisers were also firing.

This heavy burst of firing lasted for about six minutes,[4] and was for the German battle cruisers the most critical part of the action. It had hardly begun when Admiral Hipper went alongside the *Seydlitz* to transfer his flag, but finding her wireless shot away, and a couple of thousand tons of water in her,[5] he proceeded to the *Moltke*. As he got alongside, the intensity of the British fire redoubled, the captain dared not stop,[6] and Admiral Hipper was left to wander about in his destroyer for a time.

As soon as Admiral Scheer realised that he was facing the main British fleet, he turned his battle fleet to the westward, and ordered the battle cruisers and flotillas to attack in order to cover his retreat.

A few minutes later he ordered the battle cruisers to manœuvre off the enemy's van, whereupon they also turned to the westward. It was now eighteen minutes past seven.

41. Admiral Scheer's and von Hase's explanations of this phase differ. The former pictures the whole German fleet advancing, with the battle cruisers and flotillas attacking as fiercely as possible in order to force the British into a second battle. The object is attained, and the fleet withdraws to the westward at 7.17 p.m. Von Hase, on the other hand, indicates that the High Sea Fleet suddenly found itself in a trap, practically surrounded, and that the advance of the battle cruisers and flotillas was intended to extricate the battle fleet.[7] Admiral

[1] The *Vanguard* (4th ship in the 4th Division) and *Thunderer* (4th in 2nd) did not open fire.

[2] The *Monarch* (2nd ship in 2nd Division) and *Marlborough* also state definitely that they were firing at battleships.

[3] About a point on *King George V.'s* port bow.

[4] From 7.14 to 7.20.

[5] From the torpedo hit received earlier in the action.

[6] Hase, p. 207. The time was probably about 7.15.

[7] "Meanwhile the Commander-in-Chief had realised the danger to which our fleet was exposed. The van of our fleet was shut in by the semicircle of the enemy. We were in a regular death trap. There was only one way to escape from the unfavourable tactical situation: to turn the line about and withdraw on the opposite course. Before everything we must get out of the dangerous enemy envelopment. But this manœuvre had to be carried out unnoticed and unhindered. The battle cruisers and destroyers had to cover the movements of the fleet. At about 7.12 p.m. the Commander-in-Chief gave the fleet the signal to turn about on the opposite course, and almost at the same time sent by wireless to the battle cruisers and destroyers the historic order: "Close the enemy" . . . At 7.18 p.m. we received a wireless signal from the Commander-in-Chief: "Manœuvre off the enemy van," Hase, pp. 196, 203.

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3/8 W.T.(O)3124 250/6/18
4/11 W.T.55681/619

DIAGRAM 30

APPROXIMATE POSITIONS AT 7·22 P.M.



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Scheer's own signals[1] show that the order to the battle cruisers to attack was made after the British opened fire, and there is little doubt that von Hase's is the more correct of the two. What might have been a disastrous blunder was by a stroke of luck turned to Admiral Scheer's advantage, and he is naturally inclined to ascribe the agency to himself. The probable explanation of his end-on advance is that he had badly miscalculated the position of the British fleet, and was endeavouring to pass astern of it in order to overcome the unfavourable light conditions which were so seriously handicapping the firing of his battle fleet, or to slip past and make for home. He may also have hoped to cut off the 5th Battle Squadron and some battle cruisers, which he thought were some distance astern of the main fleet.[2] The impression that the British fleet was far enough to the south to enable him to pass astern about 7.0 p.m. would arise from the fact that the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron and *Shark's* Flotilla had been mistaken for part of the British battle fleet when they attacked the 1st and 2nd Scouting Groups from the north-eastward about 5.55 p.m.[3]

The Torpedo Atttacks.

42. Although the German flotillas did not succeed in hitting anything, they played a decisive part in this encounter. As early as 7.5, destroyers ahead of the battle cruisers had come under fire. This was a small attack made by half a dozen boats,[4] including three of the 3rd Flotilla. The *Colossus* was the first to see them approaching on the starboard bow and opened fire with 12-inch and 4-inch. By 7.10 they were about 2 points before the beam of the 5th and 6th Divisions, and in the next minute or two fire was opened by several ships and Admiral Sturdee hoisted the "preparative" and turned the 4th Division two points away. Three or four torpedoes were seen approaching about this time, and the *Neptune* had to alter course to avoid one.[5] By this time the enemy battle cruisers were in sight, and the thunder of their engagement had begun. The Commander-in-Chief now signalled to the 1st Battle Squadron[6] (*Marlborough* and *Colossus*) to form astern of the 4th Battle Squadron probably with the intention of withdrawing them from their exposed position on the flank. The 6th Division (*Marlborough*) turned

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[1] J.P., German Plan VI.

[2] *Ibid.*

[3] *See* p. 39.

[4] Three boats of the 3rd Flotilla, possibly supported by some of the 1st Half-Flotilla. Scheer (p. 154) shows six torpedoes fired, of which G. 88 fired two and V. 73 one. The *Neptune* reports six to eight boats, the *Hercules* six. Scheer, p. 153.

[5] *Colossus* one at 7.8 (missed astern), *Agincourt* one at 7.8 (missed astern), *Neptune* three (two of which possibly identical with *Colossus* and *Agincourt* reports) at 7.10. These torpedoes were probably fired about 7 p.m.

[6] At 7.12 p.m.

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to port about 7.18 p.m.[1] Admiral Sturdee, too, turned into line, astern of the 3rd Division,[2] about this time, bringing the 4th Battle Squadron into line ahead behind the *Iron Duke's* division, steering approximately south. While the engagement with the battle cruisers was at its height, the Commander-in-Chief evidently decided to re-form single line ahead, for he signalled to the 2nd Battle Squadron to take station ahead,[3] and a few minutes later ordered them to proceed at utmost speed, and he himself reduced to 15 knots to expedite the movement.

43. At 7.22 p.m., when the engagement with the enemy battleships and battle cruisers was drawing to a close, the fleet was disposed as in Diagram 30.

A second torpedo attack was now developing, and as early as 7.16 the *Royal Oak* had opened a vigorous fire on destroyers on the starboard beam. This was made by the 6th and 9th Flotillas attached to Admiral Hipper's Squadron, and as Admiral Scheer turned away, a dense smoke screen rose from them and drifted down towards the British fleet, effectually obscuring the German battleships from view.

Some six destroyers pressed on to attack, and came under a heavy fire at ranges of 11,000 to 8,000 yards from the ships of the 1st and 4th Battle Squadrons, particularly the *Royal Oak*, *Iron Duke*, *Benbow*, *Agincourt*, *Marlborough* and *Temeraire*.[4] It was now twenty-two minutes past seven.

The destroyers could be seen approaching about 10,000 yards off, and, judging that they were about to fire their torpedoes, the Commander-in-Chief decided to turn away. But the *Orion's* division, still trying to get into line ahead of her, were too close to allow the *Iron Duke* to turn. To get them clear the Commander-in-Chief signalled to the 2nd Battle Squadron to turn together four points to port, and then ordered the fleet to turn by sub-divisions two points to S.S.E., while the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron was sent out to attack. Another wave of destroyers was approaching and some doubt arose as to whether a two-point turn was sufficient, and a few minutes later, at twenty-five minutes past seven, the signal was made to turn away another two points[5] (Diagram 31). The 4th Light Cruiser Squadron

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[1] *Marlborough's* track chart. There is no signal record of this turn in *Marlborough's* signal log.

[2] Vice-Admiral Sturdee (r), J.P., p. 122. "The attack was soon repelled . . . and the division ordered to turn back to the course of the fleet, forming astern of the 3rd Division."

[3] At 7.16 and 7.18 to proceed at utmost speed; the Commander-in-Chief reduced to 15 knots at 7.20.

[4] 7.16, *Royal Oak* (6-inch), on starboard beam; 7.18, *Agincourt* (6-inch); 7.19, *Marlborough*, starboard bow, 11,000 yards; 7.20 *Vanguard* (12-inch); *Temeraire* (4-inch), before starboard beam, 9,000 yards; 7.24, *Iron Duke* (6-inch), green 115°, 10,000 yards; *Benbow*; 7.27, *Tiger* (6-inch); 7.31, *Hercules* (12-inch).

[5] J.P. 7.25; *Barham* (s), 7.25; *King George V.* (s), 7.25; *New Zealand* (w), 7.25; *Benbow* (s), 7.26; *Iron Duke* (s), 7.27.

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318 WT 10737/250/618
411 WT 9669/1/613.

APPROXIMATE POSITIONS AT 7·25 P.M.



DIAGRAM 31.

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316 M* 10737/250/5/18.
41/W.S.9584/6/3.

APPROXIMATE POSITIONS AT 7·35 P.M.

DIAGRAM 32.



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and a half-flotilla of the 11th Flotilla were moving out to attack, but the enemy flotilla already seemed to be breaking up and two of its boats showed signs of being hit. It had fired some 21 torpedoes,[1] of which a large number were observed crossing the British line, about 7.35.[2] The *Marlborough*, as leader of the flank division, was again the favourite target and had to alter course to avoid three torpedoes which passed ahead and close astern. The *Revenge*, *Hercules*, and *Agincourt* in the same division had to do the same.

44. The 4th Light Cruiser Squadron had got away to the south-westward, and was firing on the enemy destroyers, when, at 7.32, the Commander-in-Chief signalled to the Commodore not to go too near the enemy's battle fleet, unaware, of course, that the latter was now far away. By 7.36 the German destroyers had retired, and the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron turned to the southward to resume station on the *King George V*. The 3rd and 5th German Flotillas when, later, they approached to attack, sighted only the destroyers of the British 11th Flotilla. But this was sufficient, and they retired without firing their torpedoes. One other destroyer, however, S. 32, sighted some British capital ships, and fired a torpedo without effect.[3] No exceptional dash was displayed by the enemy in these attacks, nor were they pressed home with any great persistency,[4] a result which must be attributed to the intensity of the fire of the 1st and 4th Battle Squadrons, especially of the *Iron Duke* and *Royal Oak*. The actual German losses were not excessive. One destroyer was sunk by a hit from a 12-inch shell,[5] and two were badly hit.[6]

Position at 7.35 p.m. (Diagram 32).

45. The two turns away and the individual manœuvring to avoid torpedoes had brought the fleet into a ragged and irregular disposition. The German destroyers had retired, and at 7.35[7] the Commander-in-Chief made a signal to alter course to S. by W. and form single line ahead.

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[1] J.P., German Plan VI, Diagram 7; 17th Half-Flotilla fired 10 torpedoes at 7.25; 11th Half-Flotilla 11 at 7.23.

[2] *Marlborough*, three at 7.33; *Revenge*, two at 7.35; *Hercules*, two at 7.35; *Agincourt*, two at 7.35; *Colossus*, one at 7.35; *Collingwood*, two; *St. Vincent's* report is indefinite, but it suggests that she had to alter course to avoid torpedoes; *Oak*, one about 7.35; the six tracks of torpedoes observed by ships of the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron (J.P., p. 296) were possibly identical with some of those seen in the Battle Fleet; total reports, 19. Lord Jellicoe (G.F., p. 361) mentions 20 torpedoes, but this possibly includes one reported by *Inflexible*. Her report is indefinite as to time, but suggests 7.25. Her log, however, corrects this to 7.45 p.m.

[3] Admiral Scheer (German Plan V, J.P.) says one torpedo. *Revenge* reports two tracks at 7.45 p.m., and *Inflexible* one at the same time (*Inflexible* log). S. 32's torpedo may have been one of these.

[4] Rear-Admiral A. L. Duff (r), J.P. p. 125.

[5] S. 35, of 18th Half-Flotilla, by *Iron Duke* or *Vanguard* (7.20) or *Bellerophon* (or less probable) *Collingwood* (7.35).

[6] S. 52 and S. 36, of 17th Half-Flotilla, were hit by one heavy, one medium, and two light shells.

[7] Then on a S.E. course proceeding at 15 knots since 7.20.

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At 7.40 the *Lion*, which was about six miles to the south-westward, sent an important signal to the Commander-in-Chief stating that the enemy bore N.W. by W. 10 to 11 miles. This was received by the Commander-in-Chief about 7.42, when the Battle Fleet was ordered to alter course to S.W. (Diagram 33).

The day was drawing to a close.[1] Admiral Beatty could still see the enemy at 7.44, and at 7.45 he made a signal by searchlight to the *Minotaur*[2] telling her to inform the leading British battleship that the enemy bore N.W. by W. course about S.W. He followed this at 7.47 by a signal to the Commander-in-Chief: "Submit that the van of the battleships follow me: we can then cut off the whole of the enemy's fleet," and a few minutes later altered course W. by S. to close the enemy.

The signal was passed by wireless, and reached the *Iron Duke* soon after 8 p.m. The *Calliope* and 4th Light Cruiser Squadron had been recalled by this time,[3] and were taking up their previous station on the starboard bow of the *King George V.* The 2nd Battle Squadron was gradually hauling round to south-west to get ahead of the *Iron Duke*. By 8 p.m. it was in position, and the battle fleet was once more in single line ahead on a south-west course.

Turn to West at 8.0 p.m. (Diagram 34).

46. The Commander-in-Chief now hauled round to starboard by divisions to course west, to endeavour to regain touch with the enemy, and increased to 17 knots. It was 8 o'clock; three-quarters of an hour had passed since Admiral Scheer turned away, and he was now some 15½ miles off.

The Battle Cruiser Fleet at this time was some six miles W.S.W. from the *King George V.*, and was no longer in sight. The 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron and 1st Light Cruiser Squadron were with the *Lion*[4] and at 8.0 p.m. Admiral Beatty ordered them to sweep to the westward and locate the head of the enemy line before dark.

Admiral Scheer's Movements.

47. Meanwhile Admiral Scheer, after steering to the westward for a short time, had gradually brought his fleet round to south. All his ships were with him, and the *Lützow*, in spite of the hammering she had received, had rejoined her squadron, and reported that she could go 15 knots.[5] He now knew from the reports of his flotillas that he was confronted with the whole British battle fleet, and expected that every effort would be made to force

[1] Sunset at 8.07 G.M.T.

[2] Between *Lion* and *King George V.*: signal was passed to *King George V.*, and on to Commander-in-Chief. Received in *Iron Duke* at 7.59.

[3] At 7.40. Took station on *King George V.* about 7.50 p.m.

[4] The 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron (*Falmouth*) was about five miles west of the *Lion*: the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron (*Inconstant*) a mile or so astern of the *Lion*.

[5] Scheer, p. 159.

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38L Wt 10237/1250/6/18.
41L Wt 9568/1/6/18.

APPROXIMATE POSITIONS AT 7·42 P.M.

BRITISH FLEET ORDERED TO FORM SINGLE LINE AHEAD ON "IRON DUKE", COURSE SOUTH WEST.



DIAGRAM 33.

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APPROXIMATE POSITIONS AT 8.00. P. M.









DIAGRAM 34.

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DIAGRAM 35.

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him to the westward by attacks in force during the remaining hours of daylight, and by destroyer attacks at night so as to ensure bringing him to action at dawn the next day. The situation was one of extreme peril, for an action the next day might involve the practical annihilation of his fleet. His only hope lay in warding off the British encirclement. If he could reach Horns Riff by break of day he might still win through and escape the net closing around him. Every four miles he was forced to the westward meant half an hour further from Horns Riff. Admiral Scheer, it must be granted, was a man of quick appreciation and of bold and rapid decision. He decided to make straight for Horns Riff in close order during the night, maintaining his course regardless of attack. The 2nd Flotilla and 12th Half-Flotilla were sent to the eastward to give notice of the British approach, and all flotillas were ordered to be ready to attack during the night, though this might leave him bereft of destroyers in the battle impending the next day.

Shortly after 8 o'clock his whole fleet was proceeding south at 16 knots. The 1st Squadron was leading,[1] with the 3rd Squadron a mile or so behind; a couple of miles on the starboard bow of the *Westfalen* was the 2nd Squadron[2] trying to get ahead, with the 4th Scouting Group a mile or so ahead of it. On the port bow was the 1st Scouting Group, with the 2nd Flotilla and 12th Flotilla away to the eastward. The British Fleet he knew must be some 12 to 15 miles to the south-east.[3]

The fleets were now converging, and at 8.05 the *Calliope* sighted smoke to the W.N.W. Five minutes or so later the *Castor* sighted destroyers and ordered the 1st Division of the 11th Flotilla to attack.[4] This was the German 12th Half-Flotilla or possibly the German 2nd Flotilla, pushing down to the south-eastward (Diagram 35).

By 8.15 twelve of them could be seen, and Commodore (F) informed the Commodore, 4th Light Cruiser Squadron, who promptly proceeded with the *Calliope*, *Comus* and *Constance*[5] to his support.

48. At a quarter-past eight the 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron were on their way to the westward,[6] when they sighted five light cruisers W. by N. steering to the south-westward. This was the 4th Scouting Group, ahead of the 2nd Squadron, and the

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[1] In line ahead reversed, with the *Westfalen* leading.

[2] Presumably *Schleswig-Holstein* leading, then *Schlesien*, *Hannover*, *Pommern*, *Hessen*, *Deutschland*.

[3] The *King George V.* bore from the *Westfalen* approximately E.S.E. about 15 miles.

[4] *Ossory*, *Martial*, *Magic*, *Minion*, *Mystic*, *Mons*, *Mandate*, *Michael*.

[5] The 1st Division of the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron.

[6] Spreading on a line of bearing south; Rear-Admiral, 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron, gives time of sighting as 8.18.

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3rd Light Cruiser Squadron opened fire at 9,600 yards, altered course to south, and increased to 25 knots[1] (Diagram 36).

Almost simultaneously the *Calliope*, three or four miles to the eastward of the *Falmouth*, opened fire on a half-flotilla of enemy's destroyers which was steering S.S.W. towards the Battle Cruiser Fleet, and proceeded to chase them at full speed to the N.W.[2] Two engagements now began to develop—one, five miles ahead of the battle fleet, between the *Calliope*[3] and the 12th Half-Flotilla; the other, six or seven miles to the south-westward of the Battle Fleet, between Admiral Beatty's battle cruisers and the head of the enemy's fleet.

The destroyer attack never developed, and only two torpedoes reached the battle fleet.[4] When the enemy destroyers saw the light cruisers, they turned and ran, and the *Calliope* and her cruisers followed at full speed. The chase lasted only five minutes. At 8.26 the enemy's battle fleet suddenly loomed out of the mist to the westward about 8,000 yards off. The enemy opened fire,[5] but the *Calliope* held on for a minute or two and fired a torpedo at 6,500 yards range at the leading ship of the *Kaiser* class,[6] then turned to fall back on the battle fleet. As she retired, she came under heavy fire from two *Kaisers* and a *Helgoland*. Shots were falling thick round her and she was hit five times,[7] but got safely back with all her ships.

While the *Calliope* was driving off the enemy destroyers, the thunder of the battle cruisers' guns had broken out again to the southward. The *Falmouth*, making to the westward, had sighted the 4th Scouting Group ahead, and opened fire; Admiral Beatty had turned at once[8] to the sound of the guns and almost immediately sighted the enemy's battle cruisers to the north-westward.[9]

Admiral Beatty's squadron opened fire, and a short, sharp encounter followed, which lasted ten or fifteen minutes (Diagram 37), the last time big ships were to engage during the war. The enemy were on a southerly course, with the *Derfflinger* leading,[10] and the battleships of the *Deutschland* class were in sight as

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[1] *Falmouth* (s), 8.14, course south; 8.17, opened fire; 8.19, speed 25 knots.

[2] Commodore (r), 8.18, opened fire on enemy's destroyers—Signal, 8.18, utmost speed.

[3] *Calliope, Comus* and *Constance.*

[4] *Agincourt* and *Benbow* saw tracks at 8.25 and 8.27.

[5] At 8.28.

[6] At 8.30. Probably the *Prinzregent Luitpold.*

[7] One 4-inch gun was hit, and all the crew except the sight-setter were killed; a second shell disabled another 4-inch gun; a third burst in the after dressing station. Total casualties were 10 killed and 23 wounded.

[8] 8.15. Course west.

[9] *Princess Royal* reports sighting them at 8.18, green 60°, 12,000 yards.

[10] Hase, p. 213. The *Lützow* may have been with them, for *New Zealand* (r) mentions five ships.

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well. The *Tiger* was apparently the first to open fire,[1] and the ranges varied from 9,000 to 13,000 yards at this time.[2]

The *Lion* led gradually round to the south-west[3] and the enemy altered to the westward.

The sudden outburst of firing from the south-east had taken them by surprise. Dusk was falling and they could see little more than the flashes of the British guns. It may be doubted whether the *Seydlitz* opened fire; the *Lützow* almost certainly was not in a position to do so; the *Derfflinger* had only her two foremost turrets in action, and this was quickly reduced to one by a shot[4] which glanced off the armour, bent the rail of the turntable and jammed the turret. Help came from an unexpected quarter. Rear-Admiral Mauve's squadron of old *Deutschlands* were ahead of the fleet, and now came into action. They turned to south-westward ahead of the 1st Scouting Group, and Admiral Hipper's sorely tried squadron took refuge behind them. As the three-funnelled ships came into view, the British battle cruisers shifted their fire to them.[5] The *Princess Royal* was hit[6] about this time but sustained no serious damage. The German battle cruisers undoubtedly received further injuries (one of them turned away on fire), and in the 2nd Squadron, the *Schlesien*, *Schleswig-Holstein* and the *Pommern* were hit.[7]

Torpedoes were used towards the end of the action, the *Princess Royal* firing one at 8.32, and a few minutes later the track of one was seen crossing the *Inflexible's* bows—probably fired by the 2nd Scouting Group about 8.24.

About 8.35 the enemy turned to the westward and disappeared in the mist and deepening twilight.

While the battle cruisers were firing, the *Falmouth* and 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron had been following a southerly course between the lines, engaging the light cruisers of the 4th Scouting Group. At 8.32, when the enemy turned away, the *Falmouth* followed them to the north-west, losing sight of them in the mist about 8.40.[8]

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[1] *Tiger*, 8.21, at three-funnelled battleship. *Princess Royal*, 8.22; *Lion*, 8.23.

[2] Ranges, 8.18, *Princess Royal*, green 60°, 12,000 yards; 8.19, *Princess Royal*, 10,000; 8.20, *New Zealand*, third ship, 13,000; 8.21, *Tiger*, 7,900; 8.22, *Princess Royal*, 9,400; 8.22½, *Tiger*, 8,400; ' *New Zealand*, third ship, 11,500; 8.25, *New Zealand*, 10,400; 8.25¼, *Princess Royal*, 9,625; 8.26, *New Zealand*, 9,200; 8.27, *Tiger*, 9,600; 8.26, *New Zealand*, 9,100; 8.31 *Tiger*, 10,300 (straddle); *Princess Royal*, 9,500 (three-funnelled ship); 8.32, *Tiger*, 11,000 (straddle). (J.P., pp. 387 *et seq.*)

[3] Courses, 8.15, west, 17 knots; 8.21, W.S.W.; 8.25, S.W. 8.28, S.W. by S.; 8.35 S.W.

[4] Probably from *Lion* or *Princess Royal*. The *Princess Royal* engaged leading ship (*Derfflinger*)—then the 2nd Squadron; the *New Zealand* and *Indomitable* the third ship (probably *Moltke*). The *Tiger* seems to have been in action with three-funnelled battleships all the time.

[5] *Princess Royal*, at 8.31.

[6] *Princess Royal* (r), J.P. p. 149, about 8.32.

[7] Each received one hit. The 2nd Squadron were in reversed order, viz., *Schleswig-Holstein*, *Schlesien*, *Hannover*, *Pommern*, *Hessen*, *Deutschland*.

[8] *Falmouth* (r), 8.38.

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The Battle Fleet turns to South-West.

49. At 8.15, when the two fleets were again coming into contact, the British battle fleet was in divisions steering west, with the *King George V.* on the port wing and guides of columns bearing S.W. The *Calliope* was two or three miles sharp on the bow of the *King George V.* The *Lion* was out of sight six miles to the S.W., and the *Falmouth* about nine miles to the westward.[1]

A few minutes later the guns of the *Calliope* and the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron opened on enemy destroyers,[2] and firing could be heard away to the westward.[3] Touch had evidently been regained, and at 8.21 the Commander-in-Chief altered course to W.S.W. 2 points away from the enemy. By this time the flash of Admiral Beatty's guns could be seen to the S.W., and course was altered again to west at 8.25. The *Calliope* could be seen under fire three or four miles ahead.[4] Some enemy ships were faintly visible to the westward[5] and the Commander-in-Chief decided to form single line ahead to the south-westward. At 8.28 the signal was made to alter course to S.W., bringing the fleet into line ahead. The enemy's battle fleet was then some seven miles to the westward right ahead of the *Iron Duke* before she turned. The battle cruisers could still be heard engaged to the south-west.

8.30 to 9.0 p.m.

The encounter with the Battle Cruiser Fleet was the last engagement between heavy ships, but for over an hour the two fleets were little more than six miles apart, and a constant succession of reports was coming in. The action with Admiral Beatty had forced Admiral Hipper's battle cruisers and Admiral Mauve's pre-Dreadnoughts seven or eight miles to the westward—no inconsiderable matter in itself when every four miles in that direction meant half an hour further from Horns Riff—and Admiral Scheer now brought the 1st and 3rd Squadrons down between them and the British battle fleet (Diagram 38).

On the British side, there was some evidence to place the enemy about seven or eight miles to the westward. The 4th Light Cruiser Squadron were two or three miles on the *Iron Duke's* starboard bow, returning to their station at the head of the fleet; and at 8.30 the *Comus* could be seen firing, and in answer to a signal from the *Iron Duke* reported that she was

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[1] From *King George V.*

[2] Firing could be seen from *Royal Oak* at 8.17 p.m. *Calliope* opened fire at 8.18. Commodore (F) reported enemy destroyers N.W. to Vice-Admiral, 2nd Battle Squadron, at 8.14, but report did not reach Commander-in-Chief until 8.26.

[3] The *Falmouth* opened fire at 8.17 p.m.

[4] *Royal Oak:* "Hit observed on starboard quarter of *Calliope*" (J.P., p. 99); *Benbow:* "Heavy firing heard right ahead" (J.P. p. 354).

[5] There is only one battle fleet report of sighting the enemy battle fleet at this time. *Iron Duke* (B. turret) reports "nine heavy ships ahead" at 8.25½ p.m. (J.P., p. 60).

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

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firing at the enemy's battle fleet to the westward.[1] Admiral Beatty's guns were now silent, but at 8.40 p.m. he reported the enemy ten to eleven miles to the north-westward.[2]

When the 1st Division of the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron[3] had gone out to drive off the 13th Half-Flotilla at 8.16, the 2nd Division, consisting of *Caroline* and *Royalist*, had remained behind, keeping a couple of miles or so ahead of the *King George V.*, and they now got into touch with the enemy. At 8.45 the *Caroline* sighted three enemy battleships N.W.[4] and the *Falmouth* at the same time reported enemy battle cruisers north, going W.S.W.,[5] while at 8.46 the Commander-in-Chief signalled to ask Admiral Beatty for the bearing of the enemy.

A few minutes later the *Caroline* reported the battleships she had seen to the *King George V.*[6] and ordered the *Royalist* to attack with torpedoes.

The dusk was now deepening, but it was still light, and the Vice-Admiral, 2nd Battle Squadron, mistook the ships for our battle cruisers[7] and negatived the attack.

The *Caroline* replied that the ships were evidently enemy battleships (which was corroborated by the *Castor* at 9.15) and made an attack.[8]

The enemy opened fire on them, but the *Caroline* fired two torpedoes, and the *Royalist* one, all without result. The *King George V.* still remained convinced that they were our battle cruisers and reported them as such to the Commander-in-Chief.[9]

The evidence now available shows that the enemy was about seven miles to the westward going in a south-westerly direction

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[1] At 8.38 p.m.

[2] At 8.40 p.m. *Lion* to Commander-in-Chief: "Enemy battle cruisers and pre-Dreadnoughts N. 34° W., distant 10 to 11 miles, steering S.W." Received in *Iron Duke* 8.59. The *Lion* gave her position as 56° 40′ N., 5° 50′ E. about 6 miles N.E. of her actual position, but her relative position could be deduced with sufficient accuracy.

[3] *Calliope, Constance, Comus.*

[4] *Calliope* (r) says N.N.W., but 4th Light Cruiser Squadron track chart (J.P., plate 12*a*) says 305°; the report also says they were pre-Dreadnoughts.

[5] The *Falmouth* was then about 7½ miles W. of the *Royalist.* She reported her position as 56° 42′ N., 5° 37′ E., but as her reckoning was about five miles north-east of the *Iron Duke's* her report would place the enemy battle cruisers about nine miles N.W. of *Iron Duke* instead of about eight miles west.

[6] At 8.55 three ships N.W. about 8,000 yards—apparently old battleships. This report was not intercepted by the *Iron Duke.*

[7] Vice-Admiral, 2nd Battle Squadron (r), states that he was certain the vessels on the starboard beam were our battle cruisers. The *Lion* was then about six miles ahead of him. It is possible that the Vice-Admiral, 2nd Battle Squadron, saw the 1st Scouting Group and mistook them for our battle cruisers, or may have been misled by the *Falmouth's* position. It is hardly possible that the *Deutschland* class could be mistaken for them. *King George V.* made the "negative" at 9.6 p.m.

[8] It seems to have been made before it was negatived.

[9] At 9.05.

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There were various indications of the enemy's position. They had never been lost to sight by the *Falmouth*; they had been attacked by the *Caroline* and *Royalist*; their van had engaged the Battle Cruiser Fleet; their rear had fired on the *Calliope*.

Meanwhile the *Southampton* and 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron, a couple of miles on the starboard quarter of the fleet, had not been idle. Enemy destroyers[1] had twice pushed up to the starboard quarter of the fleet. Two had been engaged and driven off at 8.30, and just before 9.00 they made a more determined attack on the 5th Battle Squadron, and were again met by the fire of the *Southampton's* squadron and driven off.

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[1] Probably of the German 2nd Flotilla.

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DIAGRAM 39.

APPROXIMATE POSITIONS AT 9.00 P.M.



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CHAPTER VIII.

PROCEEDINGS DURING THE NIGHT.

General View of the Situation.

50. The position of the two fleets at 9.0 p.m.[1] is shown in Diagram 39. The British battle fleet is in single line ahead, course S.W., speed 17 knots,[2] with the battle cruisers about seven miles ahead, also steering S.W. 17 knots. The 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron is at the rear of the battle line; the *Calliope*, *Constance*, and *Comus* of the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron at its head on the port bow of the *King George V.*, with the *Royalist* and *Caroline* on the starboard side. The 1st Light Cruiser Squadron[3] and 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron are on the starboard side of the Battle Cruiser Fleet, with the 2nd Cruiser Squadron[4] on its starboard quarter. The *Galatea*[5] is on the port side of the battle fleet, making for the head of the line. The 4th and 11th Flotillas, with the *Castor* (Commodore F), are ahead, and 9th, 10th, 12th and 13th Flotillas at the rear of the battle line. The 1st Flotilla is in company with the battle cruisers.

The German 1st and 3rd Squadrons are approximately W by N., 6 miles from the *Iron Duke*, in single line, steering south by west, the van led by the *Westfalen*.

The 2nd Squadron and 4th Scouting Group are on the 1st Squadron's starboard bow, also steering south by west, and on the port quarter is the 1st Scouting Group.

The enemy battle fleet was not sighted from the battle fleet after 7.59 p.m.,[6] but, as explained in Chapter VII., the Commander-in-Chief could have had little doubt of their approximate position at 9.0 p.m.

If the High Sea Fleet had not been so close, the difference between the reckoning of the *Iron Duke* and the Battle Cruiser

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[1] It was still light at 9 p.m. J.P. p. 74, *Hercules* (r): "9.5 p.m., weather misty; visibility 2 to 5 miles." J.P., p.289, *Duke of Edinburgh*(r): "10 p.m., too dark for long-range firing; went to night defence stations." J.P., p.297: "9.5 p.m., *Caroline* and *Royalist* engaged with enemy's battleships at four miles range." J.P., p. 284: "8.45 p.m., *Shannon* reports *King George V.* in sight at 5 miles range."

[2] The 6th Division (*Marlborough*, *Revenge* *Hercules* and *Agincourt*) and 5th Battle Squadron were slightly astern of station.

[3] Less *Galatea*.

[4] *Duke of Edinburgh* and *Chester* in company.

[5] At 6.7 p.m. *Galatea's* speed had been temporarily reduced to 18 knots by damage to forced draught fan.

[6] G.F., p. 367 states that enemy battleships were sighted to westward on the starboard bow at 7.59 p.m. Lieutenant-Commander Calvert in *Iron Duke's* turret saw nine heavy ships ahead at 8.25 (J.P., p. 60) but this was an individual observation. The *King George V.* sighted enemy battle cruisers, which she at first mistook for British, about 9.5 p.m. They fired at the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron, and it is probable that they were observed by other ships in the Battle Fleet.

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Fleet would have made its location difficult. If the actual position of the Battle Cruiser Fleet had not been correctly gauged,[1] the battle fleet might have been misled by the signals, reporting the enemy, made by *Lion*, *Falmouth* and *Southampton*.

State of the Two Fleets.

51. The day was over, and as a result of the fighting the British had lost the *Queen Mary*, *Indefatigable* and *Invincible*. The *Lion* and *Princess Royal* had each one turret out of action, but the battle cruisers were otherwise ready and fit to renew the action. The *Warspite* was returning to Rosyth, and the guns' crews of the *Malaya's* secondary battery had suffered heavy casualties, but, with these exceptions, the steaming and fighting qualities of the 5th Battle Squadron were practically unimpaired. In the battle fleet the speed of the *Marlborough* had been slightly reduced, and the *Colossus* had five men wounded, but for all practical purposes it was as fit for action as on the day it left harbour. The *Defence* and three destroyers[2] had been sunk and the *Warrior* and three destroyers disabled.

On the German side, the *Lützow* and *Seydlitz*, two of their most powerful battle cruisers, were incapable of renewing the action; the former had received about 40 large calibre hits, and the latter 24, besides having been torpedoed. Nor was the *Derfflinger* much better off; she had 3,400 tons of water on board, and only one turret and two 5·9-inch guns fit for action.[3] There remained only the *Von der Tann* and *Moltke*, and the latter had one turret out of action.[4] The battleships had not suffered so severely as the battle cruisers, but the powerful 3rd Squadron had lost some of its fighting value.[5] The *König's* forepart was flooded, and she had been hit by ten large projectiles, whilst the *Grosser Kurfürst*, *Markgraf* and *Kaiser* had received 15 hits between them. The 1st and 2nd Squadrons had escaped with little damage, but the *Wiesbaden* and four torpedo boats[6] had been sunk.

To the Commander-in-Chief the situation may have appeared in a still more favourable light, for he did not know the full extent of the British losses, and was spared any anxiety as to the *Queen Mary* and *Indefatigable*. He knew only that the

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[1] The battle cruisers had been in sight of the battle fleet until about 7.35 p.m. Their course and speed were reported at 7.40 p.m., and the flashes of their guns were seen from the battle fleet at 8.20. The 2nd Cruiser Squadron, too, was in sight of both battle fleet and battle cruisers until 8.15 p.m. Lord Jellicoe says that during this period he assumed the *Lion* to be five or six miles ahead of the van of the battle fleet. G.F. p. 366.

[2] *Nestor*, *Nomad* and *Shark* sunk. *Acasta*, *Onslow* and *Defender* disabled.

[3] Hase, p. 207.

[4] *See* Appendix D for hits on German ships.

[5] Admiral Scheer's Report. J.P., p. 598.

[6] V.27, V. 29, V. 48, and S. 35.

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Invincible[1] had been sunk and that the *Marlborough's* speed had been reduced to 17 knots.[2]

It was not till the next day that he learnt of the fate of the *Queen Mary* and *Indefatigable*.[3]

The loss of the *Defence*, too, must have been known; and the *Warrior* had reported both engines disabled at 8.37 p.m. No reports had been made to the Commander-in-Chief as to destroyer casualties, and he would only be aware of those that came under his immediate notice.[4]

For an estimate of the state and efficiency of the German Fleet, the Commander-in-Chief could rely on his own observation. On the two occasions when the battle fleet was in effective range of the enemy, the latter's ships were seen to be repeatedly hit and to be incapable of effective reply. The *Iron Duke* herself had one of the *König* class under an accurate fire from 6.30 to 6.37 p.m., and she was not even fired at in return. The Commander-in-Chief had also seen the three torpedo attacks made by the enemy flotillas at 7.10, 7.25 and 8.15 p.m. driven off without difficulty, and two German torpedo craft destroyed. Only one ship on the British side had been hit by a torpedo, and she was still in the line fit for action. So far, then, as the Commander-in-Chief could judge of the situation, he could look forward with confidence to a renewal of the battle. The gunnery of the Grand Fleet appeared to be undoubtedly superior to that of the enemy, and the threat of the torpedo had proved less serious than was anticipated.

The fighting had also revealed the mind and intentions of the German Commander-in-Chief in a very definite manner. He had turned away in every encounter with the Grand Fleet, and it was clear that his one idea was to avoid action and return to harbour.

The Problem before the Commander-in-Chief.

52. The Commander-in-Chief decided very rightly not to fight a night action, and the problem now before him was to intercept the enemy in daylight before he reached the shelter of his shore defences.

This problem resolved itself into two main aspects—the danger of minefields and the probable route of the enemy. Reference to Diagram 40 will show that minefields offered no

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[1] J.P. Signal made at 7.3 p.m.

[2] J.P. Signal made at 7.49 p.m.

[3] "I was unaware of the loss of the *Queen Mary* and *Indefatigable* until the morning of June 1." G.F., p. 328. The Commander-in-Chief seems to have mistaken the *Indomitable* and *Inflexible* for the *Queen Mary* and *Indefatigable*, for on meeting the Battle Cruiser Fleet the next morning he asked Admiral Beatty at 5.55 a.m. what he knew of the movements of the *Indomitable* and *Inflexible*, though these two ships were actually with the Battle Cruiser Fleet and in sight of the *Iron Duke*. At 11.4 a.m. the Commander-in-Chief asks: "When did the *Queen Mary* and *Indefatigable* go?"

[4] Probably only the *Acasta*.

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real obstacle above the latitude of 55° N., whilst south of it only British minefields stood in the way of the pursuit of the German Fleet *viâ* the Horns Riff route. But the position of these was known; they could be regarded in the same light as shoal water, and there was even a possibility of driving the German fleet towards them.

There was next the question of Admiral Scheer's probable route. These were limited to four—the Kattegat and the three channels, which the Germans kept regularly swept in the Bight in response to British minelaying. Return *viâ* the Kattegat was unlikely. Admiral Scheer was 344 miles from the Little Belt, and a choice of this route would give the British a whole day to chase and renew the action. The channels or "ways" kept swept in the Bight were three in number—one past the Ems along the Frisian coast, one radiating to the north-west from Heligoland, and one by Amrum Bank and Sylt to Horns Riff.[1] These "ways" were known at the Admiralty and their general direction had been communicated to the Commander-in-Chief.

The Ems route was improbable, for it was long and round-about, and Heligoland and Horns Riff were the most likely.[2]

Narrative of Proceedings.

53. At 9.01 p.m. the battle fleet was turned by divisions to south, speed 17 knots. At about 9.05 p.m. the *King George V.* sighted the enemy's battle cruisers bearing west-north-west, but mistook them for British, reporting them to the Commander-in-Chief as such, and negativing a signal of the *Caroline* to attack with torpedoes. The *Castor* and 11th Flotilla were also ready to attack, but, as the fleet still withheld its fire, did not do so. Meanwhile the enemy battle cruisers turned away to starboard, and some enemy battleships opened fire on the *Caroline* and *Royalist*. The former fired one torpedo and the latter two, but without result.

At 9.17 p.m. the battle fleet assumed the second organisation (*vide* Appendix B) and formed divisions in line ahead, columns one mile apart, disposed abeam to port from the *King George V.* The Marlborough's sub-division[3] was by this time two to three miles astern of station, with the 5th Battle Squadron between it and the Main Fleet. The object of the closer formation was to ensure the divisions remaining in sight of each other during the night and prevent ships mistaking each other for enemy vessels.[4] At 9.27 p.m. the destroyer flotillas were ordered to take station astern five miles. Admiral Jellicoe states that this was intended to provide the battle fleet with a screen against torpedo attack,

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[1] *See* Diagram 40.

[2] *See* Diagram 41. From Admiral Scheer's 9 p.m. position to Sylt *viâ* Horns Riff was 142 miles. To Heligoland *viâ* the Heligoland way was 175 miles.

[3] *Marlborough, Revenge, Hercules* and *Agincourt.*

[4] Commander-in-Chief's despatch (J.P., p. 21).

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BRITISH AND GERMAN MINEFIELDS UP TO 1ST JUNE, 1916. AND THE GERMAN SWEPT CHANNELS IN THE HELIGOLAND BIGHT.



DIAGRAM 40

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and also to give the destroyers a chance of attacking the enemy's heavy ships should they also be proceeding to the southward.

The *Lion* now bore about 13 miles west-south-west from the *Iron Duke*, maintaining this position during the night. Sir David Beatty states that he considered that he would be carrying out the Commander-in-Chief's wishes by turning to the course of the fleet so as to ensure that the enemy did not regain his base by passing round the southern flank of the fleet.[1]

54. Meanwhile Admiral Scheer had also been disposing his fleet for the night. He had ordered the officers commanding to launch all flotillas to the attack during the night,[2] and they had therefore distributed them over the various sectors where the British were expected to block the passage to Horns Riff. Admiral Scheer then ordered the High Sea Fleet to proceed in, course S.S.E.$\frac{3}{4}$E., speed 16 knots. The 1st Squadron, which had scarcely been in action, was at the head of the line, followed by the 3rd Squadron, both being in reverse order with the *Westfalen* leading; the 2nd Battle Squadron was directed to take station astern of the 3rd Squadron. At the same time the battle cruisers were placed in the rear, but as the *Lützow* had been left behind and the *Seydlitz* and *Moltke* were proceeding independently, only the *Derfflinger* and the *Von der Tann* actually took up this position. The 2nd Scouting Group covered the van and the 4th Scouting Group the starboard side.

The two fleets were now converging on one another; at about 10.15 p.m. the 2nd Scouting Group came in contact with the *Castor* and 11th Flotilla, which were on the starboard quarter of the British starboard wing division, and a short action ensued.[3]

By 10.0 p.m. the *Marlborough's* sub-division was about four miles astern of station, and at 10.03 the 5th Battle Squadron turned 16 points to starboard to regain station on her, resuming its course at 10.12 p.m. As the *Marlborough* was then seen to be going very slowly, the Rear-Admiral, 5th Battle Squadron, increased speed to take station on the battle fleet.

At 10.05 p.m. the *Abdiel* received orders from the Commander-in-Chief to lay mines in accordance with instructions which had been previously issued.[4] The work was completed by 2.04 a.m. and the *Abdiel* returned to Rosyth.

55. In the meantime the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron, which it will be remembered was astern of the 5th Battle Squadron at 9.0 p.m., had moved over to westward of the battle fleet.

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[1] Admiral Beatty (r), J.P., p. 139.

[2] Admiral Scheer's (r), J.P., Appendix III.

[3] Details of destroyer actions during the night are given in the next chapter, *see* p. 118.

[4] Orders had been issued to the *Abdiel* to lay this minefield before it was known that the High Sea Fleet was at sea. Her operation orders were sent her before the fleet sailed on May 30th. For position of minefield *see* Diagram 40.

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About 10.30 p.m.[1] when approximately seven miles on the starboard quarter of the *King George V.*, five ships steering in the same direction appeared on the starboard beam. This was the 4th Scouting Group. They suddenly switched on searchlights and concentrated a heavy fire on the *Southampton* and *Dublin*. The action was brief and fierce. The *Southampton* was extensively damaged about the upper deck and suffered very heavy casualties. The *Dublin*, which was hit on the forebridge, lost touch with the squadron and did not rejoin until 10.0 a.m. next day. The enemy ships were also frequently hit, and the *Frauenlob* was sunk by a torpedo fired from the *Southampton*. After the action was over, the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron altered course to the eastward and took station astern of the battle fleet with the idea of screening it against torpedo attack. In taking up this position the *Birmingham* had to alter course to avoid the two rear ships of the 5th Battle Squadron and, becoming separated from the *Southampton*, took station astern of the rear ship of that squadron.

The signal reporting the *Southampton's* engagement did not reach the Commander-in-Chief until 11.38 p.m.,[2] but the gun flashes and searchlights were seen by the whole battle fleet.[3]

At 10.41 p.m. the Admiralty despatched an important signal to the Commander-in-Chief. It read: "German battle fleet ordered home at 9.14 p.m. battle cruisers in rear, course S.S.E.$\frac{3}{4}$E., speed 16 knots." This course, laid off from the position of the German fleet at 9.0 p.m. as given in the Admiralty's 10.23 signal, passed some nine miles S.W. of the Horns Riff Light Vessel (Diagram 41). The position of the German fleet as given in this Admiralty message differed, however, from its position as estimated from the reports made by various ships from 9.0 p.m. onwards.

56. It was 11.30 p.m. when the German fleet struck the 4th Flotilla, and a heavy fire was opened on the latter's van, probably by the 2nd Scouting Group, supported by the *Rostock* and 1st Squadron. The *Tipperary* was set on fire forward and completely disabled, the *Broke* was seriously damaged, the *Spitfire* collided with the *Nassau*, and the *Sparrowhawk* was

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[1] Times are somewhat conflicting. *Southampton* (r): "at 10.20 squadron was engaged." *Birmingham* (r): "about 10.15." *Dublin* (r), 10.40: "sighted enemy vessels on starboard beam." Scheer states that the *Frauenlob* was hit by a torpedo at 10.45 p.m.

[2] The *Southampton's* wireless had been shot away, but at 11.30 she ordered the *Nottingham* to report the action.

[3] Practically every battleship's report mentions gun flashes and searchlights on the starboard quarter at about 10.30 p.m. and the *Royal Oak* and *Vanguard* report seeing ships silhouetted against the searchlights. None of these reports, however, give any very clear indication of the nature of the fighting in progress, and most of them mention destroyers in action.

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

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disabled by collision with the *Broke*. On the German side the *Elbing* was rammed and disabled by the *Posen*, and the *Rostock* was torpedoed. The remainder of the flotilla made off to the eastward, then turned again to the south, and, ignorant of the course of the German fleet, inevitably struck it again about midnight, and the *Fortune* and *Ardent* were both sunk by gunfire.

During this action the *Pillau* and *Frankfurt* became separated from the main body.

At 0.10 a.m. the *Black Prince*, which had lost touch with the fleet when it deployed and was apparently following it up, found herself within 1,600 yards of the rear ships of the German 1st Squadron. A tornado of fire was opened on her from the *Thuringen* and *Ostfriesland*. She burst into flames and sank with a terrific explosion in four minutes. At about 0.25 a.m. the head of the German line, by this time well on the port quarter of the British fleet, cut through the end of the line formed by the 9th and 10th Flotillas and stragglers from the 13th. A heavy fire was opened on them, and the *Turbulent*, the last of the line, was sunk. These engagements were seen by the battle fleet, and several ships saw the firing commencing on the starboard quarter and gradually working round to the port quarter.[1]

57. At about 11.30 p.m. the *Birmingham*, then astern of the 5th Battle Squadron, observed two large enemy ships switch on their searchlights. She took them for battle cruisers, and at once reported them bearing north-east and steering south; her position placed them some 30 miles astern of the *Iron Duke*. Neither the position nor the course agreed with those previously received from the Admiralty.

Admiral Scheer's tenacity in holding on his course is probably explained by the knowledge he had of the relative position of the British flotillas to the British battle fleet.

The German W/T shore station had intercepted Admiral Jellicoe's wireless signal placing his destroyers five miles astern,

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[1] *Hercules* (r): "From 10.15 p.m. to 12.30 a.m. (June 1st) five separate engagements seem to have occurred . . . On the first occasion searchlights were observed, and attack bore N.W. by W. The attack gradually worked round the stern to N. by E." (J.P., p. 74). *Colossus* (r): "10.35 p.m., firing starboard quarter; 11.40, rapid and continuous firing for 15 minutes right astern." *Superb* (r): "10.13, much firing on starboard quarter; 11.30 and 11.43, firing observed right astern; 0.25 a.m., ditto on port quarter" (J.P., pp. 81, 307). The *Thunderer*, *Temeraire* and *Vanguard* (rear ships in the battle fleet), the *Active* and *Boadicea* (attached cruisers in rear), the whole of the 5th Battle Squadron and the ships following the *Marlborough*, also report sighting enemy ships at various times between 10.15 p.m. and 0.30 a.m., and the *Malaya* identified one of the *Westfalen* class as leading the German line during the attack on the 4th Flotilla.

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and had passed it to Admiral Scheer, who thus knew that as long as his light cruisers were in touch with the British destroyers his main fleet was comparatively safe.

At 1.48 a.m. the Admiralty sent a signal to the Commander-in-Chief to the effect that enemy submarines were apparently coming out from German ports, and that a damaged enemy ship, probably *Lützow*, was in Lat. 56° 26′ N., Long. 5° 41′ E., at midnight.

At 1.55 a.m. the Vice-Admiral, 1st Battle Squadron, reported to the Commander-in-Chief that the *Marlborough* was obliged to ease to 12 knots. She had, in fact, been dropping astern with her division for some time, though this was not known to the Commander-in-Chief. The *Marlborough* hauled out of line, and at about 3 a.m. the Vice-Admiral transferred his flag in the *Fearless* to the *Revenge*. Shortly afterwards the Commander-in-Chief ordered the *Marlborough* to the Tyne, the *Fearless* accompanying her as escort. The *Revenge*, *Hercules* and *Agincourt*, which had continued their course, were 12 miles astern of the fleet at daylight. At midnight they had crossed the enemy's track only 4½ miles ahead of him.

By 1.45 a.m. the enemy fleet had worked right round to the port quarter and were sighted by the 12th Flotilla led by the *Faulknor*. This was reported to the Commander-in-Chief, the *Faulknor* giving her position as 10 miles astern of the 1st Battle Squadron.[2] The signal, however, does not appear to have been received by any ship, possibly owing to German W/T interference.

But even if it had been received it could not have affected the result, for the Grand Fleet was now too far from Horns Riff, and it was too late to intercept the enemy and bring him to action. At 2.10 a.m. the 12th Flotilla carried out an attack and succeeded in torpedoing the *Pommern*, which blew up with a terrific explosion and the loss of all hands. At 2.35 a.m., just as it was getting light, the *Champion*, after making to the eastward, was returning to the southward in company with the *Obdurate* and *Moresby* of the 13th Flotilla,[3] and the *Marksman* and *Mœnad* of the 12th, when they sighted the German 2nd Squadron at about 4,000 yards. They were unobserved by the enemy, and the *Moresby* made a bold attack. She fired one torpedo which evidently sank the German destroyer V. 4.

58. Meanwhile the fleet was approaching the end of its disappointing journey to the south. At 2.15 a.m. the Commander-in-Chief signalled that single line would be formed on a northerly course at 2.30 a.m., and at 2.22[4] he ordered the various detached

[1] The signal was received in the *Iron Duke* at 1.55 a.m.

[2] He appears to have been further away, probably about 30 miles N.N.E. of the *Iron Duke*.

[3] The remainder of the flotilla had joined up with the 9th and 10th Flotillas.

[4] Priority: "My position 2.30 a.m., Lat. 55° 07′ N., [1]Long. 6° 21′ E., altering course north, conform and close."

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

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squadrons to conform and close. The *King George V.* led round to north at 2.39 a.m., and the Battle Fleet, less the *Marlborough's* division, formed line ahead on her in the 5th Organisation.[1] The Commander-in-Chief states that: "I deemed it advisable to disregard the danger from submarines due to a long line of ships and to form line of battle at once in case of meeting the enemy battle fleet before I have been able to get in touch with my cruisers and destroyers." The battle cruisers and 5th Battle Squadron altered course to the north a few minutes after the battle fleet.[2]

It was now too late to bar the way to Horns Riff, for the *Iron Duke* was 33 miles, and the Germans only 12 miles away from it.[3]

Lord Jellicoe states[4] that when he decided to steer to the southward it had been his intention to close Horns Riff at daylight, but the scattered state of the fleet next morning prevented his doing so.

59. At 3.15 a.m. the *Indomitable* and some of the 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron opened fire on a Zeppelin which was observing the movements of the Battle Cruiser Fleet. At 3.20 a.m. the Commander-in-Chief received information from the Admiralty that five light cruisers and 13 destroyers from Harwich had been ordered to join his Flag. At 7.0 a.m. the Commander-in-Chief ordered four of these to screen the *Marlborough*. The remainder did not join the fleet, as the Commander-in-Chief informed the Admiralty at 4.0 p.m. that they were not required. At 3.30 a.m. the *Champion*, steering to the north-westward, accompanied by the *Obdurate*, *Moresby*, *Marksman* and *Mœnad*, sighted four enemy destroyers upon an opposite course. The latter fired two torpedoes, and the *Champion* opened fire with her 6-inch guns.

At 3.29 a.m. a final signal was sent by the Admiralty, which was received in the *Iron Duke* at 3.45 a.m., informing the Commander-in-Chief that at 2.30 a.m. the German fleet was in Lat. 55° 33′ N., Long. 6° 50′ E., course S.E. by S. 16 knots. This placed it 17 miles from Horns Riff Light and 23 miles from the Grand Fleet at that time.

At 3.42 the battle fleet altered course to west and reduced to 15 knots, heavy firing having been heard to westward.[5] It turned again to north and increased to 17 knots at 3.52 a.m.

60. Meanwhile the battle cruisers were also steering in a northerly direction at 20 knots to regain visual touch with the battle fleet. At 4.07 the Vice-Admiral ordered his light cruisers to spread to the westward to locate the enemy. Admiral Beatty was still in ignorance of the enemy's course to the south-eastward,

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[1] *See* Appendix B.
[2] For position at 2.45 a.m. *see* Diagram 42.
[3] From a position 10 miles S.W. of Horns Riff (*see* Diagram, 42),
[4] G.F., p. 385.
[5] Presumably the Battle Cruiser Fleet engaging a Zeppelin at 3.20 a.m.

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and imagined him to be to the westward. The battle cruisers had been too far ahead to observe the route of the High Sea Fleet as indicated by the destroyer actions, and the Admiralty's 10.41 signal was not received in the *Lion*. Admiral Beatty had taken in the *Birmingham's* report of sighting hostile battle cruisers at 11.30, but their course had been received by him as W.S.W. instead of south, an error which tended to support the idea that the British battle cruisers were still between the enemy and his base.

There is little more to be told. At 4.10 a.m. the *Dublin* sighted some enemy vessels steering a southerly course, one of which appeared to be a light cruiser. This may have been the *Regensburg*, which had turned back to escort the destroyers, bringing in the survivors of the *Lützow*, one of which had been hit in the engine room.[1] It was the last occasion on which the ships of the opposing fleets sighted each other.

At 4.13 a.m. the Battle Fleet formed divisions in line ahead columns disposed abeam to starboard with the 5th Battle Squadron three miles ahead.

At 4.40 a.m. the Commander-in-Chief informed the Senior Officer, Battle Cruiser Fleet, that the enemy fleet had returned to harbour and told him to try to locate the *Lützow*.

At 4.45 a.m. the battle cruisers altered course to east to close the Battle Fleet and turned up astern at 5.10 a.m., and at 5.40 increased to 20 knots and proceeded to sweep out an area to the south and south-eastward.

Meanwhile, the battle fleet also swept out an area to the southward of the scene of the action, and at noon it was in Lat. 56° 20′ N., Long. 5° 26′ E. It only remained to return to harbour.

61. The enemy meanwhile had swept right across the stern of the fleet during the night.[2] At dawn his ships were still 16 miles from Horns Riff and scores of glasses swept the horizon[3] anxiously for the British fleet which they fully expected to see. To their surprise and intense relief it was not there. The way lay open and the battle cruisers were ordered to proceed in at 3.4 a.m. The *Seydlitz* did not reach Horns Riff till 4 a.m. and it was still doubtful if she could get home. Had she been as far from safety as were the damaged British ships, or had her way led across the exposed waters of the North Sea, instead of through the sheltered channels of the German Bight, there is little doubt that she and possibly others of her damaged consorts, would have been lost. As it was, she was ultimately beached the next day at the entrance to the Jade, steering stern first and drawing 42 feet of water. The German battle fleet arrived at Horns

[1] Possibly during the short encounter with the *Champion* at 3.30 a.m.

[2] Eleven miles astern at midnight.

[3] Hase, pp. 222 227, suggest that the weather at Horns Riff was clear. Admiral Scheer, on the other hand, says that it was too thick to see the full length of a squadron (H.S.F., p. 166).

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Riff at 3.0 a.m. and Admiral Scheer waited for the *Lützow*, which he had not heard of. At 3.30 came the news that she had been abandoned. The three British submarines posted off Vyl Light did not sight the enemy.[1] One misfortune still awaited the German fleet. The *Ostfriesland* struck a mine at 5 a.m., and had to be escorted back by tugs.[2] By 6.30 all danger of pursuit by the Grand Fleet was over, though the *König*, drawing 34½ ft., could not pass the Amrum Bank channel till 9.30 a.m.

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[1] E. 50, E. 26 and D. 1 had orders to spread on a line 270°, 4, 12 and 20 miles respectively from Vyl Light Vessel.

[2] This was one of the mines laid by the *Abdiel* on May 5th, 1916.

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CHAPTER IX.

DESTROYER ACTIONS DURING THE NIGHT.

The British destroyer flotillas played such an important part in the night operations that it is necessary to devote a separate chapter to their proceedings.

11th Flotilla.

62. At about 10.15 p.m. the *Castor* and 11th Flotilla,[1] which were on the starboard quarter of the Battle Fleet, came in contact with the 2nd Scouting Group. The two leading German cruisers opened fire on the *Castor*, obtaining several hits and wounding 23 men. The *Castor* replied with her 6-inch guns and fired one torpedo. The *Magic* and *Marne* also fired torpedoes, but of the remainder of the destroyers, some were blinded by the flash of the guns, and others were under the impression that the attacking ships were British.[2]

At 10.45 p.m. the flotilla again fell in with the 2nd Scouting Group, and after exchanging a few rounds the enemy was lost to sight.

At 0.15 a.m. the *Castor* reports sighting an enemy torpedo boat and firing on her at point blank range.

At 8.40 a.m. the 11th Flotilla rejoined the Battle Fleet and formed a submarine screen.

4th Flotilla[3]. (Diagram 43).

63. At about 9.0 p.m., when the 4th Flotilla was in screening station ahead of the 2nd Battle Squadron, the *Garland* engaged four enemy destroyers, which fired two torpedoes and made off at high speed to the westward. On being ordered to take station astern of the fleet five miles, the flotilla turned 16 points and passed through the lines. At 9.50 it was in two columns, led by *Tipperary* and *Broke*, and at 10.0 p.m. single line ahead was formed, course south, speed 17 knots.

At 10.35 p.m. the *Garland* reported to the Captain (D) a cruiser of the *Graudenz* class bearing W., course S., speed 17 knots, whilst at 10.50 the *Porpoise* and *Unity*, the rear ships of the line, reported three enemy destroyers[4] approaching from the starboard

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[1] Consisting of *Kempenfelt, Ossory, Mystic, Morning Star, Magic, Mounsey, Mandate, Minion, Martial, Milbrook, Moon, Marne, Manners, Michael* and *Mons*. Individual reports from the vessels of this flotilla cannot be traced, and the only information available is that given by ships' logs and Commodore (F) (J.P., p. 303).

[2] *Castor* (r) J.P., p. 304 : " It is unfortunate that this element of doubt existed in the minds of the captains of the destroyers as to whether the ships were enemy, as a good opportunity of firing torpedoes was lost."

[3] Consisting of *Tipperary* (Captain (D)), *Spitfire, Sparrowhawk Garland, Contest, Broke, Achates, Ambuscade, Ardent, Fortune, Porpoise* and *Unity*.

[4] Probably of German 7th Flotilla.

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DIAGRAM 43.

APPROXIMATE MOVEMENTS OF THE FOURTH FLOTILLA. FROM 10 P.M. TO 12.30 A.M.

UNITY
PORPOISE
FORTUNE
ARDENT
AMBUSCADE
ACHATES
BROKE

CONTEST
GARLAND
SPARROWHAWK
SPITFIRE
TIPPERARY

10 P.M.

SCALE.

½ 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 SEA MILES.

GERMAN DESTROYERS 10.48

10.48

11.00

(A) 11.27. TIPPERARY SUNK; BROKE'S DIVISION HAULS OUT
SPARROWHAWK & CONTEST JOIN BROKE'S DIVISION
(B) GARLAND TURNS TO CLOSE TIPPERARY
(C) SPITFIRE IN COLLISION WITH NASSAU
(D) GARLAND IS CHASED TO E°, THEN TURNS S. AND REJOINS ACHATES.
(E) BROKE, SPARROWHAWK & CONTEST IN COLLISION, 11.40 APPROXIMATELY.
(F) UNITY LOSES TOUCH & FOLLOWS LYDIARD.
(G) REMAINDER FOLLOW ACHATES.

MAGNETIC

(A) (D)
11.27
(B)
(C)
11.36
ROSTOCK TORPEDOED
(F)
11.40
(E) (G)

APPROXIMATE TRACK OF GERMAN FLEET

GARLAND
PORPOISE
FORTUNE
ARDENT
AMBUSCADE
ACHATES

(H) FORTUNE SUNK, PORPOISE DISABLED
(K) GARLAND CHASED TO N.E°
(L) ACHATES & AMBUSCADE CHASED TO E°
(M) ARDENT TRIES TO REGAIN TOUCH

(K)
(H) (L) (M)
12.10

(N) ARDENT SUNK

(N)
12.24

H.M.S.O.-L.4b

3/2 W" 10737A 250/6/18
4/1 W" 9568 4/6/19

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quarter. Other suspicious vessels[1] were apparently sighted after 11 p.m., but their identity was not, apparently, certain enough to justify attack and the flotilla continued its course.

At 11.30[2] searchlights blazed out suddenly on the starboard beam of the flotilla, and three enemy ships[3] poured a heavy fire on the head of the line, quickly disabling the *Tipperary* and setting her on fire forward.[4] The subsequent movements of the flotilla are shown in Diagram 43. The *Spitfire*, second ship in the line, fired two torpedoes and claims to have hit a four-funnelled cruiser.[5] She then turned to the westward to reload, apparently under the impression that there was a British Flotilla in that direction, and on again steering towards the *Tipperary* suddenly found herself close to what she thought were two cruisers. These were ships of the German 1st Battle Squadron. The *Spitfire* opened fire on the *Nassau*, putting her searchlights out of action and killing many of the crews. The *Nassau* attempted to ram, but the *Spitfire* escaped by putting her helm hard over, and the two ships ran into one another, port bow to port bow. The *Spitfire's* bridge and funnels received the full blast of the *Nassau's* 11-inch guns. The side plating was torn off her forecastle, and the bridge, searchlight platform, mast, foremost funnel, boats and davits were completely demolished. The Germans thought they had sunk her, but she managed to get clear, and eventually proceeded to the Tyne at reduced speed with 20 ft. of German plating as a memento of her exciting encounter. The *Garland* also endeavoured to return to the *Tipperary's* assistance, but was driven off to the eastward, rejoining the remainder of the flotilla shortly before midnight.

64. When the enemy first opened fire, the *Broke*, followed by the *Sparrowhawk*, altered course outwards to fire her starboard after tube, and then resumed course. A few minutes later searchlights were directed on her by a large ship on the starboard beam. After waiting a short pause for the after tube to be fired, the *Broke* put her helm hard-a-starboard, but just then a shell hit the lower bridge, killing everyone on it and jamming the helm. She therefore continued to circle and rammed the *Sparrowhawk*, just before the bridge, cutting right into her. Whilst the two ships were locked together, the *Contest* added to the confusion by

[1] The surviving executive officer of the *Tipperary* states that the enemy ships were sighted about 20 minutes before they opened fire, but their identity was in doubt. The *Sparrowhawk* reports that, "about 11.30, vessels were sighted on the starboard quarter overtaking the flotilla, and apparently steering the same course . . . When the leading ship was abreast of the *Tipperary*, she switched on searchlights." As the *Sparrowhawk* was third ship in the line an appreciable interval must have elapsed between sighting these vessels and the moment of attack.

[2] *Achates*, *Sparrowhawk*, *Unity*, *Ambuscade*, *Spitfire* and *Champion* (13th Flotilla), 11.30. *Garland*, 11.28. *Nassau* reports ramming a destroyer, (about 11.30). *Broke*, 11.0 p.m.

[3] Probably the 2nd Scouting Group.

[4] She eventually sank at 1.45 a.m.

[5] The *Rostock* was torpedoed, but she cannot be definitely allotted to the *Spitfire*, as several torpedoes were fired at this time.

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ramming the *Sparrowhawk* and cutting off five feet of her stern. The *Broke*, who had suffered very heavy casualties from the enemy's gun-fire, succeeded in extricating herself from the wreckage, and steaming north at slow speed, eventually proceeded to the Tyne. The *Sparrowhawk* drifted to the north-eastward and was abandoned and sunk about 9.0 a.m., after the *Marksman* had attempted to tow her. The remainder of the flotilla, consisting of the *Achates*, *Ambuscade*, *Ardent*, *Fortune*, *Porpoise*, and *Unity*, appears to have altered course to the eastward on the enemy opening fire, and, after proceeding about three miles in that direction, to have resumed a southerly course. The *Unity* and *Contest*, however, lost touch with the flotilla, the former joining the 9th and 10th, and the latter, with a damaged stem, steering to the north-eastward, took no further part in the battle. On the British side this phase of the action resulted in the disablement of the *Tipperary*, *Sparrowhawk*, *Broke*, and *Spitfire*, and the eventual loss of the first two. On the German side the *Rostock* and *Elbing*, which were abreast of the van of the 1st Squadron on the engaged side, turned away from the torpedoes fired by the 4th Flotilla, and in order to avoid masking the fire of the battleships endeavoured to pass through the line. During this manœuvre the *Rostock* was torpedoed by the 4th Flotilla and the *Elbing* was rammed by the *Posen*. Both vessels were eventually abandoned and sunk by the Germans, the former at 3.45 a.m. and the latter at 2.0 a.m.

65. The flotilla as an organised force now consisted of only the *Achates*, *Ambuscade*, *Ardent*, *Fortune*, *Porpoise* and *Garland*.[1] Their easterly course and subsequent alteration to the south were again leading them rapidly towards the High Sea Fleet, and about midnight enemy ships were sighted on the starboard side. These at once opened fire, sinking the *Fortune* and hitting the *Porpoise* in the after boiler room. The latter, screened by steam and the smoke of the sinking *Fortune*, was able to make her escape slowly to the northward. The *Ambuscade* after firing a torpedo was chased off to the eastward with the *Achates*, the former joining up with the *Castor* and the latter returning to Rosyth. The *Garland* made off to the north-eastward after firing a torpedo. After retiring to the eastward the *Ardent* resumed a southerly course, and converging on the enemy's south-easterly course, suddenly ran right into them again. She at once fired a torpedo, but as it left the tube the two leading ships opened a devastating fire and quickly reduced her to a wreck. After firing for about five minutes, they ceased fire and switched off searchlights. The next squadron opened fire at point blank range, the survivors took to the water and the *Ardent* sank with colours flying.

The result of this phase of the action was the destruction of the *Fortune* and *Ardent* and the disablement of the *Porpoise*. Torpedo hits were claimed by the *Garland* and *Ambuscade*, but the German ships were undamaged.

[1] The *Garland* rejoined just before midnight.

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Those vessels of the flotilla that remained capable of action were now scattered and dispersed and took no further effective part in the operations. The 4th Flotilla had ceased to exist as an organised force, but the German fleet had been thrown into confusion,[1] and its escape had been delayed by nearly half an hour, since it had been forced to haul right round to S.S.W., 6 points off its course for the Horns Riff.

The results of the two encounters between the 4th Flotilla and High Sea Fleet are summarised below :—

Approximate Time.	Vessel.	Damage and subsequent Proceedings.	Torpedoes fired.
11.30	*Tipperary* - -	Disabled by gun-fire. Sunk at 1.45 a.m.	2
11.35	*Spitfire* - -	In collision with *Nassau* -	2 (possibly hit *Rostock*).
11.30	*Garland* - -	Fired torpedo; lost flotilla, but rejoined before midnight.	1
11.30	*Contest* - -	Fired torpedo; rammed *Sparrowhawk*; lost flotilla and took no further part in the action.	1
11.30	*Unity* -	Lost flotilla and joined 9th and 10th Flotilla.	—
11.35	*Broke* - -	Damaged, and heavy casualties from gun-fire; returned to the Tyne.	1 (possibly *Rostock*).
11.35	*Sparrowhawk* -	Completely disabled by collision with *Broke* and *Contest*. Sunk by gun-fire next day owing to difficulty of towing.	1 (possibly *Rostock*).
11.30	*Achates*, *Ambuscade*, *Ardent*, *Fortune*, and *Porpoise*.	Altered course to eastward. *Ambuscade* fired two torpedoes.	2
11.30	*Elbing* (German)	Rammed and disabled by *Posen*; sunk by enemy at 2 a.m.	—
11.30	*Rostock* (German)	Torpedoed and disabled. Sunk by enemy at 3.45 a.m.	—
Midnight	*Fortune* - -	Sunk by gun-fire - -	—
Midnight	*Porpoise* - -	Disabled by gun-fire. Escaped to northward.	—
Midnight	*Achates* - -	Retired to eastward -	—
Midnight	*Ambuscade* -	Fired one torpedo; retired to eastward.	1
Midnight	*Garland* - -	Fired one torpedo; retired to north-eastward.	1
0.20 a.m.	*Ardent* - -	Sunk by gun-fire - -	1

[1] "We had frequently to stop because the whole line ahead of us was thrown into disorder as a result of the numerous destroyer attacks. In this way the *Nassau*, originally the second ship of the line, gradually fell into the last place and became our next ahead." Hase, p. 220.

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13th Flotilla. (Diagram 44.)

66. On the Commander-in-Chief ordering the destroyers to take station for the night, the 12th and 13th, and the 9th and 10th Flotillas took up a position astern of the eastern flank of the battle fleet. At 9.35 p.m. the 12th Flotilla[1] was in station, two cables astern of the *Agincourt;* at 9.45 p.m. it reduced speed, and by 10.45 p.m.[2] was five miles astern of the 5th Division. Up till 11.30 p.m. the 9th and 10th Flotillas[3] were on the starboard beam of the 12th, and the 13th Flotilla[4] was on the starboard beam of the 9th and 10th. When the enemy engaged the 4th Flotilla at 11.30 p.m. many shots fell amongst the 9th, 10th and 13th Flotillas,[5] which were in the line of fire. The *Champion*, leading the 13th, thereupon altered course to the eastward,[6] and increased to high speed without signal, and of her flotilla only the *Obdurate* and *Moresby* managed to maintain touch. The remainder followed astern of the 9th and 10th Flotillas without their senior officer being aware of this addition to his forces. The 12th Flotilla was also forced off its course to the north-eastward and had to reduce speed in order to let the *Champion* pass ahead.

After preceding about six miles to the eastward the *Champion* altered course to south. About 2.30 a.m. the *Marksman* and *Maenad*, which had become separated from the 12th Flotilla, took station astern.

It was now getting light, and at 2.34 a.m., the enemy, four ships of the *Deutschland* class, were sighted by the *Moresby*. She hoisted "Compass West" to indicate their bearing and, hauling out of line to port, she attacked, firing one torpedo three minutes later. This torpedo apparently sank the German destroyer V. 4,

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[1] Consisting of *Faulknor* (Captain (D)), *Obedient*, *Mindful*, *Marvel*, *Onslaught*, *Maenad*, *Narwhal*, *Nessus*, *Noble*, *Marksman*, *Opal*, *Nonsuch*, *Menace*, *Munster* and *Mary Rose*.

[2] *Faulknor* (r), J.P., p. 332.

[3] Consisting of *Lydiard*, *Liberty*, *Landrail*, *Laurel*, *Moorsom* and *Morris*. The *Termagant* and *Turbulent* were temporarily attached to the 13th Flotilla and the *Moorsom* was ordered to return to her base at 9.57 p.m.

[4] Consisting of *Champion* (Captain (D)), *Obdurate*, *Moresby*, *Nerissa*, *Termagant*, *Nicator*, *Narborough*, *Pelican*, *Petard* and *Turbulent*.

[5] *Nerissa* (r): "Many salvos fell between *Nerissa* and *Moresby*," J.P., p. 235. *Liberty* (r): "11.30, fire was opened on the flotilla by about four heavy ships which appeared to be 4,000 yards on our port beam," J.P., p. 259. *Champion* (r): "About 11.30 heavy firing was opened on our starboard beam, apparently at some of our destroyers between the 13th Flotilla and the enemy," J.P., p. 224.

[6] *Lydiard* (r): "*Champion* suddenly increased to high speed and disappeared to starboard," J.P., p. 255. *Landrail* reports: 11.30, fire was opened to starboard of us . . . during it *Champion* went on at high speed and disappeared without a signal," J.P., p. 258. *Champion* states: "about 11.30 heavy firing was reported on our starboard beam. I hauled out to the eastward as I was unable to attack with any of our flotilla, our own forces being between me and the enemy. Destroyers of the 13th Flotilla, with the exception of *Obdurate* and *Moresby*, lost touch with me during the night," J.P., p. 225.

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TURBULENT
PETARD
PELICAN
NARBOROUGH
NICATOR
TERMAGANT
NERISSA
MORESBY
OBDURATE
CHAMPION
11·00

11·36

11·40

318 Wt 10737 4/25
411 Wt 9568 A/6/5

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but, not having seen the *Moresby*, the enemy put their loss down to a mine.

At 2.50 a.m. the *Champion* altered course to the northward to close the Commander-in-Chief in accordance with his signal made at 2.20 a.m.

At about 3.30 a.m. four enemy torpedo-boats were sighted steering south at about 3,000 yards' range. The *Champion* opened fire from her 6-in. guns, and, upon the enemy firing torpedoes, turned away to avoid them. Two torpedoes passed close to her, one ahead and one astern, and two more were observed by the *Moresby*.

The enemy passing at high speed, upon an opposite course, quickly disappeared into the mist.

These boats were probably G. 37, 38 and 40, and V. 45 returning from the wreck of the *Lützow* with 1,250 survivors of her crew. Admiral Scheer states that these four torpedo boats engaged British cruisers and destroyers on two occasions, and that during the last action G. 40 was hit in the engine room and had to be taken in tow.

On the way north, survivors of the *Ardent* and *Fortune* were picked up. The *Champion*, *Moresby*, *Obdurate* and *Mœnad* then returned to their base, whilst the *Marksman*, after sinking the *Sparrowhawk*, joined the 1st Battle Squadron. The proceedings of the remainder of the 13th Flotilla will be considered in conjunction with those of the 9th and 10th.

9th and 10th Flotilla. (Diagram 44.)

67. When the *Champion* crossed the bows of the 9th and 10th Flotilla, the *Lydiard* (the Senior Officer of the 9th and 10th Flotilla) altered course to the south-eastward, followed by the *Unity* from the 4th Flotilla and the seven destroyers of the 13th Flotilla which had just lost touch with the *Champion*. The shots directed at the 4th Flotilla continued to fall spasmodically in the vicinity of the 9th and 10th, and the object in view was to work round to the other side of the enemy ships.[1] At about midnight, course was altered to S.W., which took the majority of the flotilla across the head of the enemy's line about 0.25 a.m., but the last four destroyers passed very close. The *Narborough* and *Pelican* sighted enemy ships on the starboard quarter at short range, whilst the *Petard* had to alter course to avoid being rammed by the leading ship. The enemy switched on searchlights and opened fire on the last two destroyers, the *Petard* and *Turbulent*. The former received several hits and the latter was sunk with all hands, either by ramming or gun-fire.

At 1.30 course was altered to the westward to close the *Castor*. At 5.35 a.m. the 9th and 10th Flotilla, which was short of fuel, proceeded to its base, and the stragglers of the 13th Flotilla were ordered to close the battle cruisers.

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[1] *Lydiard's* (r), J.P., p. 255.

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12th Flotilla. (Diagram 45.)

68. At 11.45 p.m. the *Faulknor*, leading the 12th Flotilla, was pressed off her course to the southward by the *Champion*, *Obdurate* and *Moresby*. She altered course to the eastward and later to the north-eastward, reducing speed to allow the *Champion* to pass ahead. As the flotilla was turning to S.E., two enemy cruisers suddenly appeared on the starboard side close to the rear of the line. The *Menace* had to put her helm hard over to avoid collision, and the *Nonsuch*[1] turned to the eastward and increased to full speed. The cruisers were probably the *Frankfurt* and *Pillau* of the 2nd Scouting Group, which apparently took a more northerly course than the remainder of the fleet after the action with the 4th Flotilla. As a result of this encounter the *Nonsuch* lost touch with the flotilla. She fell in with the *Acasta* about 8.0 a.m. and towed her to Aberdeen.

At 0.20 a.m. the flotilla resumed its southerly course. At about 1.45 a.m. the *Faulknor* and *Obedient* sighted strange ships on the starboard bow steering S.E. They proved to be the 2nd Squadron of the High Sea Fleet. The *Faulknor*, who was leading with the 1st and 2nd Divisions, disposed on the starboard and port quarter respectively, at once altered parallel to the enemy, increased speed to 25 knots, and ordered the 1st Division[2] to attack. But the enemy had sighted the destroyers, and, turning away, was temporarily lost to view. Thereupon the *Faulknor* recalled the 1st Division and ordered it to take station astern. The whole flotilla then proceeded at 25 knots in a south-easterly direction to get into a favourable position for attacking. In the meanwhile the *Faulknor* found time to report the position and course of the enemy to the Commander-in-Chief,[3] and at about 2.0 she turned some 16 points to starboard, followed by the *Obedient*, *Marvel*, and *Onslaught*. The *Mindful*, which originally had been astern of the *Obedient*, only having two boilers available, was left some distance behind. The *Maenad*, who had expected the attack to be made to starboard, held on to the south-eastward to admit of her tubes being trained to port, and turned about five minutes after the *Faulknor*, followed by the *Narwhal*. The *Faulknor* and the three destroyers following her sighted the enemy immediately after their turn was completed, and all fired torpedoes. The *Mindful*, which was apparently still steering in a south-easterly direction, appears to have sighted the enemy on her starboard bow whilst the *Faulknor* was delivering her attack, and to have made straight for the German line, but being masked by the destroyers astern of the *Faulknor* she had to turn away to avoid being rammed. The *Faulknor*

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[1] *Nonsuch* (1). "Two German cruisers passed astern and opened fire; attempted to fire torpedo. Increased to 33 knots."

[2] *Obedient, Mindful, Marvel* and *Onslaught*.

[3] 1.52 a.m.: "Enemy's battle fleet steering S.E., approximate bearing S.W. My position 10′ astern of 1st Battle Squadron." *Faulknor* reports that this signal was made twice on power, but was not answered. It was not received by any ship.

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DIAGRAM 45

APPROXIMATE MOVEMENTS OF THE TWELFTH FLOTILLA.
FROM 11 P.M. TO 3·30 A.M.

SCALE

5 4 3 2 1 0 5 10 15 SEA MILES.

MARY ROSE
MUNSTER
MENACE
NONSUCH
OPAL
MARKSMAN
NOBLE
NESSUS
NARWHAL
MAENAD
ONSLAUGHT
MARVEL
MINDFUL
OBEDIENT
11·00 FAULKNOR

12·30
12·15
12·10
12·20
12·15
12·00
11·45 NONSUCH
11·45
FRANKFURT
PILLAU
11·45
(B)
(A)

(A) CHAMPION AT 11·45 FORCES FAULKNOR TO E°

(B) CHAMPION AT MIDNIGHT FORCES FAULKNOR TO N.E°

MAGNETIC

(C). ENEMY S.W.

(D). MAENAD & NARWHAL TURN TO ATTACK.
(E). MAENADS SECOND ATTACK 2·28.
(F). MARKSMAN JOINS CHAMPION ABOUT 2·20.

2ND SQUADRON 1·40
(C)
1·45
2·25
2·55
2·35
POMMERN SUNK 2·10.
2·00
?
?
(D) (F)
(E)

ONSLAUGHT
MINDFUL
NOBLE
NESSUS
NARWHAL
MARY ROSE
MUNSTER
MENACE
OPAL
0315

3·30

MARVEL
OBEDIENT
FAULKNOR
3·25

MARLBOROUGH 3·25

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H.M.S.O.,Cr.,Lith

318.W.10737*/250/618

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and *Obedient* each fired two torpedoes, and the *Onslaught* and *Marvel* four each. One of them hit the *Pommern*, the third ship in the enemy's line, which blew up with a terrific explosion[1] at 2.10 a.m. The destroyers came under a heavy fire, the *Onslaught's* bridge and chart house were totally wrecked, the Captain mortally wounded, and the 1st Lieutenant killed.

69. The *Maenad* and *Narwhal* appear to have delivered their attack about ten minutes after the *Faulknor*, the former firing one torpedo and the latter two. The *Maenad* then turned approximately 16 points to starboard and delivered a second attack by herself, firing two torpedoes. None of these took effect.[2] She then ran down to the south-eastward and joined up with the *Marksman* and *Champion* about 2.30 a.m.

Nothing definite can be said as to the movements of the *Nessus*, *Noble*, *Opal*, *Menace*, *Munster* and *Mary Rose* after the *Faulknor* turned to the north-westward, for no reports from these vessels can be traced. They may or may not have followed the *Maenad* and *Narwhal*, but they did not fire any torpedoes, and it may therefore be assumed that they took no part in the attack. The proceedings of the *Marksman* are also obscure until she sighted and joined the *Champion* about 2.20 a.m. After the *Faulknor* and her division had delivered their attack, cruisers were seen approaching from the rear of the enemy's battle line. They opened a heavy fire and drove the *Faulknor's* detachment off to the north-eastward.[3] As soon as they were clear, *Faulknor* altered course to the S.W., and gradually to the south, with the intention of keeping in touch. A cruiser was sighted about 2.25 a.m., but after that the enemy was not seen again.[4]

The *Faulknor* proceeded to join the battle fleet, taking station on the quarter of the 5th Division at 3.40 a.m. In the meanwhile, at 3.20 a.m., the *Opal* had reported the remainder of the flotilla 15 miles to the westward of the *Faulknor's* 2.0 a.m. position, and at 3.46 a.m. the *Faulknor* ordered them to conform to her movements.

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[1] " . . . . and directly ahead of us saw a huge pillar of fire shoot up to the sky. It looks to us like the trail of a gigantic rocket . . . . The ship must have been blown literally to atoms, for a few minutes later not the slightest trace of her could be seen." Hase, p. 221.

[2] The Captain of the *Maenad* considered that one of his torpedoes had caused a terrific explosion in the fourth ship. His report (J.P., p. 335) states " . . . closing in again to between 4 and 5,000 yards, when I fired two more torpedoes with different settings . . . The second torpedo struck the target, with the above result. The enemy turned away 2 to 3 points after firing the third torpedo, though a two-point turn had been allowed for." The 4-inch guns are reported as hitting with 6,000 yards on the sights.

[3] The *Faulknor* reports that the cruisers which drove her off to the north-eastward " altered back towards their own fleet and continued to attack the destroyers astern of us." It is possible that these cruisers drove the remainder of the flotilla out of range and prevented them attacking."

[4] When last seen, the enemy battle line was steering S.S.W.. and this was signalled to the Commander-in-Chief by the *Faulknor* at 2.12 a.m. It was made twice on power, but was not answered. It was not received by any ship but *Marksman*.

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APPENDIX A.

PRELIMINARY DISTRIBUTION OF BRITISH SHIPS, WITH NAMES OF COMMANDING OFFICERS.

On Tuesday, May 30th, 1916, the sea-going ships of the Grand Fleet were distributed between the three northern bases as follows :—

AT SCAPA FLOW.

Iron Duke, Captain Frederick C. Dreyer, C.B. (Fleet Flagship). Flying the flag of Admiral Sir John Jellicoe, G.C.B., K.C.V.O., Commander-in-Chief. Vice-Admiral Sir Charles Madden, K.C.B., C.V.O., Chief-of-Staff; Commodore Lionel Halsey, C.M.G., Captain-of-the-Fleet.

Attached to Fleet Flagship :—

Destroyer.

Oak, Lieutenant-Commander Douglas Faviell, M.V.O.

Flotilla Leader.

Abdiel, Commander Berwick Curtis. (Fitted as a minelayer.)

Light Cruiser.

Active, Captain Percy Withers.

Seaplane Carrier.

Campania (was unable to raise steam in time to sail with the fleet, left Scapa at 1.30 a.m., but was ordered back with defects at 4.30 a.m., 31st).

Kite Balloon Ship.

Menelaus (did not sail).

1st Battle Squadron.

Marlborough, Captain George P. Ross, Flying the flag of Vice-Admiral Sir Cecil Burney, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., Second in Command of the Grand Fleet. Captain E. Percy F. G. Grant, Chief-of-Staff.

Revenge, Captain Edward B. Kiddle.
Hercules, Captain Lewis Clinton-Baker.
Agincourt, Captain Henry M. Doughty.
Colossus, Captain Alfred D. P. R. Pound. Flying the flag of Rear-Admiral Ernest F. A. Gaunt, C.M.G.
Collingwood, Captain James C. Ley.
Neptune, Captain Vivian H. G. Bernard.
St. Vincent, Captain William W. Fisher, M.V.O.

Attached to 1st Battle Squadron.

Light Cruiser.

Bellona, Captain Arthur B. S. Dutton.
(*Royal Sovereign*, which had commissioned on April 18th, 1916, and arrived at Scapa Flow on May 25th, did not proceed to sea with the fleet.)

4th Battle Squadron.

Benbow, Captain Henry W. Parker. Flying the flag of Vice-Admiral Sir Doveton Sturdee, Bart., K.C.B., C.V.O., C.M.G.
Bellerophon, Captain Edward F. Bruen.

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Temeraire, Captain Edwin V. Underhill.
Vanguard, Captain James D. Dick.
Royal Oak, Captain Crawford Maclachlan.
Superb, Captain Edmond Hyde-Parker. Flying the flag of Rear-Admiral Alexander L. Duff, C.B.
Canada, Captain William C. M. Nicholson.

Attached to 4th Battle Squadron.

Light Cruiser.

Blanche, Captain John M. Casement.
(*Emperor of India*, Second Flagship of this squadron, was at this time refitting at Invergordon; the flag was flown temporarily in *Superb*.)

3RD BATTLE CRUISER SQUADRON.

Invincible, Captain Arthur L.Cay. Flying the flag of Rear-Admiral the Hon. Horace L. A. Hood, C.B., M.V.O., D.S.O.
Indomitable, Captain Francis W. Kennedy.
Inflexible, Captain Edward H. F. Heaton-Ellis, M.V.O.

To this Squadron were temporarily attached :—

Light Cruisers.

Chester, Captain Robert N. Lawson, belonging to 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron.
Canterbury, Captain Percy M. R. Royds.

2ND CRUISER SQUADRON.

(Organised that day out of the ships of the old 2nd and 7th Cruiser Squadrons.)

Minotaur, Captain Arthur C. S. H. D'Aeth. Flying the flag of Rear-Admiral Herbert L. Heath, M.V.O.
Hampshire, Captain Herbert J. Savill.
Cochrane, Captain Eustace La T. Leatham.
Shannon, Captain John S. Dumaresq, M.V.O.
(*Achilles* was away refitting, and *Donegal* on detached service.)

4TH LIGHT CRUISER SQUADRON.

Calliope, Commodore Charles E. Le Mesurier.
Constance, Captain Cyril S. Townsend.
Comus, Captain Alan G. Hotham.
Caroline, Captain H. Ralph Crooke.
Royalist, Captain The Hon. Herbert Meade, D.S.O.

4TH FLOTILLA.

Flotilla Leaders.

Tipperary, Captain Charles J. Wintour (Captain D. IV).
Broke, Commander Walter L. Allen.

Destroyers.

Achates, Commander Reginald B. C. Hutchinson, D.S.O.
Porpoise, Commander Hugh D. Colville.
Spitfire, Lieutenant-Commander Clarence W. E. Trelawney.
Unity, Lieutenant-Commander Arthur M. Lecky.
Garland, Lieutenant-Commander Reginald S. Goff.
Ambuscade, Lieutenant-Commander Gordon A. Coles.
Ardent, Lieutenant-Commander Arthur Marsden.
Fortune, Lieutenant-Commander Frank G. Terry.
Sparrowhawk, Lieutenant-Commander Sydney Hopkins.

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Contest, Lieutenant-Commander Ernald G. H. Master.
Shark, Commander Loftus W. Jones.
Acasta, Lieutenant-Commander John O. Barron.
Christopher, Lieutenant-Commander Fairfax M. Kerr.
Owl, Commander Robert G. Hammond.
Hardy, Commander Richard A. A. Plowden.
Midge, Lieutenant-Commander James R. C. Cavendish.
Ophelia, Commander Lewis G. E. Crabbe (temporarily attached).
(*Cockatrice* and *Paragon*, of this flotilla, were away refitting, and *Victor* remained in harbour.)

PART OF 11TH FLOTILLA.

Light Cruiser.

Castor, Commodore James R. P. Hawksley, M.V.O. (Commodore F.), Captain D. XI).

Destroyers.

Marne, Lieutenant-Commander George B. Hartford.
Manners, Lieutenant-Commander Gerald C. Harrison.
Michael, Lieutenant-Commander Claude L. Bate.
Mons, Lieutenant-Commander Robert Makin.

12TH FLOTILLA.

Flotilla Leaders.

Faulknor, Captain Anselan J. B. Stirling (Captain D. XII).
Marksman, Commander Norton A. Sulivan.

Destroyers.

Obedient, Commander George W. McO. Campbell.
Maenad, Commander John P. Champion.
Opal, Commander Charles G. C. Sumner.
Mary Rose, Lieutenant-Commander Edwin A. Homan.
Marvel, Lieutenant-Commander Reginald W. Grubb.
Menace, Lieutenant-Commander Charles A. Poignand.
Nessus, Lieutenant-Commander Eric Q. Carter.
Narwhal, Lieutenant-Commander Henry V. Hudson.
Mindful, Lieutenant-Commander John J. C. Ridley.
Onslaught, Lieutenant-Commander Arthur G. Onslow, D.S.C.
Munster, Lieutenant-Commander Spencer F. Russell.
Nonsuch, Lieutenant-Commander Herbert I. N. Lyon.
Noble, Lieutenant-Commander Henry P. Boxer.
Mischief, Lieutenant-Commander the Hon. Cyril A. Ward, M.V.O.
(*Napier* and *Mameluke*, of this flotilla, were away refitting; they returned to Scapa in time to screen the Battle Fleet into the base on its return.)

AT INVERGORDON.

2ND BATTLE SQUADRON.

King George V., Captain Frederick L. Field. Flying the flag of Vice-Admiral Sir Martyn Jerram, K.C.B.
Ajax, Captain George H. Baird.
Centurion, Captain Michael Culme-Seymour, M.V.O.
Erin, Captain the Hon. Victor A. Stanley, M.V.O., A.D.C.
Orion, Captain Oliver Backhouse, C.B. Flying the flag of Rear-Admiral Arthur C. Leveson, C.B.
Monarch, Captain George H. Borrett.
Conqueror, Captain Hugh H. D. Tothill.
Thunderer, Captain James A. Fergusson.

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Attached to 2nd Battle Squadron :—

Light Cruiser.

Boadicea, Captain Louis C. S. Wollcombe, M.V.O.

1ST CRUISER SQUADRON.

Defence, Captain Stanley V. Ellis. Flying the flag of Rear-Admiral Sir Robert Arbuthnot, Bart, M.V.O.
Warrior, Captain Vincent B. Molteno.
Duke of Edinburgh, Captain Henry Blackett.
Black Prince, Captain Thomas P. Bonham.

PART OF 11TH FLOTILLA.

Flotilla Leader.

Kempenfelt, Commander Harold E. Sulivan.

Destroyers.

Ossory, Commander Harold V. Dundas.
Mystic, Commander Claud F. Allsup.
Morning Star, Lieutenant-Commander Hugh U. Fletcher.
Magic, Lieutenant-Commander Gerald C. Wynter.
Mounsey, Lieutenant-Commander Ralph V. Eyre.
Mandate, Lieutenant-Commander Edward McC. W. Lawrie.
Minion, Lieutenant-Commander Henry C. Rawlings.
Martial, Lieutenant-Commander Julian Harrison.
Milbrook, Lieutenant Charles G. Naylor.
Moon, Commander (acting) William D. Irvin (on patrol; joined up with her flotilla about 2 p.m. May 31st).
(*Marmion* and *Musketeer*, of this flotilla, were away refitting.)

AT ROSYTH.

Lion, Captain Alfred E. M. Chatfield, C.V.O. (Battle Cruiser Fleet Flagship). Flying the flag of Vice-Admiral Sir David Beatty, K.C.B., M.V.O., D.S.O. Captain Rudolph W. Bentinck, Chief-of-Staff.

5TH BATTLE SQUADRON.

Barham, Captain Arthur W. Craig. Flying the flag of Rear-Admiral Hugh Evan-Thomas, M.V.O.
Valiant, Captain Maurice Woollcombe.
Warspite, Captain Edward M. Phillpotts.
Malaya, Captain the Hon. Algernon D. E. H. Boyle, C.B., M.V.O.
(*Queen Elizabeth*, of this squadron, was under refit.)

1ST BATTLE CRUISER SQUADRON.

Princess Royal, Captain Walter H. Cowan, M.V.O., D.S.O. Flying the flag of Rear-Admiral Osmond de B. Brock, C.B.
Queen Mary, Captain Cecil I. Prowse.
Tiger, Captain Henry B. Pelly, M.V.O.

2ND BATTLE CRUISER SQUADRON.

New Zealand, Captain John F. E. Green. Flying the flag of Rear-Admiral William C. Pakenham, C.B., M.V.O.
Indefatigible, Captain Charles F. Sowerby.
(*Australia*, Flagship of this squadron, was absent refitting at Devonport; the flag was flown temporarily in *New Zealand*.)

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1st Light Cruiser Squadron.

Galatea, Commodore Edwyn S. Alexander-Sinclair, M.V.O.
Phœton, Captain John E. Cameron, M.V.O.
Inconstant, Captain Bertram S. Thesiger, C.M.G.
Cordelia, Captain Tufton P. H. Beamish.

2nd Light Cruiser Squadron.

Southampton, Commodore William E. Goodenough, M.V.O., A.D.C.
Birmingham, Captain Arthur A. M. Duff.
Nottingham, Captain Charles B. Miller.
Dublin, Captain Albert C. Scott.

3rd Light Cruiser Squadron.

Falmouth, Captain John D. Edwards. Flying the flag of Rear-Admiral Trevylyan D. W. Napier, M.V.O.
Yarmouth, Captain Thomas D. Pratt.
Birkenhead, Captain Edward Reeves.
Gloucester, Captain William F. Blunt, D.S.O.

Part of 1st Flotilla.

Light Cruiser.

Fearless, Captain Charles D. Roper (Captain D.I.).

Destroyers.

Acheron, Commander Charles G. Ramsey.
Ariel, Lieutenant-Commander Arthur G. Tippet.
Attack, Lieutenant-Commander Charles H. N. James.
Hydra, Lieutenant Francis G. Glossop.
Badger, Commander Charles A. Freemantle.
Goshawk, Commander Dashwood, F. Moir.
Defender, Lieutenant-Commander Lawrence R. Palmer.
Lizard, Lieutenant-Commander Edward Brooke.
Lapwing, Lieutenant-Commander Alexander H. Gye.
(*Botha*, *Archer*, *Jackal* and *Tigress*, of this flotilla, were away refitting, and *Phœnix* remained in harbour.)

13th Destroyer Flotilla.

Light Cruiser.

Champion, Captain James U. Farie (Captain D. XIII.).

Destroyers.

Nestor, Commander The Hon. Edward B. S. Bingham.
Nomad, Lieutenant-Commander Paul Whitfield.
Narborough, Lieutenant-Commander Geoffrey Corlett.
Obdurate, Lieutenant-Commander Cecil H. H. Sams.
Petard, Lieutenant-Commander Evelyn C. O. Thomson.
Pelican, Lieutenant-Commander Kenneth A. Beattie.
Nerissa, Lieutenant-Commander Montague G. B. Legge.
Onslow, Lieutenant-Commander John C. Tovey.
Moresby, Lieutenant-Commander Roger V. Alison.
Nicator, Lieutenant Jack E. A. Mocatta.
(*Negro*, *Nereus*, *Paladin*, *Penn* and *Pigeon*, of this flotilla, were away refitting, and *Nepean* remained in harbour.)

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PART OF 9TH FLOTILLA.

Lydiard, Commander Malcolm L. Goldsmith.
Liberty, Lieutenant-Commander Phillip W. S. King.
Landrail, Lieutenant-Commander Francis E. H. G. Hobart
Laurel, Lieutenant Henry D. C. Stanistreet.

PART OF 10TH FLOTILLA.

Moorsom, Commander John C. Hodgson.
Morris, Lieutenant-Commander Edward S. Graham.
Turbulent, Lieutenant-Commander Dudley Stuart.
Termagant, Lieutenant-Commander Cuthbert P. Blake.

Seaplane Carrier.

Engadine, Lieutenant-Commander Charles G. Robinson.

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APPENDIX B.

ORGANISATION OF THE BRITISH FLEET.

Battle Fleet.

Organisation No. 5.			Organisation No. 2.	
	King George V.	1st Division	*King George V.*	1st Division (2nd Battle Squadron)
	Ajax		*Ajax*	
	Centurion		*Centurion*	
2nd Battle Squadron	*Erin*		*Erin*	
	Orion		*Orion*	
	Monarch	2nd Division	*Monarch*	
	Conqueror		*Conqueror*	
	Thunderer		*Thunderer*	
	Iron Duke	3rd Division	*Iron Duke*	2nd Division (*Iron Duke* and 4th Battle Squadron)
	Royal Oak		*Royal Oak*	
	Superb		*Superb*	
4th Battle Squadron	*Canada*		*Canada*	
	Benbow		*Benbow*	
	Bellerophon	4th Division	*Bellerophon*	
	Temeraire		*Temeraire*	
	Vanguard		*Vanguard*	
	Colossus	5th Division	*Marlborough*	3rd Division (1st Battle Squadron)
	Collingwood		*Revenge*	
	Neptune		*Hercules*	
1st Battle Squadron	*St. Vincent*		*Agincourt*	
	Marlborough		*Colossus*	
	Revenge	6th Division	*Collingwood*	
	Hercules		*Neptune*	
	Agincourt		*St. Vincent*	
Attached Cruisers	*Boadicea*		Attached	*Oak*
	Blanche			*Abdiel*
	Bellona			
	Active			

5th Battle Squadron.

Barham	*Warspite*
Valiant	*Malaya*

Battle Cruisers.

Lion.

1st Battle Cruiser Squadron.	2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron.	3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron.
Princess Royal	*New Zealand*	*Invincible*
Queen Mary	*Indefatigable*	*Inflexible*
Tiger		*Indomitable*

Light Cruisers.

1st Light Cruiser Squadron.	2nd Light Cruiser Squadron.	3rd Light Cruiser Squadron.
Galatea	*Southampton*	*Falmouth*
Phæton	*Birmingham*	*Yarmouth*
Inconstant	*Nottingham*	*Birkenhead*
Cordelia	*Dublin*	*Gloucester*
		Chester

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Cruiser Squadrons.

1st Cruiser Squadron.	2nd Cruiser Squadron.
Defence	*Minotaur*
Warrior	*Hampshire*
Duke of Edinburgh	*Cochrane*
Black Prince	*Shannon*

Light Cruiser Squadron.

4th Light Cruiser Squadron.

Calliope	*Comus*	*Royalist*
Constance	*Caroline*	

Light Cruiser—*Canterbury*.

Destroyer Flotillas.

12th Flotilla.	11th Flotilla.	4th Flotilla.
Faulknor	*Castor*	*Tipperary*
Marksman	*Kempenfelt*	*Broke*
Obedient	*Ossory*	*Achates*
Mœnad	*Mystic*	*Porpoise*
Opal	*Moon*	*Spitfire*
Mary Rose	*Morning Star*	*Unity*
Marvel	*Magic*	*Garland*
Menace	*Mounsey*	*Ambuscade*
Nessus	*Mandate*	*Ardent*
Narwhal	*Marne*	*Fortune*
Mindful	*Minion*	*Sparrowhawk*
Onslaught	*Manners*	*Contest*
Munster	*Michael*	*Shark*
Nonsuch	*Mons*	*Acasta*
Noble	*Martial*	*Ophelia*
Mischief	*Milbrook*	*Christopher*
		Owl
		Hardy
		Midge

1st Flotilla.	13th Flotilla.	9th and 10th Flotillas.
Fearless	*Champion*	*Lydiara*
Acheron	*Nestor*	*Liberty*
Ariel	*Nomad*	*Landrail*
Attack	*Narborough*	*Laurel*
Hydra	*Obdurate*	*Moorsom*
Badger	*Petard*	*Morris*
Goshawk	*Pelican*	*Turbulent*
Defender	*Nerissa*	*Termagant*
Lizard	*Onslow*	
Lapwing	*Moresby*	
	Nicator	

Seaplane Carrier.

Engadine.

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ORGANISATION OF THE GERMAN FLEET

Battleships.

3rd Squadron	*König*	5th Division
	Grosser Kürfurst	
	Kronprinz	
	Markgraf	
	Kaiser	6th Division
	Kaiserin	
	Prinzregent Luitpold	
1st Squadron	*Friedrich der Grosse* (Fleet Flagship)	1st Division
	Ostfriesland	
	Thüringen	
	Helgoland	
	Oldenburg	
	Posen	2nd Division
	Rheinland	
	Nassau	
	Westfalen	
2nd Squadron	*Deutschland*	3rd Division
	Hessen	
	Pommern	
	Hannover	4th Division
	Schlesien	
	Schleswig-Holstein	

Cruisers.

1st Scouting Group (Battle Cruisers).	2nd Scouting Group (Light Cruisers).	4th Scouting Group (Light Cruisers).
Lützow	*Frankfurt*	*Stettin*
Derfflinger	*Wiesbaden*	*München*
Seydlitz	*Pillau*	*Hamburg*
Moltke	*Elbing*	*Frauenlob*
Von der Tann		*Stuttgart*

Destroyer Flotillas.

Rostock (light cruiser)	*Regensburg* (light cruiser)
1st Leader of Torpedo Boats.	2nd Leader of Torpedo Boats.
First half of 1st Flotilla	2nd Flotilla
3rd Flotilla	6th Flotilla
5th Flotilla	9th Flotilla
7th Flotilla	

Note.—Each flotilla consisted of 11 destroyers, and was divided up into two half-flotillas, the 1st Flotilla consisting of the 1st and 2nd Half-Flotillas, the 2nd Flotilla consisting of the 3rd and 4th Half-Flotillas, and so on.

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APPENDIX C.

BRITISH CASUALTIES.

Ship.	Officers.			Men.		
	Killed.	Wounded.	Prisoners of War.	Killed.	Wounded.	Prisoners of War.
Marlborough	—	—	—	2	—	—
Colossus	—	—	—	—	5	—
Barham	4	1	—	22	36	—
Valiant	—	—	—	—	1	—
Warspite	1	3	—	13(2)	13(1)	—
Malaya	2	—	—	61(4)	33	—
Lion	6	1	—	93(2)	43	—
Princess Royal	—	1	—	22(2)	77	—
Queen Mary (sunk)	57	2	1	1,209	5	1
Tiger	2	—	—	22	37	—
Indefatigable (sunk)	57	—	—	960(5)	—	2
Invincible (sunk)	61	—	—	965(5)	—	—
Southampton	—	1	—	35(1)	40	—
Dublin	1	—	—	2	24	—
Chester	2	3	—	33	39	—
Defence (sunk)	54	—	—	849(4)	—	—
Warrior (sunk)[1]	1	2	—	70	25	—
Black Prince (sunk)	37	—	—	820(5)	—	—
Calliope	—	2	—	10	7	—
Defender	—	—	—	1	2	—
Tipperary (sunk)	11	—	—	174	2	8
Broke	1	3	—	46	33	—
Porpoise	—	—	—	2	2	—
Spitfire	—	3	—	6	16	—
Ardent (sunk)	4	1	—	74	1	—
Fortune (sunk)	4	—	—	63	1	—
Sparrowhawk (sunk)	—	—	—	6	—	—
Shark (sunk)	7	—	—	79	2	—
Acasta	1	—	—	5	1	—
Moorsom	—	—	—	—	1	—
Turbulent (sunk)	5	—	—	85	—	13
Castor	—	1	—	13	22	—
Nessus	2	—	—	5	7	—
Onslaught	3	—	—	2	2	—
Nestor (sunk)	2	—	5	4	—	75
Nomad (sunk)	1	—	4	7	—	68
Petard	2	1	—	7	5	—
Onslow	—	—	—	2	3	—
Total	328	25	10	5,769	485	167

[1] Casualties sustained prior to loss of ship.

Numbers in brackets indicate the number of civilians included.

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GERMAN CASUALTIES.

Ship.	Officers.		Men..	
	Killed.	Wounded.	Killed.	Wounded.
Ostfriesland - - -	—	—	1	10
Oldenburg - - -	4	3	4	11
Rheinland - - -	—	1	10	19
Nassau - - - -	2	2	10	13
Westfalen - - -	—	1	2	7
Pommern (sunk) - -	71	—	769	—
Schlesien - - -	—	1	1	—
Schleswig-Holstein - -	—	—	3	8
König - - - -	1	1	44	26
Grosser Kurfürst - -	3	1	12	10
Markgraf - - -	—	1	11	12
Kaiser - - - -	—	—	—	1
Seydlitz - - - -	5	4	93	46
Moltke - - - -	—	—	17	22
Derfflinger - - -	1	2	153	24
Von der Tann - -	1	3	11	32
Lützow (sunk) - -	5	5	106	49
Pillau - - - -	—	—	4	23
Frankfurt - - -	1	1	2	20
Wiesbaden (sunk) - -	27	—	543	—
Elbing (sunk) - - -	—	1	4	9
Rostock (sunk) - -	1	—	13	6
Stettin - - - -	—	1	9	26
München - - -	1	4	7	15
Hamburg - - -	1	4	13	21
Frauenlob (sunk) - -	17	—	325	—
S. 32 - - - -	—	—	3	1
G. 40 - - - -	—	—	1	1
B. 98 - - - -	—	1	2	10
V. 48 (sunk) - - -	6	—	84	—
V. 4 (sunk) - - -	1	—	17	4
VI. Flotilla - - -	—	3	3	13
IX. Flotilla - - -	12	—	108	15
Total - - -	160	40	2,385	454

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APPENDIX D.

DAMAGE SUSTAINED BY BRITISH SHIPS.

Lion.

Received about 12 hits from large projectiles.

1. Struck fore end of sick bay skylight, then upper deck plating and inboard side of 4-inch armour, where it exploded.
2 and 3. After end of forecastle, exploded on striking upper deck, causing many casualties amongst 4-inch gun's crews.
4. Just above forecastle deck (starboard) and caused cordite fire near port side after 4-inch guns.
5. Pierced mainmast.
6. Struck "Q" turret, when trained on port beam. Front roof plate forced off and entire turret's crew killed, due to cordite fire in working chamber, hoist and waiting tray. Magazine was flooded.
7. 12-inch shell (probably a richochet) pierced blast screen and dropped between blast screen and middle funnel without exploding.
8. Pierced fore end of blast screen (port) and struck middle funnel casing. Exploded and caused a lot of local damage.
9. Entered ship's side, struck upper deck, and was deflected up, passing through forecastle deck. This shot caused a severe fire in cabins on entry.
10 and 11. Struck side armour close together, midway between main and upper decks. Armour damaged, but not pierced.
12. Struck sheet cable holder and passed through forecastle deck and side plating.

Repairs were completed on July 19th, 1916.

Princess Royal.

Received about six hits from large projectiles.

1. Struck "X" turret armour, killing four men and putting turret out of action, through armour being driven in.
2. Struck just above joint of 6-inch and 9-inch side armour (starboard). Passed through and burst port side.
3. Struck 2 ft. below main deck (port), and pierced 9-inch armour, burst inside, causing many small fires.
4. Entered Admiral's pantry and exploded on striking upper deck, causing fire, and many casualties from gassing and burns.
5. Struck starboard strutt of foremast about 20 ft. above forecastle, nearly half severing it, passed through funnel and more than half severed the port strutt. The mast was unaffected and director firing continued.
6. Struck edge of muzzle of right gun of "Q" turret, and apparently exploded in the air.

Repairs were completed on July 15th, 1916.

Tiger.

Received about 10 hits from large projectiles.

1. On after plate of side armour (port) near water line. Plate slightly displaced and wing compartment flooded.
2. On port side of "X" turret close to deck. Armour broken, but gun mounting unaffected.
3. Struck 9 inch belt port side. Plate pushed in about 3 inch.
4. Through 6-inch armour just below upper deck (port). Shell burst inside and caused local damage.
5. Between forecastle and upper decks (port). Struck and cracked "A" turret armour.
6. Entered between forecastle and upper decks (port). Burst inside and caused local damage.

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7. Struck starboard cable holder, shattering it, passed through forecastle deck and exploded.
8. Struck forecastle deck (port) and burst inside.
9. Through shelter deck, hit forecastle deck, but did not penetrate.
10. Struck roof of "Q" turret, knocked off centre sighting hood Turret not put out of action.

Repairs were completed on July 2nd, 1916.

Barham.

Received about six hits from large projectiles.

1. Through upper deck (starboard) and exploded between upper and main decks.
2. Through upper deck (starboard) and exploded between upper and main decks. One fragment entered lower conning tower.
3. Through superstructure (starboard) and exploded on forecastle deck.
4. Through forecastle deck, exploding inside.
5. Through side plating between upper and main decks (starboard), exploding inside and causing fire.
6. Struck armour belt port side. Armour not damaged, but driven in ¾ in.

Repairs were completed on July 4th, 1916.

Malaya.

Received seven hits from large projectiles.

1. On lower tier of armour. Armour pushed in slightly.
2. On upper tier of armour. Splash off face of plate.
3 and 4. Close together, inner and outer bottoms torn away just below armour shelf.
5. Through forecastle deck and burst, causing cordite fire in starboard battery. No. 3 casemate gun had to be replaced.
6. On lower boom stanchion; damage to superstructure.
7. Middle roof plates of "X" turret. No material damage inside turret.

Repairs were completed on June 24th, 1916.

Warspite.

Received 13 hits from large projectiles.

1. On unarmoured side (starboard) between main and middle decks. Burst inside.
2. On unarmoured side (port) between main and middle decks. Burst in Captain's quarters.
3. Through 6-inch armour, 3 ft. above middle deck. Burst inside.
4. Through upper deck. Burst inside.
5. Through 6-inch armour between main and upper decks. Burst inside.
6. On main armour, breaking off top corner of armoured plate. Burst inside.
7. Through 6-inch armour and exploded inside.
8. Through upper deck, causing small fire.
9. Through after funnel, struck armour gratings and deflected up and burst starboard side.
10. Struck upper deck, exploded on impact, caused small cordite fire.
11. Through after funnel, deflected up by armour gratings and passed through shelter deck.
12. Struck deck edge of fore shelter and burst inside, causing fire.
13. Struck after side of after communication tube, half severed it and turned it through 60°, then burst.

Repairs were completed on July 20th, 1916.

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Marlborough.

One torpedo. Struck about 18 ft. below water line and 3 ft. before fore end of boiler room.

Repairs were completed on August 2nd, 1916.

Southampton.

Received 18 hits from 5·9 and below.

1. Struck upper deck, making small hole.
2. Struck immediately below upper deck and burst in cabin.
3. Passed through deadlight and struck ammunition hoist.
4. Cracked 1½ in. protective plating along seam.
5. Struck ship's side, pierced 1½-inch protective plating and burst inside.
6. Struck ship's side and apparently exploded on impact.
7. Pierced starboard side of forecastle; did not burst.
8. Burst inside.
9. Struck forecastle deck and burst, putting both starboard and port guns out of action; set fire to cordite charges. The flame passed down adjacent ammunition hoist, but no further.
10. Struck forecastle and burst on impact.
11. Pierced 1½ in. protective plating. Small damage.
12. Struck mast 9 ft. above forecastle and caused fire on mast.
13. Slight damage.

14, 15, 16, 17, 18 } On protective plating, causing indentations and one small hole.

Repairs were completed on June 20th, 1916.

Dublin.

Received eight hits.

1. After end of forecastle; did considerable damage.
2. After davit of 30-ft. cutter; local damage.
3. Shell pierced protective and side plating in No. 4 bunker, but did not further damage.
4. Through top corner of chart house.
5. Pierced ship's side above protective plating; burst on mess deck.
6. Pierced ship's side above upper deck and burst on deck.
7. Indented protective and side plating.
8. Pierced ship's side forward; apparently did not burst.

Repairs were completed on June 17th, 1916.

Chester.

Received about 17 hits.

1. On protective plating (starboard), which had to be renewed.
2. On protective plating (port). Plate renewed.
3. On protective plating (port). Plate renewed.
4. Port side upper edge of armour.
5. Port bow.

Most of the others burst on upper deck, causing much damage and many casualties.

S. 1 gun damaged by splinter and condemned.
P. 1 gun. Direct hit on gun.
S. 2 gun. Breech mechanism damaged by splinter.
S. 4 gun. Shield struck and bent.

Repairs were completed on July 25th, 1916.

Broke.

Received about nine hits and damaged by collision.

Repairs were completed on August 31st, 1916.

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Contest.
Collision; damage to bow.
Repairs were completed on June 19th, 1916.

Spitfire.
Received about two hits; bow damaged by collision.
Repairs were completed on July 31st, 1916.

Acasta.
Received about two hits, probably 5·9-inch.
Repairs were completed on August 2nd, 1916.

Onslow.
Received about five hits, three 5·9 -inch and two 4·1-inch.
Repairs were completed on August 8th, 1916.

Porpoise.
Received about two hits; air chamber of spare torpedo burst.
Repairs were completed on June 23rd, 1916.

Defender.
One hit from a 12-inch shell.
Repairs were completed on June 23rd, 1916.

Onslaught.
About one hit, fore end of ship.
Repairs were completed on June 23rd, 1916.

Petard.
About three hits.
Repairs were completed on June 27th, 1916.

Moorsom.
About one hit.
Repairs were completed on June 17th, 1916.

DAMAGE SUSTAINED BY GERMAN SHIPS.

Lützow.
Received about 40 hits—finally unable to steam and was sunk by a German torpedo.

Seydlitz.
Received about 24 hits from large projectiles and one torpedo—three smaller hits.
Apparently all turrets were hit, except foremost one.
No 4 turret received two hits and all the crew were killed.
Several 5·9-inch guns were put out of action.
Was in great danger of sinking.
Ready for sea on September 16th, 1916.

Derfflinger.
Received about 20 hits from large projectiles and nine smaller hits.
Two after turrets hit and put out of action and crews killed.
Several 5·9-inch guns put out of action.
Ready for sea on November 3rd, 1916.

Moltke.
Received about four hits from large projectiles and several smaller hits.
Ready for sea August 7th, 1916.

Von der Tann.
Received about four hits from large projectiles.
Fore turret put out of action. After turret hit; not much damage.
Repairs took about six weeks.

König.
Received about 10 hits from large projectiles.
Fore part flooded and a heavy list to port.
Ready for sea August 3rd, 1916.

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Grosser Kurfürst.
Received about eight hits from large projectiles.
Ready for sea on July 18th, 1916.

Markgraf.
Received about five hits from large projectiles and possibly a torpedo.

Kaiser.
Received about two hits from heavy projectiles.
Ready for sea on June 14th, 1916.

Ostriesland.
Hit a mine on her way home.
Ready for sea on July 29th, 1916.

Helgoland.
Received one hit from heavy projectile.
There is also a report that she struck a mine.
Ready for sea on June 19th, 1916.

Oldenburg.
Received one hit, 4-inch high explosive at night.
Ready for sea on June 19th, 1916.

Rheinland.
Two medium calibre hits.

Nassau.
Two small calibre hits. High explosive or shrapnel.
Also damaged by ramming British destroyer.

Westfalen.
One medium calibre hit.

Schlesien.
Received one hit from large calibre projectile.

Schleswig-Holstein.
Received one hit from large calibre projectile.

Pommern.
Received one hit from large calibre projectile.
Torpedoed and sunk by 12th Flotilla, 2.10 a.m. June 1st.

Pillau.
Received one hit from large calibre projectile.
Funnels and superstructure damaged.

Frankfurt.
Received one large hit and three medium.

Stettin.
Two medium calibre hits.

Munchen.
Five medium calibre hits.

Hamburg.
Four medium calibre hits.

S. 32.
Three small calibre hits.

G. 40.
One medium calibre hit.

B. 98.
One small calibre hit.

S. 52.
Received unknown number of hits.

S. 36.
Received unknown number of hits.

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APPENDIX E.

LIST OF SHIPS SUNK.

British.	German.
Battleships.	
—	*Pommern*
Battle Cruisers.	
Queen Mary	*Lützow*
Indefatigable	—
Invincible	—
Armoured Cruisers.	
Defence	—
Warrior	—
Black Prince	—
Light Cruisers.	
—	*Wiesbaden*
—	*Elbing*
—	*Rostock*
—	*Frauenlob*
Destroyers.	
Tipperary	V. 48
Ardent	V. 4
Fortune	V. 27
Sparrowhawk	S. 35
Shark	V. 29
Nestor	—
Nomad	—
Turbulent	—

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APPENDIX F.

SUMMARY OF REPORTS OF ENEMY RECEIVED IN "IRON DUKE."[1]

RECEIVED BETWEEN 2.20 P.M. AND 3.35 P.M.

REPORTS OF ENEMY LIGHT CRUISERS.[2]

1. Received 2.18 p.m. From *Galatea* at 2.20 in 56° 48′ N., 5° 21′ E. 2 cruisers E.S.E.
2. Received 2.30 p.m. From *Galatea* at 2.30 in 56° 30′ N., 5° 19′ E. 1 cruiser east, steering S.S.E.
3. Received 2.34 p.m. From *Galatea*. Enemy ships reported are 2 destroyers.
4. Received 2.35 p.m. From *Galatea* at 2.30 in 56° 50′ N., 5° 19′ E. Smoke E.N.E.
5. Received 2.51 p.m. From *Galatea* at 2.45 in 56° 52′ N., 5° 33′ E. Smoke, 7 vessels, turned north.
6. Received 3.5 p.m. From *Falmouth* at 3.00 in 56° 59′ N., 5° 31′ E. 3 cruisers east, course north.
7. Received 3.8 p.m. From *Galatea* at 3.7, in 56° 59′ N., 5° 27½′ E. course N.N.W. Enemy altered course N.W.
8. Received 3.24 p.m. From *Nottingham* at 3.22, in 56° 46′ N., 5° 14′ E. Smoke E.N.E., 5 columns.
9. Received 3.27 p.m. From *Galatea* at 3.15 (position omitted). Smoke E.S.E., steering W.N.W.
10. Received 3.35 p.m. from Admiralty. At 2.31 in 56° 57′ N., 6° 9′ E., enemy light cruiser.

RECEIVED BETWEEN 3.40 P.M. AND 4 P.M.

REPORTS OF ENEMY BATTLE CRUISERS.

11. Received 3.40 p.m. From *Lion* at 3.35 in 56° 53′ N., 5° 28′ E. Enemy battle cruisers, 5 in number, north-east.
12. Received 3.41 p.m. From *Galatea* at 3.35 in 57° 04′ N., 5° 10′ E. Light cruisers altered course to south.
13. Received 3.44 p.m. From *Falmouth* at 3.38 in 57° 10′ N., 5° 14′ E. Enemy E. by S. Course S.E., 21–25 knots.
14. Received 3.45 p.m. From *Lion* at 3.45 in 56° 53′ N., 5° 33′ E. Course of enemy S. 55° E.
15. Received 3.55 p.m. From *Lion* at 3.50 in 56° 53′ N., 5° 31′ E. Engaging enemy.
16. Received 3.59 p.m. from *Galatea*. At 3.55 in 57° 03′ N., 5° 27′ E., own course E.S.E., 28 knots; enemy bearing E.S.E., course E.S.E.

RECEIVED BETWEEN 4.30 AND 5.5 P.M.

REPORTS OF ENEMY BATTLE FLEET.

17. Received 4.30 p.m. From *Southampton* at 4.30 in 56° 38′ N., 6° 07′ E. One cruiser S.E., course N.E. Commander-in-Chief asks at 4.41 to check repeat. Repeated at 5 p.m. in original form.

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[1] The substance of the reports is given, but not necessarily the actual signals.

[2] The times of receipt are from J.P., Appendix II., except that of the Admiralty report, which is from the *Iron Duke's* wireless entry log.

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18. Received 4.38 p.m. From *Champion* at 4.30 in 56° 51′ N., 5° 46′ E. Enemy's battle fleet, centre S.E. Course E.N.E.
19. Received at 4.38 p.m. From *Southampton* at 4.38 in 56° 34′ N. 6° 20′ E. Enemy battle fleet, approximately S.E., course north.
20. Received about 5.5 p.m.[1] *Lion* at 4.45 in 56° 36′ N., 6° 04′ E. 26–30 battleships bearing S.S.E., steering S.E.
21. Received 5 p.m.[2] From *Southampton* at 4.46 in 56° 29′ N., 6° 14′ E. Enemy battle fleet, centre east, course north.
22. Received 5 p.m. from Admiralty. At 4.09 Enemy battle fleet in 56° 27′ N., 6° 18′ E. course N.W., 15 knots.
23. Received 5 p.m. From *Southampton* at 5.00 in 56° 33′ N., 6° 00′ E. Enemy battle fleet, east 10 to 11 miles, course north.

RECEIVED BETWEEN 5.35 P.M. AND 6.14 P.M.

CONTACT SIGNALS.

24. *Southampton* to Commander-in-Chief. Received 5.48 (W/T). Enemy's battle fleet has altered course N.N.W. My position Lat. 56° 46′ N., 5° 40′ E., 5.40. (J.P., p. 456 gives 5.40. This is too early. *Iron Duke* did not receive it until 5.48. *Iron Duke* (s), 5.48; *Benbow* (s), 5.52; *Southampton* (w/e), 5.44; *New Zealand* (s), 5.47; *Falmouth* (s), 5.43. *Southampton's* signalled position was 6 miles south of her actual position.)
25. *Black Prince* to Commander-in-Chief and *Minotaur* W/T. Received 5.42. Battle cruisers bearing south 5 miles. My position Lat. 56° 59′ N., Long. 5° 24′ E. 5.40. (*Black Prince's* signalled position was about S. 27 W., 17 miles from Commander-in-Chief by *Iron Duke's* reckoning. This would place battle cruisers S.S.W. 21½ miles from *Iron Duke*. *Black Prince* was actually about 8 miles 60° from her signalled position. J.P. p. 456 has "Enemy battle cruisers," but *Iron Duke* (s), also *Marlborough* (s), has "battle cruisers," and Commander-in-Chief rightly assumed them to be Admiral Beatty's squadron (G.F., p. 344).)
26. *Defence* to *Minotaur* (W/T and S.L.). Received 5.46. Ships in action bearing S.S.W., steering N.E. My position 57° 07′ N., 5° 38′ E., 5.45. (*Iron Duke* (s), 5.46; *Benbow* (s), 5.49; *Marlborough* (w), 5.49. The *Defence* was actually 2½ miles 74° from above position. This signal would make ships in action S. by W. by Commander-in-Chief's reckoning, about 45° on starboard bow. This was the boom and flash of Admiral Beatty's guns, but Commander-in-Chief thought they might be the enemy's battle cruisers (G.F., p. 344).)
27. *Falmouth* to S.O. cruisers (S.L.). Received 5.48. Two heavy enemy ships bearing S.S.E., steering N.E. My position 57° 07′ N., Long. 5° 45′ E., 5.45. (Not in *Iron Duke* (s), *Marlborough* (s), 5.10. The heavy enemy ships may possibly have been the *König* and *Grosser Kurfürst*, then about 14 miles S. 7° E. from the *Falmouth*, or, more probably, the 1st Scouting Group, then bearing S. 30° E. 10 miles. If this signal was received in the *Iron Duke* it would place the enemy sharp on the *Iron Duke's* starboard bow about 20 miles. The *Falmouth's* actual position was 4¾ miles 230° from position signalled.)
28. *Southampton* to Commander-in-Chief and S.O., Battle Cruiser Fleet. Received 5.52 (W/T). Enemy battle fleet has altered course to north. Enemy battle cruisers bear S.W. from enemy battle fleet. My position 56° 50′ N., 5° 44′ E., 5.50. (This makes the *Southampton*

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[1] *Iron Duke* (s), 5.5.; *Minotaur* (s), 5.10; *Marlborough* (s), 5.8.
[2] *Iron Duke* (w/e), 5.19; *Marlborough* (w), 5.15; J.P. says 5 p.m.

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about 24 miles S. 2° W. from *Iron Duke's* reckoning. *Southampton* was actually 7¾ miles 315° from signalled position.)

29. Admiralty to Commander-in-Chief. Received 5.53. Enemy main force at 4.30 p.m. in 56° 31′ N., 6° 5′ E., steering north, 15 knots, 5.45. (This signal would place the enemy at 5.50 p.m., S. 15° E., 26 miles from the *Iron Duke's* reckoning, approximately 2 points on the starboard bow. This is only 4 miles 270° from the actual position of the head of the German line in 56° 31′ N., 6° 15′ E.. at 4.30 p.m.)
30. *Marlborough* to Commander-in-Chief. Received 6 p.m. (S.L.).[1] Our battle cruisers bearing S.S.W., 3 to 4 miles, steering east *Lion* leading ship. 6.00.
31. *Southampton* to Commander-in-Chief and S.O., Battle Cruiser Fleet. Received 6.3 (W/T).[2] Urgent. Have lost sight of enemy's battle fleet. Am engaging enemy battle cruisers. Position 56° 57′ N., 5° 43′ E. Course N.N.E., 26 knots. 6.00. (This was the *Southampton's* last wireless message before deployment. The positions in 5.50 and 6.00 are 7 miles apart, giving her a speed of 42 knots. *Southampton's* actual position is 5½ miles 292° from above position.)
32. *Lion.* Received 6.6. *Lion* to Commander-in-Chief (S.L.). Enemy's battle cruisers bearing S.E. 6.06. (The *Lion* was about S. 18° W., 2½ miles from *Iron Duke.* This would place enemy battle cruisers about S.S.E. of *Iron Duke* 7 miles, on the port bow of the fleet (going south at the time). The Commander-in-Chief thereupon turned to a S.E. course (G.F., p. 347).)
33. *Marlborough* to Commander-in-Chief. Received 6.7 (S.L.). 5th Battle Squadron bearing S.W. 6.05. (This places 5th Battle Squadron approximately 8 miles on starboard beam of *Iron Duke.*)
34. *Barham* to Commander-in-Chief (Flags). Received 6.12. Enemy in sight S.S.E. 6.10. (*Iron Duke* (s), 6.12; G.F. p. 347, 6.15. This would place the enemy at 6.12 about 5 miles 40° on *Marlborough's* bow on the Commander-in-Chief's basis of a five-mile visibility.)
35. *Lion* to Commander-in-Chief. Received 6.14 (S.L.). Sighted enemy's battle fleet S.S.W. 6.14. (*Iron Duke* (s), 6.14; G.F., p. 347, 6.14. This makes enemy about 5 miles 34° on *Marlborough's* bow.)
36. *Southampton.* Received 6.24. Enemy battle fleet bears 10 to 11 miles S.S.E. Course N.E. My position Lat. 56° 58′ N., Long. 5° 51′ E. 6.20. (*Iron Duke* (s), 6.18; *Marlborough* (w), 6.21; *Benbow* (s), 6.22; *New Zealand* (w), 6.22; *Falmouth* (s), 6.23. This position received after deployment gives the *Southampton* an easterly course from 6.00.

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[1] *Iron Duke* (s), 5.55; *Marlborough* (s), 6.00.

[2] *Iron Duke* (s), 6.3; *Benbow* (s), 6.7; *New Zealand* (w), 6.7; *Marlborough* (s), 6.6; *Falmouth* (s), 6.7.

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APPENDIX G.

PREFACE.

This Appendix has been added to the Admiralty Narrative, to meet the wishes of Admiral of the Fleet, Viscount Jellicoe.

Where, however, the Appendix differs from the Admiralty Narrative, Their Lordships are satisfied that the Narrative is more in accordance with the evidence available.

Notes have been added, where necessary, mainly in amplification or elucidation of the text criticised in the Appendix.

GENERAL REMARKS (BY LORD JELLICOE).

Whilst many more noticeable inaccuracies in original Admiralty Staff Appreciation[1] sent to me have been corrected as result of comments forwarded with my letter of 27th November, 1922, there still remain in the revised draft certain incorrect and misleading statements. I fully realise the difficulty of reconciling conflicting evidence, but the Narrative contains implications which are based upon a far greater knowledge of German and some British movements than was within the cognizance of the Commander-in-Chief at the time.

The influence on the mind of the compiler of the Narrative of post-war data, and of knowledge available at the time to ships clear of British Battle Fleet, but not known to the Commander-in-Chief in the centre of the line, is apparent in a number of inferences[2] drawn, though no doubt unintentionally.

It is with sincere regret that I feel compelled to express dissent in any form. It is, however, generally known from statements made in Parliament, that the Narrative would be sent to me for comment before publication, and for that reason I think it is my duty to draw attention in the following Appendix to a few of the most important passages with which I am still unable to agree. I refrain from commenting on other passages, and several diagrams, with which I am not in complete agreement.

I. On page 12 the amended text is unjust to Admiral Evan Thomas owing to insinuation that he was responsible for delay in 5th Battle Squadron coming into action at same time as British Battle Cruisers.

The facts are as follows[3] :—

The 5th Battle Squadron was stationed by Sir D. Beatty 5 miles from the *Lion* and at 2.32 p.m. was actually slightly inside this distance.

At this time a signal was made general *by flags* for the leader to turn to S.S.E., ships following in succession. It is not surprising that this signal was not immediately distinguishable on board the *Barham* nearly 5 miles away, and apparently it was not till 2.40 p.m. that it was made out[4] and the course of the 5th Battle Squadron altered accordingly; during the period 2.32–2.40 the distance between the *Lion* and *Barham* had opened to 10 miles.

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[1] It should be noted that this publication is an official Narrative, and not a Staff Appreciation.

[2] Their Lordships are satisfied that the compilers of the Narrative have kept to facts, and that inferences and implications have been strictly repressed

The facts are clearly stated in the Narrative, pp. 10 to 15.

[3] *See* notes 4 and 6 on p. 12 of the Narrative. The course about to be steered was received in *Barham* at 2.30; the " executive " signal is logged in *Barham* at 2 37 p.m.

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At 2.52 p.m. the Vice-Admiral, Battle Cruiser Fleet, made another general signal to turn to S.E. and at 3.1 to turn to East, both signals by flags. At 3.5 p.m. the Rear-Admiral, 5th Battle Squadron, signalled to his squadron, course E.S.E.

At 3.13 p.m. the Vice-Admiral, Battle Cruiser Fleet, made a general signal again by flags to turn to N.E. and the Rear-Admiral, 5th Battle Squadron, at 3.14 signalled to his squadron course East. At this time the distance between the *Lion* and *Barham* had decreased to 7½ miles, and at 3.20 the Rear-Admiral, 5th Battle Squadron, altered his course to N.E., the course of the Battle Cruiser Fleet.

At 3.30 the distance between the *Lion* and the *Barham* was down to 6 miles. At this time the Vice-Admiral, Battle Cruiser Fleet, made a general signal again by flags for course to be altered to East, and for a speed of 25 knots. This was repeated by flags at 3.32 p.m.[1], and at 3.35 it was apparently realised that the *Barham*, which ship was still steering N.E., could not read the flag signals,[2] and the signal was made to her from the *Lion* by searchlight giving the new course and speed and ordering ships to assume complete readiness for action, and stating that the enemy was in sight. This signal was immediately obeyed, the Rear-Admiral, 5th Battle Squadron, signalling the course at 3.35, East, and speed 24 knots, the full speed of the squadron, although attempts were made to go at a higher speed later. The delay had, however, again opened the gap between the squadrons, the *Barham* at 3.40 p.m. being 7½ miles from the *Lion*.

At 3.36 p.m. the Senior Officers of all squadrons were informed from the *Lion*, by wireless, that the present course and speed was East 25 knots.

At 3.45 the Vice-Admiral, Battle Cruiser Fleet, ordered the Battle Cruisers to form on a line of bearing N.W., and at 3.45 made a general signal by flags to alter course together, to E.S.E. This alteration again increased the distance from the 5th Battle Squadron. The German Light Cruisers were sighted from this squadron at 3.47 bearing East. Between 3.52 and 4.5 p.m. being then in action, the *Lion* altered course considerably to the southward without signal, and as the *Barham* was hauling round gradually, the result was that the distance between the two ships had by 4.5 p.m. increased to 9½ miles.[3]

II. On pages 24 and 27 injustice is again done to Admiral Evan Thomas, the implication being made that he delayed turning 5th Battle Squadron to Northwards at 4.52 p.m. unduly with result that his ships came under heavy fire from German battleships[4]. This is not in agreement with statement by Admiral Evan Thomas, from which it appears that he obeyed signal to turn his ships in succession to starboard when it was hauled down on board the *Lion*.[5]

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[1] This signal was not repeated at 3.32 p.m. The signal at 3.32 in J.P., p. 448. is a mutilated version of that at 3.30 (p. 447), which was the actual signal made.

[2] This assumption does not appear to be justified.

[3] The 5th Battle Squadron had been ordered to keep station 5 miles N.N.W. from the *Lion*, and no exact signals, either by flag or searchlight, as to the courses, speeds, etc. necessary to maintain this appointed station were essential. An admiral commanding a squadron sighting or in touch with the enemy would anticipate that his supporting squadron would close without further orders.

The Admiral Commanding 5th B.S. had all the information and was as fully cognizant of the position as was the Vice-Admiral, B.C.F.

[4] The facts as stated in the Narrative are correct.

[5] The "statement by Admiral Evan Thomas" (*see* J.P., p. 193) is as follows:—"At 4.50 p.m. *Lion* approached the 5th Battle Squadron, steering to the Northward with the signal flying to the 5th Battle Squadron—'Turn 16 points in succession to starboard.' *This turn was made after our battle cruisers had passed at* 4.53 . . . ."

No record of the time of this signal exists in the *Barham's* signal log. In J.P. (p. 453) the time is given as 4.48 p.m.

Their Lordships cannot accept that any injustice is done, or implied, in the wording of the Narrative.

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III. Pages 32 and 41 to 42 altered wording fails to give true idea of confusion caused by contradictory reports, the effect of which was felt throughout the action. The difficulties arising from the receipt of the various reports are not realised or brought out, and a false impression is thereby created.[1]

Up to 5.50 p.m., the earlier reports had led me to expect to meet the enemy's battle fleet ahead, this expectation being based on a mean of reports from *Lion* and *Southampton*. I should not for a moment have relied on Admiralty information of the enemy in preference to reports from ships which actually sighted him, or even have attached equal weight to such reports. It would be assumed that the Admiralty report relied on directional wireless, as was stated to be the case in the signal made at 1510 (J.P., page 446), giving the position of an enemy light cruiser, which position appeared to be at least 16 miles in error, by the *Nottingham's* 1522 report[2] (J.P., page 447). It is not easy at this distance of time to reproduce the reasoning from memory, but if the *mean position* of the centre of the Battle Fleet as arrived at, viz. :—Lat. 56° 33½′ North, Long. 6° 27½′ East[3] is taken, the van being in Lat. 56° 35½′ N., Long. 6° 26½′ East, and the course North given by *Southampton* at 5 p.m. accepted, with a speed of 15 knots, it would place the van of the enemy at 6.14 p.m. in Lat. 56° 53½′ North, Long. 6° 19′ East.

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[1] *See* Admiralty Narrative, p. 41, lines 28 to 32.

[2] The Admiralty report here quoted, placed an enemy light cruiser in Lat. 56° 57′ N., Long. 6° 9′ E., and an enemy destroyer in Lat. 56° 57′ N., Long. 5° 43′ E., both at *2·31 p.m.* These positions could not be compared with that given by *Nottingham*, as is suggested above, since her report was made *fifty minutes* later.

Compared, however, with *Galatea's* signals made about 2.31 p.m., the time mentioned in the Admiralty signal, there was a fair agreement between the positions reported.

[3] By considering this series of signals in the form and in the chronological order in which they were received in the *Iron Duke*, a somewhat different 5 p.m. position has been arrived at.

The position of the B.C.F. at 3.50 p.m. was reported to the *Iron Duke*, with a course for the enemy of S. 55° E. This position and course must have been plotted in the *Iron Duke*, to give an approximate estimate of the whereabouts of the B.C.F. pending further information.

At 4.30 p.m. came the first indication of the presence of new enemy forces to the south-eastward. The position given by *Southampton* was 25 miles from the *Lion's* position 40 minutes before. Since the maximum distance the *Southampton* could run in the time was about 17 miles, she must have been at least eight miles south-east of *Lion*. When, therefore, her next signal came in eight minutes later placing her another eight miles to the south-east, it was obvious that her reckoning was considerably in error to the south-east.

At the same time as the *Southampton's* signal, came one from the *Champion*. Both reported the enemy battle fleet bearing south-east, the latter made it steering E.N.E. at 4.30, the former, steering North at 4.38 p.m. The two positions, however, were about 25 miles apart. But, as we have seen, there was a good indication that the *Southampton's* position was too much to the south-east, so that it was quite reasonable to correct it to her maximum distance run in eight minutes, and then to take a mean of those two positions, adjusted for time, and so to place the van of the enemy battle fleet at 4.38 p.m. in about Lat. 56° 39′ N., Long. 6° 16′ E. This could not, of course, be relied upon as absolutely accurate, but it would have been a fair deduction from these signals, the only information then available. Plotted on to 5 p.m. this would give a position 11 miles nearer the Grand Fleet than that mentioned in the Appendix above. The hypothetical positions given above are, therefore, about this distance too much to the south-east, but as will now be shown, further information came in to modify the original estimate.

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Had the *Iron Duke* continued on the S.E. by S. course till 6.14, she would then have been in position Lat. 57° 8′ North, Long. 5° 44′ East, and the van of the enemy would have borne about S.E. ½ S., *i.e.*, practically right ahead and 19½ miles from the *Iron Duke*, instead of S. 14° W. 7½ miles. *i.e.*, close to on the starboard bow, as given in Sir D. Beatty's report. If a speed of 20 knots were allowed to the enemy instead of 15 knots, the van would have been, according to my calculations at the time, in Lat. 57° 1½′ N., Long. 6° 16′ E., at 6.14 p.m.; whereas Sir D. Beatty's report placed it at this time in Lat. 57° 0½′ N., Long. 5° 44′ E. In the first case (15 knots) the van of the enemy was 20½ miles N.W. by W., and in the second case (20 knots) 17 miles W. by N. of its anticipated position.[1] Whilst it is true, therefore, that a considerable number of reports did come in between 5.35 and 6.14 p.m., the information conveyed was merely very confusing and contradictory.[2]

It was just after 5 o'clock when four signals followed close upon each other.

The first was from the Admiralty, giving the position, course and speed of the enemy battlefleet at 4.09 p.m. Plotted on to 4.30 with this course and speed, then to 4.38 with that given by the *Champion*, then to 5 p.m. with the *Southampton's* report (*i.e.*, all the evidence available), would give a 5 p.m. position for the enemy about 7 miles south and 7 miles west of the original estimate. Here was a further indication that the *Southampton's* position, was at any rate, too far to the eastward in Longitude, as was suspected. But, meanwhile, the *Southampton's* 5 p.m. signal had come in. This placed the enemy in approximately the same longitude as the estimated position but about 10 miles south in latitude. The signal was closely followed by the *Lion's* 4.45 signal, which was incorrectly received. This, of course, could not be known at the time, and would be plotted as received. It would then place the enemy battlefleet at 5 p.m. (when plotted on) within 3 miles of the position given by *Southampton*, though well to the eastward of the Admiralty position.

Such close agreement between the *Lion* and the *Southampton* would afford a valuable check upon the flagship's position for the enemy. This placed the enemy at 5 p.m. in Lat. 56° 33′ N., Long. 6° 13′ E., steering North, or nearly nine miles west of the position given by Lord Jellicoe in the Appendix above.

Nothing more came in for nearly three-quarters of an hour except the *Southampton's* belated 4.46 p.m. signal.

It would not affect the 5 p.m. estimate of position, since her own position was obviously inaccurate, but it would serve a useful purpose; to confirm the enemy's course as being North and not S.E., as the mutilated signal from the *Lion* suggested.

Thus it will be observed that the reports so far received placed the enemy battlefleet about 9 miles west of the "mean position" given above in the Appendix, with a strong indication from the Admiralty signal, that the B.C.F reckoning was a little too far to the eastward and so, that the enemy was a little more to the westward, both relative to the *Iron Duke's* reckoning.

[1] From the reasoning in the preceding note, it will follow that these hypothetical positions are also about 9 miles in error. There were, in addition, plain indications (which are discussed below), that the enemy did not steer North after 5 p.m., but more nearly N.W. by N.

[2] The information received between 5.35 and the *Lion's* 6.14 signal was as follows :—

At 5.42 came a signal from the *Black Prince*. She gave her position as being 17 miles 3 points before the starboard beam of the *Iron Duke*. Her correct position in the screen being known, gave an indication that her reported position was some 7 miles north-west of her actual position. However, taking her signal as received, it placed battle cruisers (which were rightly assumed to be our own, *see* Grand Fleet, p. 344) at 5.40 p.m. 28 miles N. 37° W. from the *Lion's* last reported position (at 4.45 p.m.). This was, of course, a little more than the *Lion* could have covered in the time, but bearing in mind the apparent error in the *Black Prince's* reckoning mentioned above, and the ever-expected differences between the reckonings of two forces out of sight of one another, it was as accurate as could be hoped and pointed to the *Lion* and so also the enemy, having steered not North but about N.W. by N.,

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The Admiralty 1745 message and the *Southampton's* 5.40 signal agreed fairly well, if one assumed that the latter was reporting the bearing of the centre of the battlefleet (as would naturally be the case with the Admiralty), and assuming also that the enemy bore East, 10 to 11 miles from *Southampton* as in previous message (*a*) (5 p.m.) (it is to be noted that neither bearing nor distance were given).

The *Black Prince's* signal, however, placed battle cruisers 18 miles to the North Westward of these positions. Even assuming that the *Black Prince* was, in fact, reporting our own Battle Cruisers as German ships, the true position of the enemy was still entirely in doubt. It will be seen, moreover, what a number of assumptions had to be made in connection with the reports. The matter was made more confusing still by the reference in the *Southampton's* 1750 signal to the bearing of the German battle cruisers to their battlefleet.[1] The reports of gun-fire

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since the last estimate. Almost at once came another signal in which the *Defence* reported ships in action at 5.45 in a position about 7 miles north-east of *Black Prince's* report. Here was further confirmation that the *Lion* and so also the enemy was coming to the north-westward. Within two minutes came the *Southampton's* 5.40 p.m. signal. Her position was 17 miles N. 28° W. from her last reported position at 5 p.m. The distance was plainly correct (for speed 26 knots), so that the course was absolute confirmation of the indications already given, that the enemy was not steering North but more nearly N.W. by N. It could not, of course, be assumed (as is suggested at (*a*) in the Appendix) that the enemy still bore East 10 to 11 miles from the *Southampton*, since that assumption would have meant that the enemy battlefleet was also steaming 26 knots.

The absence of any bearing did not by any means invalidate the *Southampton's* signal, since it was plain that the enemy was still within visual distance of her, which would fix the bearing within a few points. For there was a limit to his maximum possible run, and to the distance the *Southampton* was from him. This signal would put the van of the enemy battlefleet at 5.40 p.m. in about Lat. 56° 46′ N., Long. 5° 59′ E. at the maximum speed of the *Kōnig* class, viz., 22 knots (*see* C.-in-C.in J.P., p. 2.). The two positions from the Armoured cruisers, however, pointed to this position being some 4 or 5 miles too far from the Grand Fleet, since they indicated that the *Southampton's* reckoning was too much to south and east.

Further confirmation was soon available. The Admiralty 5.45 p.m. signal gave a position, course and speed for the enemy battlefleet at 4.30 p.m. This was in agreement with the previous Admiralty signal, but the position (plotted on to 5 p.m.) was some 8 miles N.W. of that given by *Southampton* at 5 p.m. In other words it was another indication that her reckoning was too much to south and east, and so, that the enemy was nearer the Grand Fleet than her report showed.

It will thus be seen that the series of signals was capable of conveying a fair amount of information. The statements in the Narrative are based upon this information, of which these notes are considered to be a fair summary.

The conclusions arrived at, however, differ from those deduced in the Appendix above.

From the position of the enemy reported by the *Lion's* signal, with the courses given by the *Southampton*, and with the various indications of the enemy's north-westerly course between about 5 p.m. and 5.45 p.m., the relative position of the enemy at 6.14 p.m. would appear to be some 15 miles to the west-north-westward of the positions at 6.14 p.m. given in the Appendix.

[1] The previous note has indicated that the enemy battlefleet could not still have borne east 10 to 11 miles from the *Southampton* at 5.40 p.m. It was obvious that with the latter steaming 26 knots, the former must have dropped back to the south-eastward. In these circumstances, it is not apparent how this report can have caused confusion, since it only placed the enemy battle cruisers about abeam of their battlefleet, the course of the latter being clearly indicated as being north-westerly.

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from the *Minotaur*, *Defence* and *Calliope*, did not give much assistance, as it could not be stated whether the firing came from our own vessels or German ships, nor could the class of ship be indicated.[1]

IV. Pages 58, 59 :—The account of destroyer attack gives the impression only eleventh half flotilla attacked, ignoring the seventeenth half flotilla.[2]

The bearings given in Note 2 misleading, as no reference is made to bearing 63 green from H.M.S. *Iron Duke* of first part of attack.[3]

V. Page 64, lines 14 and 15 :—H.M.S. *Calliope* was not fired on till 8.28[4] (Jutland Paper, p. 297).

VI. Page 64, lines 25 to 27, very misleading. Statement is partially correct if Third L.C.S. and Fourth Scout Group are considered to represent British and German Fleets, but wholly inaccurate when applied to main bodies.[5] Four reports only were received[6] :—*Falmouth's* position being uncertain, rendered her report vague; *Southampton's* combined with *Lion's* which mentioned two squadrons only raised doubts as to two German Battle Squadrons accompanied by destroyers *Southampton* reported.

VII. Page 66, line 4 :—The Commander-in-Chief could not tell that firing of (? on) H.M.S. *Calliope* came from rear and not from ships engaged by our Battle Cruisers.[7]

VIII. Page 67, Note 1 :—Statement as to light misleading. It is contradicted by Scheer, myself (J.P., p. 20), Fighting at Jutland, pages 415, 416, 429 and others.[8]

IX. Page 72, lines 22 to 31, hardly conveys correct impression.

The information at the disposal of the Commander-in-Chief regarding the position of the High Sea Fleet, and the deductions to be drawn from that information as to the route which the Fleet would follow, are given below :—

At 9.41 p.m. the Commander-in-Chief heard from Sir David Beatty that at 9 p.m. the enemy bore N. by W. from *Lion* and was steering W.S.W. As he had signalled the distance of the German ships at 8.40 p.m. as 10 to 11 miles, the same distance would be assumed at 9 p.m. The position assigned to the *Lion* in this signal did not agree with that signalled by Admiral Jerram in the *King George V.* at 9.5 p.m.,[9] and as the *Lion* and *Iron Duke* were at that time both in sight from the *King George V.*, the

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[1] The reports of gunfire would indicate the proximity of the enemy. *cf.* G.F., p. 346 : " . . . it became apparent by the sound of the heavy firing that the enemy's heavy ships must be in close proximity . . . "

[2] The text mentions " . . . six destroyers pressed on to attack . . .," followed by " . . . another wave of destroyers was approaching . . . . " Note 1 on p. 59, *q.v.*, mentions both 11th and 17th Half Flotillas.

[3] This bearing was taken about 7.10 p.m. (*see* J.P., pp. 19, 54), and is referred to, in its correct place chronologically, on page 54 of the Narrative.

[4] *See* Narrative, page 62, note 5.

[5] *See* diagrams 37 and 38, which are considered accurate, for the distance apart of the main bodies.

[6] For the number of reports received in the *Iron Duke*, *see* J.P. Appendix II; the *Calliope's* division was also seen from the *Iron Duke*, under fire from the enemy battle fleet.

[7] Lord Jellicoe in " Grand Fleet " (p. 366) states that he assumed the *Lion* to be, at this period, 5 to 6 miles ahead of the van of the Battle Fleet, *i.e.*, about 8 miles ahead of *Iron Duke*. The *Calliope* was actually in sight about 3½ miles on the *Iron Duke's* starboard bow. It was unlikely, with the visibility as it was, that these two ships were under fire from the same enemy squadron.

[8] A perusal of the evidence here quoted will show that it does nothing to contradict that from official reports, which is given in the note.

Further, Lord Jellicoe has stated that " . . . and the necessary " dispositions (for the night) made whilst there was still sufficient daylight for " the Flag officers and Captain to see adjacent divisions and squadrons . . . " These dispositions were ordered at 9.17 p.m.

[9] *See* Admiralty Narrative, p. 72, lines 28 to 31.

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position of the *Lion* with reference to the *Iron Duke* given by Admiral Jerram, would naturally be accepted as accurate, instead of that given by Sir David Beatty. The Commander-in-Chief could not, of course, know that the Vice-Admiral, 2nd Battle Squadron, mistook other vessels for our Battle Cruisers.

Taking the *Iron Duke's* position at 9 p.m. as Lat. 56° 39′ N., Long. 5° 42′ E., (*i.e.*, the position worked back from her signalled 9.45 p.m. position, page 474, J.P.), the German Battle Cruisers at 9 p.m. would be in about Lat. 56° 47′ N., Long. 5° 24′ E., steering W.S.W., and the Admiralty 9 p.m. position signalled at 2158 would be rejected in favour of this information. The Admiralty position was obviously incorrect, since it placed the enemy 10 miles ahead of the *Iron Duke* at 9 p.m. The difference in position of the enemy at 9 p.m. between the Admiralty report and that of the *Lion* (worked out from the position assigned to the *Lion* by the *King George V.*) is 14 miles. As, however, the *Lion* was reporting Battle Cruisers, which were presumably in the van, and the Admiralty was reporting the rear ship of the enemy's fleet, the actual difference was much greater. The *Lion's* position, as signalled by Sir D. Beatty at 9 p.m. would also obviously be rejected in favour of that given by Admiral Jerram, since Sir D. Beatty placed the *Lion* in the position which I knew the *King George V.* was in.

The Admiralty signal of 2241 is the next information.

The deduction to be drawn from the Admiralty message depended largely on the time that it was assumed that the course S.S.E. ¾ E. was adopted. If it was considered at the time that the course was steered at 9.30 p.m. it would take the High Sea Fleet 8 miles off the Horn Reef Light Vessel, or 16 miles off if the W.S.W. course was maintained till 10 p.m. As a matter of fact, it appears from Scheer's diagram No. VII. (J.P.), that the S.S.E. ¾ E. course was not adopted till after 9.30 p.m. Course was also altered to starboard soon after 10 p.m., probably as a result of the attack by the *Castor*. In any case, however, other reports received at about the same time made it appear that the enemy would make for a more westerly approach to his base. I refer to the 2330 and 2240 reports from the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron, already mentioned, the 2240 report from the Commodore F. and the gun flashes that were seen, star shell explosions seen, and the sound of gun-fire heard from the *Iron Duke* between 10 p.m. and midnight. The 2330 report gave the course of the enemy Battle Cruisers as South, *i.e.*, following us, and indicated that a S.S.E. ¾ E. course was not being followed. The evident signs of destroyer fighting in rear, at a long distance astern led me to think that our T.B.D.'s were in action with enemy T.B.D.'s and supporting light cruisers, and I considered that the effect of such fighting would be to turn the enemy to the northward or westward, even if he had originally intended to take the passage by the Horn Reef. Very possibly the reason which caused Von Scheer to hold to his course for the Horn's Reef in face of our destroyer attacks[1] was that he was informed by a German shore station (which had apparently intercepted my 9.15 p.m. signal to the destroyers to take stations 5 miles astern of the Battle Fleet), that my destroyers were so placed, and this gave him a clue to the course and position of the British Battle Fleet once he came in contact with our destroyers. I do not know whether he had also been informed of my signalled course, but as the above incident shows that the code was compromised, it is quite possible that he had been so informed, and therefore knew that he was safe in steering to cut across the rear of the British Fleet. An explanation of the above should be given as it explains

[1] The flotillas were ordered to take station astern 5 miles, and no instructions were given them to attack the enemy, nor were they informed of the enemy's position. In these circumstances, no organised attack were made in the dark hours. When the German van cut through the flotillas, however, the individual destroyers attacked with great gallantry and persistence.

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Scheer's movements and his tenacity in adhering to his course in spite of the destroyer attacks.[1]

It should be realised that implicit reliance could not be placed on "Intercepts." I could not assume, for instance, that because the High Sea Fleet steered a course S.S.E. ½ E. at some time between 9 and 10 p.m., that this course would be maintained until I received information from the Admiralty to the contrary. I could not expect that any but a small proportion of Scheer's signals would be intercepted. It was only possible to get those made on "Power." It is easy after the event, with full knowledge from both sides, to make correct assumptions.

Experience earlier in the day had shown that one might be misled if trusting too much to Intercepts, *e.g.*, the different courses[2] assigned to the enemy by the Admiralty and the *Southampton*.[3]

X. Page 73, line 24:—unless word "several" is altered to "two" my original remarks should be published. (*The original remarks are appended.*)

There was nothing to indicate that our destroyers were in action with enemy Battleships, as might be gathered from this wording nor is it correct to say that several ships saw the firing "working round to the port quarter." Note 1 mentions two ships only,[4] viz.:—the *Hercules*, which saw firing "one point on the port quarter"; and the *Superb*, "on the port quarter."

The conclusions to be drawn from the firing, and from the reports from the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron were that our destroyers, and the light cruisers astern, were in action with enemy destroyers supported by light cruisers. This opinion was shared by Sir H. Evan Thomas, page 195, J.P. The ships which are mentioned in Note 1 as having gleaned the best information from the firing belonged either to the *Marlborough's* division, which had dropped a considerable distance astern of the remainder of the Battle Fleet, or the 5th Battle Squadron, which was also far astern. This should be stated.[5]

XI. Page 75, lines 14 to 17. The intention was formed on the previous evening. This should be made clear, as the events of the night influenced the morning movements.

XII. Page 76, lines 4 to 9. The *Birmingham's* report, it should be mentioned, read correctly by the Commander-in-Chief, also gave the impression that the Battle Fleet was between the enemy and his intended return route.[6]

XIII. Pages 103 to 105. Many of the signals are not quoted in full and are, therefore, liable to mislead.[7]

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[1] This matter is included in Admiralty Narrative, *see* pp. 73, 74.

[2] The Admiralty and *Southampton* signals both gave the same course for the enemy, *see* Appendix F., signals Nos. 19 and 29.

[3] It will be observed that this objection is based upon Lord Jellicoe's inferences as to what the various signals and other indications of the German fleet's passage across his stern, conveyed to him at the time.

Their Lordships arrived at somewhat different conclusions, based upon these indications, and inferences drawn from them, but as these were only inferences and not facts, they were not included in the Narrative, in which only the bare facts remain.

[4] Note 1 does not include all the evidence available.

It is not possible to include every piece of evidence in a note, since that would entirely overload the Narrative. Hence the reason that the word "several" was used. There are also reports from the *Neptune* and the *Bellerophon* for example.

[5] *See* p. 73, note 1, and p. 74, para. 2.

[6] This is another instance in which an inference drawn by Lord Jellicoe is omitted from the Narrative, because it is an inference and not a plain statement of fact. *See also* note 3, above.

[7] In view of notes 1 and 2 to page 103, to which attention is particularly called, it is not considered that these *précis* are misleading.

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